Westminster pundits generally agree that David Cameron has so far failed to ‘seal the deal’ with the British electorate. The reason for this is pretty clear: Cameron has used his three-and-a-half years as Tory leader to send messages about a change in Tory tone, to try and ‘detoxify the Tory brand’ and to float lightly about the political landscape trying to take advantage of particular government embarrassments or failures. He has sometimes done these things very skilfully. But throughout, there has been little substance or sense of certainty about the future.
The contrast with Labour in opposition in the 1980s is instructive. Through many difficult contests (the rosy view that Labour was not divided then is quite wrong) Neil Kinnock’s leadership addressed Labour’s problems of policy, organisation and communication.Organisation and communication provided some of the best theatre. Adoption of the red rose and the contest with Militant provided plenty of headlines.
But the meat was in the arguments about policy – withdrawal from the EU, sales of council houses, renationalisation of utilities, industrial relations law, unilateral nuclear disarmament and a range of other questions. These were bruising disputes about genuinely held differences of opinion, but they had to happen because Labour had to show that it was equipped to govern in tune with the feelings of the nation. In the end, the party did not go far enough, particularly on tax and spending, so that the famous 1992 ‘shadow budget’ illustrated the limitations of our changes and left us open to attacks on our credibility. These doubts were enough to lead to defeat and five more crippling Tory years.
Cameron has engaged on none of the big Tory policy problems, either with his own party or with the country as a whole. He believes that he can get to, and then win, a general election without addressing those issues. He hopes that the mood for change – any change – will be so strong that people (the media in particular) will be uninterested in Conservative policies. His dream is to be elected with a ‘doctor’s mandate’, giving him policy freedom after a general election without the need to commit beforehand.
In this hope he takes false strength from the example of Tony Blair, who he believes went to the 1997 general election ‘policy-lite’ and surfed the wave of public opinion desperate for an end to the Tory government without wanting to make difficult commitments.
There are two errors in this thinking. The first is that Labour, under Kinnock’s leadership, had already done most of the heavy policy lifting, so that Blair didn’t need to. This is in contrast to Cameron‘s predecessors – William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard – who didn’t do any. Indeed, in many ways they went in the opposite direction and dug the Tories deeper into their reactionary and nationalistic bunker. They left the hard work to Cameron, but it’s been too difficult for him.
The Tory leader’s second mistake is equally important. Blair did construct a policy alternative to the Conservatives and in some detail. The clearest expression of this was the ‘five pledges’ card. These were deceptively simple. In fact, they were more than symbolic and they were difficult to achieve. They charted a clear direction for New Labour.
I believe that the reason Cameron’s poll ratings contrast so poorly with Blair’s in 1996 is that Cameron still has to make the substantial decisions on policy direction which would enable him to convince the public that he’s the right man to lead the country. And, of course, that failure gives Labour its chance and shows the strategy which we have to follow.
In three key areas Labour has to be clear about its approach and to press the Conservatives aggressively.
The first of these is the management of the economy and public spending. The world financial and economic crisis means that any British government has to set out the way in which it will restore the nation’s fiscal strength. Any government will have both to raise taxation and to reduce spending.
This debate will dominate politics for the next five years, as we discuss what taxes to raise and which spending to cut. Labour must force the Conservatives to set out their approach, and so reveal the deep Tory divisions about both tax and spending.
So far we have not been able to challenge effectively. A major reason for this is that our own budget on 22 April did not go far enough in showing how Labour would resolve these matters. The 50p top rate of tax and the commitment to £15bn of efficiency savings were not enough to set out our own approach clearly. We need to highlight our commitment to social justice and more efficient public services and so expose Tory prevarications.
Our second focus should be upon the Tory approach to the EU, and indeed international affairs in general. The split between the Tory party and the European Peoples’ party has been fairly well advertised, but the implications less so.
The British people have concerns about the economy, about crime, dealing with migration effectively, addressing climate change and energy security and building peace and security. All of these matters can only be addressed internationally, and in particular at the level of the EU. None of them can be solved by retreating behind the white cliffs of Dover, erecting ever higher barriers between ourselves and our neighbours and hoping that ill winds will just blow past us.
The fact is that the introverted, negative and reactionary nationalism offered by Cameron’s Conservative party would leave our citizens adrift as the international pressures we face become greater and greater. ‘Stop the world I want to get off’ is an aspiration which is simply no answer to the very real challenges of the modern world.
As with tax and spend, it is essential for Labour to set out clearly its approach to the best means of international cooperation, both inside and outside the EU, to address these challenges, and then to force the Conservatives to outline their approach. On the basis of their current policies this is frankly incredible and could only advertise their deep internal divisions.
Unfortunately, the state of our domestic politics has made it difficult to set out these alternatives during the European parliament election campaign, as would have been desirable. However, over a difficult autumn for the EU we can and should continue to press our stance energetically.
The third key policy area is the relationship between security and civil liberties. This is another major internal Tory rift, as David Davis has illustrated. In recent years, the Tory approach has been cynical and oppositionist. Whether on counter-terrorism or identity cards, on antisocial behaviour or the introduction of politics into policing, the Tory ‘civil libertarians’ have won their internal argument to the extent that the Tories cannot be trusted with government.
In this area senior Conservatives do understand their own contradictions as they aspire to government, but they just hope that they can avoid debate. Here, too, Labour has to continue with clear policy proposals and to engage the debate.
Cameron’s ability to ‘seal the deal’ and secure a Conservative election victory depends on Labour’s clarity in setting out our own policy agenda. On that basis we must force our opponents onto the battlefield. The people we represent rely upon our success.