The government s dossier presented evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. How can you be sure that it actually intends to use them?
We would only find that out the day afterwards and I think the evidence of September 11th demonstrates that we can t afford to wait. It changed the way we need to view the world. We need to be much more concerned than we were about threats, wherever they may originate, and the reason why we remain desperately concerned about Iraq is, of course, because they used weapons of mass destruction before. They have continued to develop chemical and biological weapons and have sought to acquire a nuclear weapon, in the face of international criticism and despite sanctions. This is something that we regard as being central to the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Can you clarify the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda?
There is some evidence, clearly, of Iraq s support for terrorist organisations and of some links to al-Qaeda. But nobody is suggesting that Iraq was behind September 11th, as far as we are aware. There is nothing to indicate that Iraq supported or sustained al-Qaeda s ability to carry out those appalling attacks. What I see as being the concern of the international community after September 11th is to look at those threats wherever they arise and say, we have to deal with them . If we don t deal with them, we can t say to the people of the United Kingdom, look, we had that information but we did not take action.
IsIraq not a distraction from the war on terrorism ? As the bombing in Bali showed, al-Qaeda is not finished off yet.
But these are not separate events. These are not discrete packages about which you can say, right, this week we re doing al-Qaeda and next week we ll go on to something else . If there is a threat to our security we judge there is from Iraq and from al-Qaeda we have to deal with them, even if those threats are simultaneous. Whatever pressure is necessary we have to bring to bear.
In terms of Iraq, is the objective regime change or disarmament? Is the former not a logical consequence of the latter?
We have made quite clear that our objective is to remove the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein. We regard his possession of weapons of mass destruction as being absolutely central to his regime and therefore disarmament would change that regime, a point that Colin Powell has made. It is about changing the nature of the regime, critically about removing the threat from weapons of mass destruction.
If we took military action and Saddam was still in power at the end of it, would that be a failure?
If we took military action and that had the effect of eliminating his ability to develop and use weapons of mass destruction, that would be a success. My view is that, given his commitment to developing such weapons, he is never going to allow that change to take place.
Do you think pre-emptive action against another country can be legally and morally justified?
It has always been recognised in international law that countries are entitled to take action to defend themselves or if they perceive a threat, either to themselves or to their allies. There is nothing new about that. Pre-emption is perhaps a new-ish word to describe it but the issue is the imminence of threat.
Why are we considering action against Iraq now, when the weapons inspectors were thrown out in 1998?
There has been a debate about Iraq for some time. It has not suddenly burst onto the scene. I believe the primary reason, undoubtedly, is that September 11th changed our focus; we need to see the world through the prism of what happened. That means recognising the threats which are capable of damaging our society or that of our allies. Our view is that Saddam is unique in the sense that he has this track record, he has continued to develop weapons of mass destruction and, frankly, we don t know, because of the expulsion of the weapons inspectors, what has happened there since 1998.
Do you think US unilateralism in other areas for instance, over Kyoto is having a knock-on effect?
I don t. I think if you judge the US by its actions in this area going to the UN, participating in negotiations you could not have expected any more of them.
If Saddam allows the inspectors back in, with unfettered access, will you and the US be happy to return to a policy of containment?
Clearly, that depends on them not only having unfettered access but having the ability to deal with whatever they find. They must be able to report confidently to the UN that Saddam s ability to develop weapons of mass destruction is at an end. It is an enormous task that they would undertake.
Is there a risk that military action in Iraq could set off a chain of events across the Middle East that we cannot control?
It is important that we explain, and go on explaining, why Iraq is unique and why, because of its history and record, it is a threat, not only to its own people, but also to its neighbours and the wider world. In explaining that, we must make it clear that this is not about wider issues that Saddam might seek to exploit. It is only in very recent times that Saddam has ever talked about Palestine. He is not noted for his long-term support for the Palestinian cause.
The Prime Minister has emphasised the importance of restarting the Middle East peace talks. President Bush doesn t seem so keen.
I wouldn t say that for a moment. The Americans are committed to the peace process, they want to see it as a success, as we do. Clearly, there is one essential precondition: there should be peace before you can have a peace process. It is important that both sides recognise that it will be impossible for the other side to sit down with them while there is still conflict.
