The transition in Afghanistan
We support the government’s position of combat troops returning from Afghanistan as soon as possible, withdrawing district by district, province by province, based on conditions on the ground. We must now look forwards to discuss how we achieve our targets and the conditions by which we judge progress, rather than working backwards from an end date.
The most pressing condition is achieving lasting, Afghan-led security. We are not facing defeat, but the absence of defeat is not the same as success.
As we withdraw we should have proper burden sharing of the non-combat residual responsibilities, including security force training. We shouldn’t have Berlin 1945-style carve-outs of geographic distinction for Nato forces. Nor should we settle for simple coordination, however good individual nations’ efforts, but instead insist on deep and joint working of a single effort as the template for this and any future missions. The capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces is vital both for the futures of the Afghan people and any British military personnel who will remain long after combat operations have ended. The ANSF need improved force recruitment and retention, ensuring forces reflect the ethnic make-up of the areas they secure. As others have rightly reflected, it’s not sustainable to have a national force that is only three per cent Southern Pashtun.
Consolidating military gains and preventing the Taliban regaining a foothold in local communities will come if security forces, in particular police, are part of the communities they serve. The Taliban did this by simultaneously terrorising and providing some material wellbeing to local people. Security forces must now facilitate local empowerment, giving authority to local tribal leaders to make security operations reflective and responsive to local concerns. Coalition troops can suppress violence temporarily, but, pre- and post-2015, self-governance must fill the vacuum otherwise occupied by the Taliban.
Economic resilience is intrinsic to long-term security, enabling a government offer which is more attractive than poppy cultivation or violence. For poppy-free provinces it is not eradication or sanction but job creation to give families a stake in their society that will make the difference. We need a plan to develop infrastructure and build the agricultural, transport and energy sectors. Afghanistan’s natural resources and the growing Asian economy offer huge opportunities if investment is made in the right areas.
Transition will only be successful if overseen by strong, accountable national government, with integrity and legitimacy, backed by regional partners committing to trade and active support for the political settlement and process of reintegration.
An Alliance that remains fit for purpose
This, I believe, is the framework in which Nato should plan the transition, but the Alliance should also plan its own transition to a post-Afghanistan world.
To remain diplomatically and fighting fit Nato must reform. It does seem bizarre that Nato has more people in uniform serving in its various HQs than the UK has serving in Afghanistan. But for Nato to be as important in our children’s lifetimes as it was in our parents’ it must clearly define its purpose in a 21st century security landscape of more diffuse, interconnected and rapidly developing threats. Is it an expeditionary force? One based on territorial defence only? Or principally a political alliance? There are divergent views on the answers to these questions, which inhibits Nato in being the leader of international military action we want it to be. These questions are also reflected in public sentiment, where old reassuring Cold War certainties have been supplanted by a mix of anxiety and near ambivalence.
To ensure strategic direction, enhance military value and strengthen the long-term core purpose of the Alliance, there needs to be agreement on priority threats, and the strategic concept will be updated, based on Madeleine Albright’s ‘Assured Security: Dynamic Engagement’ report, to include emerging threats such as extremism in failing or failed states, piracy and energy security. Common purpose, however, will come when there is a clearer shared perception of threats.
One example of divergence is Iran – Tehran is understood differently in some capitals like Paris, Washington and London compared to Ankara. Nato must find a unified voice on this, as well as big issues such as preventative action on climate change-fuelled conflict, how to repel cyber threats to economic and defence infrastructures and how Islamic extremism can best be contained through military, diplomatic and humanitarian means. The need for agreement is made more pressing at a time when defence budgets face pressures.
This is a huge challenge, but there is no time to waste. The task for Nato this weekend is to outline a plan for a self-determined future for Afghanistan. The opportunity is to determine its own future.