This is a struggle between the governing Justice and Development Party (Turkish initials are AKP), who are Islamists, and the secular Kemalists who ruled Turkey for most of its history. The two power blocs have traded blows over the most contentious proposals, including changes which would weaken the institutions in which the Kemalists are most powerful, the army and judiciary. The struggle for reform and political infighting have become intertwined.
In order to reform the system and further its agenda the government sought to make changes to the 1982 constitution, which was written in the aftermath of the military coup of September 12, 1980. The constitution provides a legal framework for maintaining the army and judiciary as the most powerful institutions in the country which establishes an alternative power centre to the elected civil authorities.
The constitution thus provides legal sanction for undemocratic rule with its provisions for the outlawing of political parties by the judiciary and protection of army officers accused of human rights abuses during the 1980 coup. The resulting semi-authoritarian system has so far failed to impress the EU not to mention many Turkish citizens.
The Islamists were able to kill two birds with one stone. By agreeing to reforms they could simultaneously strike blows against their enemies by weakening the secular establishment and thereby increasing their own power. The Kemalists are protecting their own interests while proclaiming their defence of secularism by opposing the reforms.
The government’s reform package, first submitted to parliament for approval, was fought over there, failing to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority. The government then decided to put the issue to the voters to decide in a referendum, but the opposition People’s Republican Party appealed to the Constitutional Court, which is charged with reviewing legislation to ensure that it is in agreement with the constitution to make a ruling on the proposals.
One of the contentious provisions in the referendum was intended to change the way in which members of the Court itself are chosen, giving more power to the president and parliament to appoint members, a step toward meeting EU requirements which would at the same time have benefited the government by replacing Kemalists with its own appointees. In keeping with the adversarial nature of the reform process the Court annulled parts of the proposal thus preserving for now its character and the separation of powers.
The Court also made the decision to include in the referendum a proposal which would make it possible for civilian courts to try army officers accused of human rights abuses during the 1980 coup, though this is not likely to have a much of a practical effect. In a landscape of conflict the infighting over reforms sometime adds to the impression that a civil war is taking place within the institutions of power.
Prime minister Erdogan claims he is not aiming to create an Islamic state. This makes it difficult to assess how profound a transformation Turkey is undergoing at present. It may be that this will prove to be only a struggle between two tendencies being democratically played out. The opposition thinks that the stakes are a lot higher and seems to feel that if Erdogan has his way this will be seen in retrospect to have been the beginning of a revolution. Evidence cited by observers to justify this concern includes government attacks on press freedom, its embrace of Hamas and its role in the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations.
On the other side of the ledger and despite a drop in support in Turkey for EU membership since Erdogan came to power there are many members of the business and middle classes in a country which now has one of the world’s fastest growing economies who want stability and increased integration with Europe. This along with existing ties to the west adds ballast against instability.
The situation at present is certainly not straightforward. The JDP’s reforming impulse seems to derive from ambiguous motives. It is not a clear and simple case of democracy versus authoritarianism as far as the un-aided eye can see. It would be ironic if a vote for democratic reform resulted in new forms of misrule by removing the Kemalist bulwark against changes to the secular character of the nation. On the other hand Erdogan’s promises may not be empty; he may prove to be the great Islamic reformer many proclaim him to be. The roulette wheel is turning…