There is an instinctive dilemma for progressives when it comes to approaching Iran. Even for liberal interventionists who supported the decision on Iraq, the idea of launching another war in the Middle East over WMD seems unwise to say the least. But this cautious mood is strained by the sense that we should not be equivocal towards one of the worst human rights abusers on the planet.
Iran leads the world in the execution of children and it is a crime punishable by death to be gay, to break ‘chastity’ or to commit adultery. For those that don’t face death, 100 lashes is a common punishment for a first ‘offence’. The judiciary in Iran is one of the most repressive in the world, cracking down on such moral irregularities as women wearing makeup, bright clothes, listening to western music or going on dates with men.
We need to consider very carefully how best we can help those advocating reform in Iran without damaging their cause or internal credibility. Recent developments in the nuclear file give the international community the space to negotiate with Iran’s government. But the ongoing crackdown on dissidents reminds us that the rights of ordinary Iranians must not be forgotten if a diplomatic agreement is achieved.
There are two problems when it comes to the Iran issue – one is the existence of far too much ‘megaphone diplomacy’ on both sides. While the Iranians talk of removing Israel from the map, and defeating the Great Satan (the US), the US keeps the option of military action firmly on the table, while explicitly calling Iran one of the great threats to international security, and one of the last members of the axis of evil. A period of quieter engagement, with far less hyperbole from governments and in the media, would be welcome.
The second sticking point is the impasse over uranium enrichment. The international community, under pressure from the US, has insisted that Iran should suspend all uranium enrichment before negotiations begin. While this move would increase confidence, Iran is right to point out that this has no legal basis as far as the Non-Proliferation Treaty is concerned. This red line prevents any serious negotiation from happening.
A more appropriate red line, as ICG president and former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans suggests, would be the one that is central in the NPT – the distinction between civilian and military capability. If the international community has the confidence that Iran’s enrichment was purely for peaceful purposes, it wouldn’t matter how much nuclear fuel Iran produces. ‘That line will hold if we can get Iran to accept a highly intrusive monitoring, verification and inspection regime that goes well beyond basic Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards, which already apply, and includes both the optional additional inspection measures available under that treaty as well as tough further measures,’ says Evans.
As many members of the US Congress have urged, the US and Iran need to engage in diplomatic discussions for any of this to be achieved. While the E-3 have engaged in useful negotiations, the Iranians realise that the real powerbroker is not currently at the table. The US needs to engage in a ‘diplomatic surge’ to get any real movement from Iran. As Iran is years away from a nuclear weapon, there is time for vigorous diplomacy.
On 14 March, Iranians went to the polls to elect the 290 member Majlis (parliament) which provided an interesting preview to the 2009 presidential elections. The 2004 elections, although marred by corruption and candidate exclusions, were used as a launchpad for conservatives to win the 2005 election when they eventually united behind Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The reformists have set their sights on the upcoming Majlis elections, having captured a number of council seats in 2007. However, it was the conservative factions who prospered, though not all of them are supporters of Ahmadinejad.
While the reformists were hoping to do well in the elections, two factors hampered their progress. The first was the disqualification by the Guardian Council of many prospective candidates. The Council banned hundreds of reformists from standing, leading one moderate group linked to former President Rafsanjani to boycott the elections. Furthermore, the Council didn’t announce the names of those who were allowed to stand until 5 March, which with holidays gave reformists only six days to campaign before the elections on 14 March. All the conservatives knew that they would be allowed to stand and therefore had ample time to campaign.
The second obstacle was internal divisions among reformists. The conservatives have learnt from the mistakes of the 2006 municipal elections with the various religious, revolutionary and pro-Ahmadinejad factions uniting under the umbrella of the so-called ‘6 plus 5 committees’. The reformists failed to agree on a united list, despite attempts to run a joint list with supporters of former President Khatami and Ali Akbar Nouri, as well as some moderate conservatives such as former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani.
President Ahmadinejad remains popular among his base of the rural poor and traditionalists thanks to his distribution of oil revenues to his supporters. But given the current economic chaos, with double digit unemployment and inflation, his unpopularity among the urban middle classes could spread to other constituencies. Much of Ahmadinejad’s future will rest on the results of these elections, but if Ahmadinejad is seen as a liability come 2009, the conservative clerics may choose to support another candidate to ensure the reformists are kept from power.
Although the conservatives won the parliamentary elections decisively, it is not necessarily good news for Ahmadinejad. As Ami-Ali Amiri, one of the winning MPs said: ‘The results of the elections should not be interpreted as a victory for Ahmadinejad’s government because the majority of the new parliament deputies will be critical towards the government,’. As we went to print, conservative critics of Ahmadinejad who are close to the Tehran Mayor Mohammad Qalibaf had won just over half of the 220 seats declared. A rival faction in the parliament may prove to be a thorn in the President’s side in the runup to the presidential elections.
Given Britain and America’s history with Iran, it is important that neither country is seen as interfering in Iran’s affairs unnecessarily. However, that is not to say that fellow progressives shouldn’t support those campaigning for long-term change in the country.
Much faith has been placed on NGOs and civil society groups as a potential vanguard for a democratic opening in Iran. An increasing number of NGOs in Iran have campaigned successfully for change to the laws on a range of issues such as the environment and abortion. However, their role is seen as less overtly ‘political’ than those who are advocating greater democratic rights for women and minorities. While civil society networks and religious charities have a long history in Iran, more western-style NGOs are a relatively recent addition to the social sphere. As such there is a need for greater funding, cooperation (both internally and internationally) and capacity building for these groups to meet their potential.
The US state department’s highly publicised announcement of a $75m ‘pro-democracy fund’ was a botched move that seems to have backfired. Most human rights activists such as Shirin Ebadi and Akbar Ganji have called for the end of the programme, as have most NGOs operating in Iran. The fund, whose recipients are kept secret, seems to have had the reverse to its intended effect. It has reduced the space for pro-democracy groups to operate by giving the regime pretext to crack down on groups under the paranoid cover of outsiders funding a velvet revolution.
As the National American Iranian Council has rightly argued, there are far better ways to support the indigenous capacity of Iran’s civil society. The funding should be reprogrammed towards cultural exchanges to increase people to people contact; US sanctions on NGO activities should be lifted (US citizens cannot donate more than $100 to Iranian NGOs) and more could be done to support and invigorate broadcasters such as BBC Persian and Voice of America Persian.
The challenges for engaging with both the Iranian government on the nuclear issues, and with the people of Iran, are immense, but not insurmountable. The contradiction between these two approaches can be resolved. As long as we are clear that as progressives we don’t seek regime change in Tehran, but a change in the behaviour of the regime – as the citizens demand it – then perhaps this particular circle can be squared.