There is a well established narrative that New Labour lost the working classes progressively throughout 13 years of government. And in 2010 it lost even more skilled and unskilled C2, D and E working class voters. Given that these groups are Labour’s traditional ‘core’, it is clear that Labour has deserted it roots and that only a recalibration back in their favour can win them back. Sound plausible? The only problem is that this ‘betrayal’ analysis is highly flawed.

Demos Open Left commissioned YouGov to undertake a 45,000 respondent poll to begin to understand – in fundamental terms – what was underlying the election outcome. The poll has enabled us to compare the values and outlook of Labour loyalists – those that stuck with Labour from 2005 – and the voters Labour lost from 2005. When we looked at the issues that divide these two groups a very different picture to the ‘betrayal’ narrative emerges.

C2, D and E voters, whom Labour lost disproportionately in the election, seem to have a very different outlook in many key respects to what you may expect from Labour’s traditional ‘core’, should such a thing still exist. They are different to the extent that any ‘back to traditional base’ or ‘core vote’ strategy looks extremely suspect.

Take the Labour government’s defence of services against spending cuts – it seems that it was falling on deaf ears. When it came to the NHS, 33 per cent of loyal Labour voters thought that the priority was to ‘avoid cuts’. Of the voters that Labour lost, that proportion was only 13 per cent. And 55 per cent of the ‘lost’ vote thought that the priority was actually to ‘seek greater efficiency and end top-down control.’ 31 per cent of ‘loyal’ Labour voters thought the same. Government spending had reached or even breached acceptable limits for Labour’s lost voters.

This is echoed in the degree of scepticism towards the state amongst Labour’s ‘lost’ voters. 54 per cent of Labour ‘loyalists’ consider government to be ‘a force for good’ improving their lives and the lives of their family. Only 33 per cent of Labour deserters are of the same view. 27 per cent of the same group see government as ‘part of the problem not the solution.’ By a margin of only 6 per cent, Labour’s ‘lost’ voters see government as a force for good. This doesn’t seem to be a cacophonous cry for a return to ‘real’ Labour or tax and spend.

Labour’s renewal will need rather more imagination than that. The ‘safe house’ shelter from the coalition brutality strategy is appealing but misguided. Even if any ‘safe house’ would do, underlying scepticism would mean that the successes of such a strategy would be short-lived.

All of this suggests some of the context and themes of Labour’s next renewal. It does not determine its precise form. There is room for competing visions of the purpose of the modern state, the limits of the market, and the expansion of civil society and the limits on political imagination are fewer than Labour sometimes pretended in its recent history.

Nonetheless, if Labour is to be seen as a party of the future once more then it must ask searching questions about both the market and the state. As a corollary, that would mean a new discussion about the possibilities provided by a more active civil society. The notion that people are now willing to be simply passive recipients of nationally administered, standardised services feels increasingly anachronistic.

An extended period in government becomes rather like a cave existence. Like chained men in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave freed to see the world in the light and without walls, Labour’s leaders now have the chance to interpret the world afresh. If they reach for the easy answers they will fail. If they start where people are and craft a vision and story of a different future then they may succeed. But the exercise starts with where people actually are; not where Labour assumes or wants to think that they are.