At some stage in the early hours of Friday 24 June when all hope had vanished, when any positive Remain declarations were being greeted with an ironic cheer, one of the local Britain Stronger In Europe campaigners said to me in despair: ‘I don’t understand. We had all the facts on our side’. It still seems extraordinary that a campaign that had overwhelmingly won the economic argument against opponents who did not have the faintest clue about what would happen if we did leave the European Union, ultimately ended in failure. The full post mortem will doubtless take up volumes – but here are some initial thoughts on Labour’s role in the campaign.

In the weeks leading up to 23 June, I spent a lot of time on a large council estate in West London with other local members, trying to talk to as many Labour voters as we could. The majority told us they would vote Remain. But too many times the door was opened by someone who had little idea that the party had an opinion. There were many people we did not get to speak to or leave a leaflet with, so that just within the constituency where I live, there must have been thousands of Labour voters who would have gone into the polling booth without knowing Labour supported Remain.

Of course the psycho-drama at the top of the Tory party – a compelling mash-up of House of Cards and Game of Thrones – was always going to make for a better media story than set piece speeches from the opposition. Nevertheless it was worrying that only two days before the referendum, I was asked on the doorstep ‘Where’s Labour been? Why do you only ever see Tories on TV?’ This matters for two reasons. Firstly, there may have been hundreds of thousands of Labour voters throughout the country who were undecided about the referendum and who might have been persuaded to vote Remain if they had been clearer about Labour’s views. Secondly, it was in the traditional Labour heartlands of England and Wales, that the referendum was lost. Labour’s absence from the stage meant that the Remain message was only coming from the likes of David Cameron and George Osborne – the Oxford-educated representatives of globalised big business, who those voters had every reason to distrust.

It was these sorts of voices that provided the ‘facts’ supporting the Remain side. Logically, it seemed like the right approach to keep repeating the views of a staggeringly wide range of experts, who stressed that Brexit would be economically disastrous. But by the end of the campaign I had started wincing every time an ‘expert’ was quoted, because I could already hear the putative rejoinder: ‘But the experts got it wrong before’. And those seven words could instantly reduce months of work by some seriously knowledgeable people to the same level of plausibility as the opinion of a random punter in the pub. When facts seem so unreliable, then people will understandably rely more on gut instinct to make decisions. Yet Remain made little attempt to appeal to emotion. If the Labour leadership had made more of a passionate and positive case for the European Union then this might have been different.

The most emotional of subjects for Leave voters was immigration. Leave successfully portrayed support for Remain, not as a vote for the status quo, but as a choice to accept future waves of migrants which would make existing problems in public services and housing, much, much worse. How many voters genuinely believed that 76 million Turks were about to arrive on our shores is debatable, but the claim made it more believable that slightly lower (but still frighteningly large) numbers of people were on their way. Yet Remain had nothing to say about immigration. Collectively we shuffled our feet, looked guilty and tried to change the subject back to the economy. Neither of the main parties had the nerve to make the case that migration has made a significant economic, social and cultural contribution to the United Kingdom. The silence from the Tory Remainers was understandable. As believers in unfettered free markets, they had no reply to the legitimate fears of British people who have suffered from the downsides of migration. But Labour could – and should – have had those answers.

Overall, the Remain side underestimated the power of the Vote Leave slogan ‘Take back control’. We failed to understand its appeal at a more fundamental level, than just as a reference to political sovereignty. The citizens of post-industrial towns who voted Leave in such large numbers, were often people who knew that their entire livelihood could be taken away by the flourish of a director’s pen in a foreign boardroom. Many of them lived in areas which were dependent on EU money, but who felt that there was little dignity in such dependence. These are the people that Labour exists to stick up for, these are people on whose behalf Labour should have done more to challenge the Vote Leave untruth that Brexit would give them greater control over their lives, rather than less.

I had expected to be writing this article in the wake of a narrow Remain victory. However, the victory for Leave ironically means that the needs to persuade the British people of the merits of the European project must go on, for it we are to limit the damage which will be done to our country, we must be aiming to maintain as close a relationship with the EU as possible. This time Labour needs to go about the campaign in the right way.

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Christabel Cooper writes a regular column on the Progress website

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