Afghanistan, Somalia and Zimbabwe are often classified as ‘failed states‘. More surprisingly, Mexico and Pakistan, according to a recently reported Pentagon study, are both in danger of joining them on future ‘failed states’ lists. States which are failing or are at risk of failure are increasingly recognised for their national, regional and global impacts – and, if we believe the Pentagon, some are increasingly ‘close to home’.
But what does state failure mean? As these diverse examples show, state failure is shorthand for a wide spectrum of experiences of failure in social and political state structures and institutions. Breakdowns in governance, rule of law, and the ability to provide for and protect citizens often characterise these states. Those states at risk of becoming failed states or which exhibit some, but not all, of the features of state failure have also been labelled ‘fragile’ states.
Many western governments have recognised the challenges these fragile and failed states present. In an era of global financial crisis, for example, it is significant that the UK government has committed to maintaining its aid commitments, and around 60 per cent of DFID’s bilateral assistance (aid from the UK to another government) will be spent in fragile and conflict-affected countries. At the same time, in the context of a global tightening of belts, combined with near constant press coverage of the ‘symptoms of fragility’ – conflict, piracy, poverty – the spotlight will inevitably focus on the need to deliver some concrete results from this political (and financial) commitment.
Current evidence suggests that such progress will be a challenge. According to a 2008 report by the National Audit Office, “DFID rated around two thirds of its development expenditure in insecure countries as achieving all or most of its objectives, compared with around three quarters in secure countries. In the most insecure countries, around half of development expenditure achieved these ratings”.
It is important to recognise that it is much harder to work in these contexts than where there are basic levels of state provision and security. The challenge is identifying whether current shortcomings are the product of circumstance or of inappropriate or ineffective policy responses to these states.
A recent book by Seth D. Kaplan argues that development approaches towards failed and fragile states are themselves failing. Though well-intentioned, he argues that they lack an overall strategy and as a consequence have largely failed to ‘fix’ fragile states. For Kaplan, two key factors are often overlooked in development responses to state fragility.
First, development policies focus on support to formal state institutions but neglect to consider how these interact with informal institutions, including societal norms and political culture within a given country. Thus, billions have been spent supporting formal state institutions in Somalia to little discernable impact, while in Somaliland, with much less external aid, higher levels of state stability have been maintained in part because of the nature of its ‘informal society’ and the strength of some societal norms.
Second, Kaplan argues that social cohesion is often ignored or sidelined in development strategies. People, he argues, need to feel committed to the state entity and to invest in it (not just in financial terms) for it to be successful. Where a state is highly fragmented, with little that binds communities together, state fragility is much more likely.
These are challenging – and controversial – propositions. Donors have conventionally shied away from perceived ‘meddling’ in internal affairs of political culture and societal organisation and development paradigms in recent decades have sought to de-emphasis identity and social cohesion (largely because of its implied links with ethnicity).
Whatever your views on these issues, Kaplan seems to provide a useful exhortation to look ‘behind the curtain’ of formal state institutions and ‘the national picture’, to instead consider the role of local politics, processes and issues like identity in combating state failure. And arguably, it was lack of analysis of currents within informal society and realities ‘behind the façades’, which contributed to some of the existing security and development failings in Iraq and Afghanistan.
To date, the UK government has done an admirable job of maintaining its resolve to work with and support countries at risk of instability and fragility. A key challenge remains the need to be able to show some concrete achievements as a result of this support. Without this, and in the context of a sharp recession, there remains a real danger that the British electorate will turn against the UK’s global commitments to those less well off.
Leni Wild is writing in a personal capacity