I write this having just listened to the prime minister talk about Britain’s strategy for Afghanistan. There wasn’t a huge amount to disagree with in the content of the speech – he was right to talk about the need for increasing support for the Afghan National Army and police, and for other NATO members to play a full role in the mission there.
But the tone and vision of the speech seemed to be lacking a clear and coherent thread. It didn’t appear to provide a new direction for what General McChrystal said was needed – ‘a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort.’
The message seemed to be akin to ‘trust me, we’re doing the right things in Afghanistan’. The only acknowledgement of the need for change was a mention that the training of Afghan army troops needs to be speeded up to 4,000 a month, in order to meet the target of building Afghanistan’s armed forces to a level of 134,000.
Perhaps it is not surprising that this was a defensive speech at heart. Having come just after the resignation of the defence secretary’s PPS, Eric Joyce MP – one of the only members of the PLP with military experience – the prime minister had been put on the back foot by events.
But the slings and arrows of Westminster politics aside, we need to get back on to the front foot in terms of our military strategy and our overall plan for Afghanistan.
A little over two years ago, I was involved in running The Iraq Commission, a joint inquiry led by the Foreign Policy Centre and televised by Channel 4. The inquiry, which took evidence from a range of Iraqis, diplomats, NGOs, military experts and others was led by a cross party panel, chaired by Paddy Ashdown, Margaret Jay and Tom King.
Lasting just a few months, it produced a substantive and credible set of recommendations for the future of Britain’s involvement in Iraq. It provided a clear exit strategy and a route map for improving security and kick starting development in the war torn country. Almost all the recommendations were acted upon by the government.
At the time we finished the project, I asked the commissioners what they thought the FPC should focus on next. The response was almost unanimous – there needed to be an Afghanistan Commission. Although Paddy Ashdown nearly had the chance to be the NATO representative in Kabul, the Commission idea never got off the ground because of a lack of support.
It may seem two years too late for developing a new Afghanistan strategy. We will need to be realistic about what is achievable in such a situation. As the final Iraq Commission report said ‘there are no easy options left, only painful ones.’ The same could well be said of Afghanistan today.
That doesn’t mean we should simply continue down the same path if it is the wrong one.
We need a focussed, urgent and comprehensive review of our strategy in Afghanistan and a new vision for our long term presence in the country.
I wouldn’t want to prejudge people who have more expertise in military matters or the situation in the country, but I would suggest that the following principles could form the basis of a new direction:
• We must move from a situation where we are simply patrolling on the ground looking for Taliban fighters, to one where we move to ‘overwatch’ and focus on training the Afghan army and police.
• We have to engage with all actors in Afghanistan – including the Taliban, opposition politicians and the warlords, providing they renounce violence. We have to encourage low level fighters to take up other opportunities in the economy and in politics.
• We need a far more effective relationship with the Pakistani government, and ensure that the Afghans work hand in hand with their neighbours. The relationship between the countries has at best been uncoordinated; at worst it has been hostile.
• A comprehensive economic roadmap needs to be developed for Afghanistan to liberalise its economy and create opportunities for all. This needs to be combined with a bigger role for the United Nations – especially her development agencies, and for promoting political reconciliation following the disputed elections.
All this will be crucial to progress in Afghanistan. Of course, Afghans will have to take much of the responsibility on themselves to deliver this change – including President Karzai, assuming he is re-elected.
Real change in Iraq only really began to emerge when Prime Minister Maliki took a clear stand against the Shi’a militants, and reached out to Sunni fighters at the same time. It will require concerted political will not just from NATO members but from Afghans as well to improve the lot of this nation.