In late 2005 or early 2006, the British electorate will vote in a referendum to adopt the European constitution. But it will happen only under the following conditions. First, that Tony Blair calls the general election when I believe he will, in April next year, for 5 May 2005. Second, that he wins by a substantial majority – at least by 40 seats in the House over all other parties. He would lose over a hundred seats, but would still have a majority Wilson and Callaghan would have given their left arm for.
Third, that before going to the country to endorse the European constitution, the government will have ‘renegotiated the terms’ to include a provision that limits Brussels’ powers to what is provided in the proposed constitution, limiting the likelihood of creeping further erosion of British sovereignty. Fourth, getting the ‘redlined’ limits agreed; and fifth and finally, being towards the end of a series of referendums in other EU states, most won by sizeable majorities.
There is much confusion over the conduct of referendums in this country, and little experience of nationwide referendums, with only the EEC referendum in 1975 to guide us. In that referendum, there was a massive twenty-point swing in public support for a ‘Yes’ vote in the six months leading up to referendum day. In January 1975, a Gallup poll showed only 47 percent for Britain staying a member of the EEC. In June, the British public voted 67 percent ‘Yes’ and 33 percent ‘No’.
What caused the shift? The government renegotiated the terms of membership, and they (and the Tories and Liberals as well) strongly supported Britain staying in, as did the CBI and TUC, and all the national newspapers except Tribune.
This time is different, and by no means will such near unanimous support be mobilised to argue the case for a‘Yes’ vote.
My belief is that the government will win it, but by a far narrower margin – of the order of 53 percent to 47 percent.
During the last general election, the then leader of the Opposition tried to frighten the electorate with warnings that any referendum on the euro would be ‘rigged’ as to timing and question wording. I consistently and continually hear from politicians: ‘What matters is how you ask the question (and so forth) in a referendum’.
They are wrong. Polls are ongoing – here today, gone tomorrow. They are not binding. When an interviewer on behalf of a polling organisation asks your opinions, your attitudes or your values, your behaviour or your knowledge, it is not binding. You do not feel an obligation to think carefully and thoroughly about what it is that is being asked. It is relatively unimportant; it is not necessarily something you have thought about, you are just courteous enough to answer the questions.
The media will not have covered the question matter in advance, for the most part, and the wording is vital.
Referendums, on the other hand, are considered. At the end of a three- or four-week campaign people know what is at issue, and the people who cast their vote have thought about it. It is not sprung on them, nor is it a surprise that elicits an instant response. It is on a certain day; you know when it is. It is morally binding because the electorate has been asked by their elected government to help them decide on an issue, normally of sovereignty.
A referendum is by definition nationally important and because of that, it is the subject of media focus, and frankly the wording is very unimportant. Because of the wording of the Italian constitution, when they had a referendum on abortion in 1981, you had to vote ‘No’ to say ‘Yes’. And so that was the slogan of the people who were for changing the constitution, because you had to vote no to say yes, and everybody knew exactly what was at issue and how they were voting. That is not so in an opinion poll.
To help us look into the future of the European constitution referendum, we can look back to two very different models to guide us into an understanding of the psychology of two very different electorates. First, remember TULV? Trade Unions for a Labour Victory. Headed by Larry Whitty, then a trade unionist, later the Labour party general secretary, now a government minister – Lord Whitty.
Larry organised the series of trade union ballots giving members’ approval for their trade union to donate funds to the political party of their choice – overwhelmingly, of course, the Labour party. He did this carefully, starting the balloting with those unions that private polling indicated would be most likely to return a high favourable vote.
Domino-like, the unions followed one by one, and as the ‘Yes’ votes mounted up it became easier and easier to win the ballots.
This lesson won’t be forgotten even now, and it is almost certain that the counter lesson of Maastrict won’t be forgotten either, when marginal nations voted early, and in some cases were narrowly won, and in Denmark, lost first time round. If advised by Lord Whitty, they would have started with Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and the other ‘get’ countries and, after four or five, it would have been much easier to have the ‘give’ countries such as Denmark vote to go along with the majority.
The other is the ratification in 1787 of the American constitution known as the ‘Miracle of Philadelphia’. The drafting of the constitution of the United States gave much more power to the central government but reserved the rights not granted in the constitution to the individual states – subsidiarity.
How was it sold? By a few, well-organised, dedicated men – Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. Their Federalist Papers – polemics of a high standard, yet closely reasoned – were fiercely argued and widely discussed over some years, topic by topic, by the electors.
They were admittedly a tiny proportion of the public and many were unlettered and uneducated by modern standards, lacking the facilities of modern communication, transportation and infrastructure, and without political parties (perhaps a blessing), or pressure groups, except as they evolved during the debates.
Majority voting wasn’t on the agenda: it was all or nothing. Every one of the thirteen states had to cede sovereignty and power to the centre and give up perquisites of office. Virginia and Maryland had to surrender land for the Federal capital.
Without the careful political manipulation of the Federalist Papers, and without a figurehead of stature on whom all could agree – a military hero, a rich patrician plantation owner: George Washington – it would not have happened.
All thirteen colonies had to endorse it, and it was an uphill battle. Little New Hampshire’s farmers not only were against it, they weren’t even sure they wanted to be a state in the union. Yet as they voted, one by one the states fell into line, and with a wonderfully orchestrated campaign, and a renegotiated constitution guaranteeing the first ten amendments, even New Hampshire’s farmers decided they didn’t want to be left out, and all thirteen ratified the US constitution.
And that’s why I believe that this time the British will in due course, and after the renegotiation, vote along with all the other EU countries to endorse the European constitution. And that, within six months of winning the European constitution referendum, Tony Blair will hand over the leadership of the Labour party, and Gordon Brown will take over and become prime minister.