In the world of media management, Baroness Kinnock’s timing couldn’t have been less fortunate. To admit, just two hours after Gordon Brown had made a series of policy announcements on tackling the terrorist threat, that counter-terror funding in Pakistan and counter-narcotics work in Afghanistan was being cut was a gift to the opposition.

While the scale and significance in the impact of the exchange rates shouldn’t be overblown, it raises an interesting question about how we can most effectively deliver a counter-terrorism strategy at a time when resources are stretched.

The problem of terrorism is often seen by many on the left as being one purely of ideology and poverty. While it’s true that there is a clash of beliefs that needs to be fought, we also need to understand the enablers of terrorism – the networks of capital and information that allow jihadist structures to operate. Poverty is a moot point as well – the Bin Laden family was one of the richest construction magnates in the Arab world, and those involved in 7/7 were radicalised not because of poverty (they were were mainly middle class, educated university graduates) but partly because of a cultural isolation, driven from a disjunct between their generation and the previous one which was far more conservative. Ironically, the traditional communities pushed a younger more progressive generation into the arms of the radicals (for more on this, read Shiv Malik’s fascinating account of the lead-up to the attacks).

While much has been written about the process of radicalisation, and how terrorist groups begin, less research has been done into how terrorist groups end, and what implications this might have for tackling Al Qa’ida.

The independent research organisation RAND has produced an interesting analysis of the ways in which terrorist groups ceased to exist between 1968 and 2006. The evidence suggests that most groups are rarely defeated as the result of a military campaign – this only happened in 7% of cases according to their data. In fact, the research suggests that most groups ended because of operations carried out by the police or intelligence agencies – for religion-inspired terrorists this was true in 73% of cases (the good news is religious terrorists are never victorious).

This has an impact on our semantics of course. For many years, along with its counterparts in France, Australia and elsewhere the British government has not labelled our counter-terror strategies a ‘war on terror,’ with Hilary Benn notably criticising the phrase. The point is not only that terrorism cannot be defeated by a purely military strategy, but by labelling terrorists as ‘holy warriors’ rather than simple ‘criminals’ is to play into their misguided agenda. That is something that was notable in Gordon Brown’s response to the failed London attacks in 2007.

That is not to say military force is not one element of the strategy. The weaponry and manpower being deployed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and now Yemen are important tools. But our tactics need to be wide-ranging and flexible. Some of the greatest successes of military campaigns come when they make the most of local forces – look at the way in which tribal sheikhs were effectively brought in to support the Iraqi police and security forces to tackle Al Qa’ida in Iraq from 2007 onwards.

Similarly, the US agencies have had their greatest successes in Pakistan when conducting joint policing and intelligence work with their local counterparts. This is the stuff of James Bond-style operations – the dark and shadowy world of counter-terror work that we rarely hear about. In 2005 Pakistani intelligence officers dressed in burkas tackled Abu Farraj al-Libbi – Bin Laden’s number three – when he visited a graveyard in the north west frontier province one night in 2005. It is effective operations such as those to capture Abu Zubeida in 2001, which snared not just Al Qa’ida’s main operational head but 27 of his closest commanders. Partnership is key – the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who masterminded 9/11, was only possible thanks to the work of local intelligence, leading the head of the CIA to personally thank those involved and issue many Pakistani security officials with CIA medals. Effective and rapid intelligence sharing must be improved – we have to understand how it was that our co-operation with European and American agencies allowed someone on a terror watch list to travel from Nigeria to Amsterdam to Detroit.
Al Qa’ida may be an unprecedented terrorist network in terms of its global reach and organisational structure, which allows a degree of flexibility and autonomy in the establishment of cells. However, its modus operandi is not totally unprecedented. It still needs to raise money, communicate between members and plan attacks. It is particularly difficult to disrupt the networks that allow these actions given they are spread over a number of different countries, but they are still vulnerable to effective penetration by police and intelligence operations.

One element of the strategy that often goes under-reported is that of terrorist financing. The Henry Jackson Society recently noted that ‘one of the key drivers of the merger between Osama Bin Laden and his now-deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1998 was the fact that Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad had run out of money and Bin Laden still had plenty to spare. Whether its proceeds be from oil, opium, extortion, or old-fashioned state sponsorship, dealing with terror finance is central to winning the war on terror.’

This is a challenge not just for governments alone. Businesses in the financial sector, whether banks, bureaux de change or money transfer organisations need to take a lead in identifying and partnering with police and intelligence agencies to ensure they can identify their customers and ensure that the sources of terrorist funding are cut off.

The objective of any effective counter-terrorism strategy is to remove the safe havens that exist for terrorism. While US, UK and alliance forces have been increasing their presence on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the recent thwarted attack on Detroit raised the prospect of attending to the safe havens that exist within Yemen. Many column inches were printed on the subject of tackling Yemen’s ‘empty quarter’ along with other potential terrorist havens in Somalia and the borders shared between Mali, Niger, Algeria and Mauritania.

That will require greater cooperation, resources and effective working from our agencies. Counter-terrorism is an expensive and painstaking piece of work and it may be worth considering the effectiveness of the cooperation between the home office, foreign office and DFID on this issue, and the fact that much of the emphasis and resources of our foreign policy have shifted in recent years away from the FCO and DFID.

Of course, we shouldn’t forget the increases this government has put into the security services and our assistance for countries like Pakistan, but it’s important we redouble our efforts to fight on every front.

As Daniel Byman, a leading academic, put it ‘there is not single strategy that can successfully defeat the jihadists. All heads of the hydra of terrorism must be attacked.’

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