Six months ago, parliament rejected military intervention in Syria. It simply made the situation worse, says James Bloodworth

The disinclination of the public to want Britain to intervene militarily in Syria has more to do with the ‘Ukipification’ of British politics than it does with any outbreak of flower power or anti-war sentiment.

We did not stay out of Syria because, as the Stop the War Coalition would have it, the public favours good over bad, socialism over imperialism, or peace over war. We stayed out because, as the American writer Conor Friedersdorf approvingly suggested in the Atlantic magazine (albeit in an American context), ‘Non-intervention would pose no threat to us.’

Or at least that is what many foolishly thought. The refugee crisis in Syria (three million have so far fled the country) has scotched the possibility of ‘keeping out’, and, however much some may wish it was otherwise, for any serious humanitarian (not to say socialist) there is an obligation to help those caught up in the Assad dictatorship’s war on the people of Syria.

There is no significant neoconservative movement in Britain, at least not in the sense that there is in the United States. Those advocating intervention in Syria in the dog days of last summer consisted of a handful of Blairites, a few Atlanticist conservatives and a small number of heterodox liberals and socialists. The further away from the political centre one gravitated the more strident opposition to intervention tended to become. Thus the United Kingdom Independence party’s line on Syria was at times indistinguishable from that of the left, the thrust being that we must stay out no matter what.

There were, of course, those on the left who opposed intervention for good reasons, not the least of which was a healthy fear of the religious extremists present in the ranks of the opposition. More generally, though, the anti-war sentiment which reached its apogee in late August was characterised by a mixture of selfishness, insincerity and cant, regardless of the abstractions and rationalisations evoked to justify the collective turning away from the plight of the Syrians.

Apart from the considered opposition of a certain portion of the liberal left, objections to western military intervention against Bashar al-Assad tended to rest on one of the following three premises.

First, anti-imperialism. This tended to manifest itself less as opposition to war than support for the other side – hence ‘anti-war’ activists managed to see no contradiction in appearing on Russian state television to denounce foreign intervention in Syria. At its worst this ‘anti-imperialism’ was represented by the Stop the War Coalition, which regularly invites fellow travellers of dictatorships to bellow anti-American rhetoric at the assorted cranks that turn up at their annual get-togethers. Irresponsible but significantly more principled are those who took a ‘third camp’ position of opposition to western intervention and condemnation of dictatorship. Overall, though, opposition of this sort was based on an unquestioning faith in fly-blown texts which have long passed their usefulness.

Second, isolationism. Many on both left and right seem at times to want to stop the world and get off, as do a majority of the public. The 9/11 wars have made people understandably recoil from new military adventures in the Middle East, and the global financial crisis has encouraged the solipsistic idea that we in the west have ‘our own problems’ to deal with which are comparable to people having heavy explosives dropped on their heads. In other words, we are all ‘Little Englanders’ now (or at least lots of us are).

Third, ‘ignorers’. ‘Ignorers’ are similar to isolationists but are less willing to say openly that they have no interest in the suffering of people in foreign countries. Usually unconsciously callous, ‘ignorers’ will tell you that they would rather focus on ‘domestic issues’ and ‘the things which really concern voters’ as a roundabout way of saying that the people of Syria can go and hang. Voters do not care about Syria, and therefore neither should I, or so the rationale goes. In contrast to isolationists ‘ignorers’ tend to be political weathercocks rather than signposts.

Considering that the three aforementioned categories make up a much bigger proportion of public opinion than those who supported (and still support) military intervention, it is perhaps unsurprising that Britain has spent the past three years observing the bloodshed in Syria with a cool equanimity. The mistake of the aforementioned ‘types’, however, has been to assume that non-intervention would be the end of it, and that a vote in the House of Commons would ultimately have any bearing on the matter. In so much as the August vote mattered it simply helped to make the situation significantly worse, as well as exacerbated the potential for violent fallout as extremists travel from Britain to Syria to fight jihad (extremists who, unless they are killed, will presumably want to return to Britain at some point).

There is no keeping out of Syria and had we grasped the point earlier on we might now be dealing with a strong or even triumphant Free Syrian Army rather than a murderous gangster state engaged in a war to the finish with an assortment of jihadist fanatics. One reason the situation in Syria has deteriorated to the extent that it has is because the governments of Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have had fewer scruples about backing those in Syria whose interests align with their own. Because the west has provided only tepid support to the relatively democratic FSA the latter now lags behind the Islamist Islamic Front in terms of recruits as well as the arms it has access to. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this was inevitable. As Michael Weiss, a columnist for the Middle Eastern NOW website, has put it, ‘A salafi super-militia would never have been necessary had … western officials fully backed the more moderate FSA when it was a going concern and not a laughingstock.’

Not only has 36 months of ‘diplomacy’ left more than 100,000 dead and over three million displaced, it has also failed any sort of ‘realpolitik’ test so beloved by the ‘ignorers’ and isolationists; for an outcome amenable to western interests looks significantly less likely today than it did three years ago. Syria is now a damage-limitation exercise, and the impact of western inertia will likely be felt beyond the borders of Syria. Assad crossed Barack Obama’s red line with complete impunity. Iran’s mullahs will presumably now assume that the crossing of such lines is inconsequential – even in the case of nuclear weapons.

One option the Americans have (not including the continued acquiescence in Assad’s genocide) is a wholesale strategy to supply and train well-vetted opposition militias and to back them with air support. Actions, in other words, that would hasten the end of Assad and his odious crime family.

What is clear is that Britain will play no further part in resolving the conflict in Syria. If opinion polls are anything to go by then Labour’s decision to use the Commons vote to squash military intervention was wildly popular, as is the meanness of the government’s policy towards Syrian refugees. The mistake would be to assume that the two developments are unrelated. After all, it is Nigel Farage who is in the ascendant and not the Peace Pledge Union.

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James Bloodworth is a contributing editor to Progress and editor of Left Foot Forward

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Photo: Erik Barfoed