The Conservatives, who are naturally hawkish and ideologically committed to cuts in public spending; and the Liberal Democrats, who question the replacement of Trident and opposed the war in Iraq, have to find common ground to build a coherent defence and foreign policy for government. Cutting and pasting elements of disparate manifestoes and compromising on what where key election pledges is a risk, as the lowest common denominator won’t easily produce coherent policy.
The media leaks over the last few days show, as Paul Cornish has said, ‘that the review has been ‘indecision led’ rather than led by strategy or even the Treasury.’ Our military will be unbalanced and lack crucial capabilities.
Allegedly HMS Ark Royal and the Harrier force will be scrapped within months, and the Navy will be effectively demoted from the world stage. The two new carriers won’t come online until at least 2020, when one will probably be sold. The Navy will lack any capability to project strike airpower for nearly a decade, and this will place ground troops at huge risk in overseas operations without adequate air cover. The Navy will lose many of its frigates and destroyers and so its surface capability will be significantly impaired.
The RAF and army also look set lose vital capabilities. The government’s indecision, their total lack of any grand strategy puts our future role in the world under threat and gives our enemies comfort that the UK will not be as capable. We will have very limited ability to project force.
The government’s National Security Strategy is policy not a grand strategy and it has shifted ground away from conventional warfare, and that is a dangerous assumption to make. Once we lose capability it will be very hard to get it back. Grand strategy is not policy, but policy should be derived from it. The NSS is designed as a tool of the Treasury, and it is not a reflection of the real strategic picture based on a grand strategy for the UK.
Labour answered the question of what the role of the UK was in the world and therein what role the armed forces had to play through the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the same question must be answered now to shape policy over the next ten years. However, the track record of defence reviews over the post second world war period is poor. Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman argue that:
‘Defence policy, planning and analysis in the United Kingdom has reached a state of organisational, bureaucratic and intellectual decay.’
They persuasively argue that British defence planning has historically followed a flawed four step process:
‘Failure, inertia, formulation and misimplementation. This flawed pattern of policy development has led to a cycle of defence reviews that have proved to be incomplete and unsustainable; a cycle from which successive governments have so far proved unable or unwilling to escape.’
We need a focus on the grand strategy of the UK. While you can never plan for events, and you should always expect the unexpected, the advantage for a Strategic Defence Review that captures the grand strategy of the government is the clarity it gives the military that the politicians know what they expect the armed forces to do. Before cutting, before spending, before stepping out on the world stage to articulate a defence policy it is critical that the government determine the grand strategy of the country. There is no grand strategy from this government and when it comes to these cuts they are chaotic and ill thought through.
The simple statements listed in the coalition agreement on defence do not amount to a proper policy. If the issue of Trident’s replacement is moved to a review post the next general election and in effect kicked into the long grass the danger to our global credibility as a nuclear power and the fact that this is one of the biggest spending issues the country will face over the next ten years is of huge significance.
A strategic review is needed but the coalition government are failing the crucial grand strategic test. Right now the MOD battle with the Treasury is in full swing and the accountants are winning. Liam Fox’s leaked letter to David Cameron reveals the tensions within the Tory party, let alone between the coalition partners:
‘How do we want to be remembered and judged for our stewardship of national security? We have repeatedly and robustly argued that this is the first duty of government and we run the risk of having those words thrown back at us if the SDSR fails to reflect that position and act upon it.
Cuts there will have to be. Coherence, we cannot do without, if there is to be any chance of a credible narrative.’
The government’s disarray over these matters is a grave cause for concern when our forces are deployed overseas and the lack any grand strategic direction is a recipe for confusion and for fundamental mistakes to be made in how our armed forces are used.