If there is regime change in Iraq, how long do you envisage British troops will be in Iraq afterwards?
You are building hypothesis on top of hypothesis. It is important that we stabilise the situation in Iraq if Saddam were to be removed. That would depend on the circumstances and on how quickly a successor government could be formed. It is a process that is under way in Afghanistan and, generally speaking, going very well. There are enormous numbers of talented, intelligent, well-educated Iraqis who, I m sure, would relish the prospects of rebuilding their country along democratic lines, rather than along the model that Saddam has pursued.
Some people allege we have stayed in Afghanistan and engaged in nation building but the Americans have not.
I don t accept that. The Americans have far more troops in Afghanistan than we do; they commit far more money; they are committed, for example, to the training of an Afghan national army. All of which is about the process of ensuring that they win the peace as well as having been very successful militarily. There is no doubt that the Americans recognise the importance of ensuring that Afghanistan develops along modern, democratic lines and they have put enormous effort into achieving that.
People say that if Iraq did not have huge oil reserves, nobody would be interested.
I have had this argument put to me at Labour Party meetings. I will not allow, neither will the Prime Minister, nor, I believe would President Bush allow, a single military life to be risked for the sake of what would be a financial justification. We are talking here about risking the lives of people in defence of our own freedom and liberty. That is not the same as risking lives in some sort of economic fortune hunting. I will not take that decision, and I m confident neither will the Prime Minister, where the issue is supposed to be oil. The issue is the threat to our safety and security and to that of our allies.
The Guardian has dubbed you the greatest hawk in Tony Blair s team. Is that a fair assessment?
I don t believe it is, because I think all members of the cabinet recognise the threat from Saddam, the need to deal with that threat and accept the process that we have currently gone through. I am no different from anyone else in that sense. We ve gone to the UN, we re helping to negotiate a text there and we all recognise that if that process does not succeed then, as a last resort, we would have to use force. But that is very much a last resort.
Does it not concern you that some of our allies in Europe do not seem to support our position on Iraq?
I just don t accept that argument. When I talk to my counterparts in a number of other European countries, they are in precisely the same position that we are in today. They recognise that it might be necessary to use force ultimately if the UN process for getting weapons inspectors back in stalls or fails. They would want to see a UN resolution supporting the use of force but, apart from Germany, for particular reasons, no other country, so far as I am aware, has ruled out the use of force. I don t see that we are in a different position from our allies.
Do you think the commitment not to use force by Gerhard Schroeder was unwise?
I think each country has its own particular approach to these issues. Everyone understands why the emphasis in Germany is rather different, given its relatively recent history, and everyone understands why, in the context of a closely fought election campaign, that particular position was taken.
Do you think the threat of military action contributes to the unease that party members feel at the moment?
No I don t. I accept that there is a real debate in the Labour Party about the prospect of military action in Iraq. I think once the arguments are explained, the issues are much less difficult than it might seem at first sight. I have received nothing but praise for the role of British forces in, say, Sierra Leone and, for that matter, in Afghanistan and Kosovo. I don t think I have heard much criticism of our role in Kosovo to ensure that the Albanians were not slaughtered; in Sierra Leone to support a democratically elected government, the UN and the peace process; and in Afghanistan to deal with a terrorist organisation and an intolerant, fanatical government. I have not come across criticism of our roles in each of those areas, other than from those who perhaps oppose force in any circumstances. That s not a view that I take or the Labour government takes. I respect that view but it is not one that colours the way we behave. Kofi Annan has said that you can do a great deal with diplomacy but you can do even more with diplomacy backed by the threat of force.
Do you think there is an inherent tension being the defence secretary in a Labour government?
I don t, because I see, having been a foreign office minister before, and as I have said by quoting Kofi Annan, that the use of force, or the threat of it, is simply the other side of the coin of diplomacy. If you are serious about a particular position internationally, ultimately in the modern world you have to be prepared to see that through as a last resort. Unless we are prepared to see it through, you will not get the effects in the world that we want to see. We are not always dealing with democratically elected, decent people, who will respond to an invitation to behave properly. Unless we are prepared to threaten and use force against the likes of Milosovic and Saddam, they will not take our position seriously.