A year ago, the argument for the democratic transformation of the broader Middle East and South Asia looked distinctly shaky. The situation in Iraq had never been worse; Lebanon had been thrown back into crisis; the Taliban was resurgent in Afghanistan. It was difficult to argue that democracy was the solution to terror, given the election victories of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in Iran and Hamas in Palestine. By contrast, the dictatorial alternatives seemed a much better bet. In Pakistan, President Musharraf was holding an unruly public in check, while in Algeria the military dictatorship was finally getting a grip on a long-running Islamist insurgency.
Now this analysis looks a lot less safe. In part, this is due to the successes of the Iraq ‘surge’: victory for the Iraqi democratic forces there now seems much more possible than before. Perhaps more importantly, the ‘pro-Western’ dictatorships across the region are now under mounting strain. Algeria has experienced a revival of the terrorism which haunted it throughout the 1990s, while Pakistan is seemingly in the grips of an Islamist revolution and popular insurgency combined. And Pakistan, through the ‘tribal areas’, is infecting Afghanistan, while the Taliban continue to provide hope and a rallying cry for Islamist extremists the world over. So in many ways we are back at the point when the concept of ‘democratic geopolitics’ was first coined to break with the disastrous traditional western policy of supporting dictatorships that spawn radical movements.
The broader Middle East and south Asia are regions of crucial importance to Britain and the rest of the EU. Both form a large residual basin akin to a ‘Grand Area’– an outer perimeter of defence on which the security of the European Neighbourhood and ultimately, the EU, depends. The security of the Union depends on the security of the Neighbourhood and the security of the Neighbourhood in turn is determined by the situation in the Grand Area. Working alongside the US, the EU must become more strategically involved in what is emerging as the geopolitical shatter-belt of the 21st century.
In this Grand Area, the EU-led by Britain – should throw its weight behind an assertive grand strategy to promote constitutional government and order throughout the region. Britain and the rest of the EU should promote democracy in Pakistan and across south Asia and the broader Middle East, not just as a good in itself but as a vital national and European interest. Finally, a grand strategy underpinned by democratic geopolitics would seek to prevent reckless or self-interested meddling on the part of foreign powers in the Grand Area. Chinese support for Sudan and Russian interference over Iranian nuclear ambitions have been decidedly unhelpful, encouraging disruptive behaviour by both regimes.
This strategy goes above and beyond the giving of mere economic aid; it will also require European security guarantees to fledgling democratic governments and, from time to time, calibrated military intervention. This means that European armed forces and command structures must be suitable for the task. There must also be both the logistical capacity and the political willingness to deploy them in cooperation with the United States on projects of vital common concern. For example, if Islamist extremists ever take control of Pakistan, through a coup or by the ballot box, the country’s nuclear arsenal would need to be rapidly disarmed. It would be unthinkable to see atomic weapons in the hands of the jihadis who trained the 2005 tube bombers. While this approach may lead to a more interventionist and complex foreign policy, in the long run it will be worth it. Constitutional democracies are much less likely to export terror and instability than repressive regimes. They make for more responsible and conducive allies, as well as better partners for economic exchange, scientific innovation and environmental protection.
Besides, political participation makes populations not only stakeholders in the new order, but also sharpens their sense of political responsibility. Thus it is often said that Palestinians have been ‘punished’ for voting for Hamas. Yet that is a well-established pattern in European and American diplomacy. After all, Austria was ‘punished’ for voting for the far-right Jorg Haider: why should Palestinians not pay the price for supporting an organisation prone to intolerance and dedicated to the destruction of Israel? They were not like the North Koreans or the Iraqis under Saddam Hussein. They had a choice and they chose extremism. Europeans and Americans must show that aid will be provided for those willing to identify and choose leaders conducive to democratic values, whereas those unwilling to act responsibly must remain isolated.