Tony Blair’s description of the results of the 2007 elections as ‘a perfectly good springboard to win in the general election’ will encapsulate for many voters what they dislike about him and the modern Labour party: an attempt to paint a clear defeat as a partial victory. In a sense, that would be unfair: it is perfectly true that Labour’s prospects for the next general election are, on the evidence of 2007, far from hopeless. But a defeat it was, and to find anything in the results that would give positive uplift is hard indeed.

Labour was comprehensively beaten in the local elections in England, gaining just 27 per cent of the BBC’s ‘estimated national equivalent vote share’. This is the party’s third successive humiliation in a non-general-election year, following 26 per cent shares in both 2004 and 2006. In Scotland and Wales its results were worse, beaten by the SNP in votes and seats at Holyrood, and falling below a third of the vote in the Welsh assembly. Quite apart from the elections being a mark on the scorecard, there is an inevitable effect on grassroots morale, which will be mirrored by the elation of Labour’s opponents. The winners and losers at the local election level are the same people who form the core of the constituency campaigning team for the general election, and each new defeat sets up fresh obstacles to be overcome.

Furthermore, if – as seems possible – a new clampdown on campaign spending throws the onus in the marginals back on to the availability and enthusiasm of local manpower at the next general election, the impact of May’s defeat could be magnified. Labour’s failure to contest an estimated 40 per cent of English council seats this year suggests local weakness is already a problem.

In more practical terms, Labour holds 500-fewer council seats and controls eight-fewer councils than it did before May 3, and has lost its share of power in the Scottish devolved administration and will be severely hamstrung in Wales. These are effects, unlike the share of the vote, that go beyond the symbolic. More opposition-controlled councils may well mean more confrontation between local authorities and government, with Westminster inevitably taking the blame in the eyes of many voters, however unjustly.

The same could be true on a grander scale with an SNP administration at Holyrood, which might see tension between Edinburgh and London as liable to build support for separation. Just as damaging, perhaps, may be the effect on nervous Labour MPs who see their seats threatened. Will they become desperate enough to defy the whips for local gain, whatever the impact on the national picture?

The Tories reached the psychologically important 40 per cent for only the second time since 1982, and their lead of 13 points over Labour in the national projection almost equals the 14 per cent Labour achieved the year before the 1997 landslide. The academic psephologists differ in their interpretations of the scale of the Conservative victory – John Curtice reads the result as being equivalent to a majority of 20 seats, Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher put the figure at 54 – but they agree in translating it as an outcome that would put the Tories in power.

But how real is the Conservative progress? It would be misleading to assume local election results show ‘what would have happened’. Differential turnout has a much more powerful effect at local elections, so that a Conservative lead is worth less in general election votes than an equivalent Labour one. Nor should it be forgotten that the Tories’ impressive net gains (around 900 councillors and 39 councils) were mostly in seats last fought in 2003 – the comparison is with the final year of the Iain Duncan Smith leadership.

More worrying for the Conservatives and heartening for Labour, though, is the geographical pattern of the Conservatives’ advance. They have two almost entirely separate tasks if they are to take the most straightforward route to winning the next general election. First, they must capture enough marginal seats from Labour to deprive the government of its majority, and go some way towards building one of their own. This is a battle which will be fought in the ‘middle England’ centre ground of the classic floating voters. Second, they must regain some of the seats they have lost to the Liberal Democrats, most of which are in their traditional heartland areas and where the voters who have defected are often ‘natural’ Tories. While their gains in 2007 suggest progress towards the second of these objectives, the first is still apparently more elusive.

Crucially, the Tories are still failing to make inroads in the urban and suburban north, which contains a clutch of key target seats. They had a handful of dramatic victories, such as in Blackpool, but in the local authorities covering most of their northern target seats they stood still (Bolton, Lancaster, and Sefton), or even saw Labour making net gains (Leeds, Bradford, Calderdale and Kirklees, which collectively include 10 marginal seats the Tories must win).

Another relevant factor is the poor performance of the Liberal Democrats, their second successive failure to capitalise on Labour’s unpopularity. Although their vote share held up at 26 per cent, they made a net loss of almost 250 seats; they also lost a seat at Holyrood and stood still at Cardiff Bay. Many of their losses were in the areas where the Conservatives hope to regain Westminster seats, which in certain circumstances may mean the difference between a Labour minority government sustained by the Lib Dems, and Cameron gaining the keys to Downing Street.

Potentially as dangerous, though, may be the effect in constituencies where the Liberal Democrats have no hope of winning. In 2005, Labour certainly suffered to some extent from ‘tactical unwind’ – where Liberal Democrats, whose tactical votes had previously helped Labour MPs win marginal seats, returned to their own party rather than vote to support Blair’s government. But where would they go if the Liberal Democrats lost credibility with them as well? Might they go the whole hog and switch to the Tories?

In other words, once Labour’s votes fall beyond a certain threshold they may be at the mercy of swings between their opponents. Indeed, this is what has already happened at the Scottish parliament elections: Labour’s share of the regional vote in 2007 was within a tenth of a percentage point of their 2003 performance, but the SNP gained 10 points, mostly from the collapse in the independent and minor party vote, and it was this that made them the largest party at Holyrood.

Governments have survived ‘mid-term blues’ before. Labour won in 2005, the year after being reduced to a 26 per cent local election share; and followed up a 30 per cent share in 2000 with a landslide in 2001. Viewed in this light, 27 per cent in 2007 looks less disastrous. But there is no doubt that for the last year or more the momentum has been with the Conservatives. Labour’s change of leadership may offer leverage to turn opinion around, and all is not yet lost. But 2007 was no springboard. Labour begins its dive towards the next election with its feet planted firmly on the floor of the swimming pool, and its head only just above water.