The decline of the Liberal party was fundamentallyaffected by coalition with the Tories. Before May 2010 there had been three such coalitions – in 1895, 1918 and 1931. They all had very specific origins, though there was a longer-term tendency for Liberals to move towards working with the Conservatives in an anti-Labour front, in ratepayers’ associations, in local elections. All three coalitions were disastrous for the country and the party itself. That of 1895 plunged us into the South African war. That of 1918 speeded us into economic recession. That of 1931 made that depression worse. The coalition of 1918 divided the party into two and ended it as a party of government. The one of 1931 divided the Liberals into three and ended them as a party of opposition as well.

All three were scarred by their origins. Secret deals between the Liberal and Conservative machines tarnished their subsequent reputation. The 1918 coalition became notorious for the electoral ‘coupon’ concluded between the Conservative (Unionist) and coalition Liberal party whips. The 1931 coalition became notorious for the secret ‘bankers’ ramp’ which allegedly created the so-called National government. But at least all three previous coalitions were known to the electors before a general election, and offered them an agreed manifesto. The coalition of 2010 is peculiar because it was put together after the votes had been counted, and apparently in conflict with the wishes of people who had voted Liberal Democrat in the first place. There was no election manifesto, only a ‘coalition agreement’ worked out in private. Over five million voted for David Lloyd George’s coalition in 1918, and well over 14million for Ramsay MacDonald’s in 1931. Nobody voted for Nick Clegg’s.

The coalition of 1895, led by Lord Salisbury, had the specific purpose of preventing self-government for Ireland, as well as defending property rights more generally. It took important elements away from the Liberal party, notably the nonconformist and other followers of Joseph Chamberlain, but the damage was largely limited to the west Midlands. Fierce tensions arose between the coalition partners over the Education Act in 1902 and tariff reform in 1903. Chamberlain had refused to merge the two party organisations to protect his power base, and the outcome was an almost unprecedented electoral disaster in which many Liberal Unionists returned to their old allegiance.

The coalition of 1931 was set up to combat the financial crisis of that summer. It was important for both Conservatives and Liberals to have a Labour prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, as a figurehead. The ‘agreement to differ’ on free trade and imperial preference provoked deep tension and proved terminal. The Simonite National Liberals became indistinguishable from the Tories. Herbert Samuel’s official Liberals all resigned en bloc after 12 months and never recovered.

By far the most interesting coalition is that of 1918. It depended on a man and mood. Claiming 57.9 per cent of the votes, it had an overwhelmingly dominant leader, Lloyd George, hailed as ‘the man who won the war’. It was shaped by the wartime urge for unity of command. There was, at first, a place for prewar Liberalism in social policy – in housing, education, health and national insurance – but it lasted only as long as the mood of wartime collectivism lasted. By 1921 it had turned into an anti-Labour front which disturbed many radicals. By now there was also serious Liberal anxiety over inroads into free trade, foreign policy, ‘anti-waste’ threats to social reform, and especially the violent era of the Black and Tans in Ireland. Liberal ministers like Christopher Addison and Edwin Montagu were lost, guilty of noisy deviance on social reform and India. Another minister, Winston Churchill, was moving to the right. There was scant collaboration in by-elections, while separate whips and party organisations were maintained. Plans for a ‘fusion’ of the two coalition parties fizzled out. In the end, the government rested solely on the authority of an increasingly discredited prime minister, condemned significantly by Stanley Baldwin as ‘a dynamic force’. On the Unionists’ side, Austen Chamberlain, their new leader, lacked the authority of his predecessor, Andrew Bonar Law. A grassroots revolt saw the coalition collapse. The very idea of coalition was damaged fundamentally henceforth. In 1924 the Liberals’ seats slumped from 158 to 40. The real beneficiary of this coalition was the opposition Labour party which had wisely followed George Bernard Shaw’s advice in 1918 – ‘Go back to Lloyd George and say “Nothing doing”.’

Is the 2010 coalition likely to have happier results for the Liberal Democrats? Certainly the background is very different, with the steady erosion of two-party politics since the 1970s, far more fluid social allegiances with the weakening of the traditional class system, and a disenchanted approach towards the party system as a whole. Regular hung parliaments and possible coalitions may become more likely. But there are some unhappy echoes of the past today: the ‘agreement to differ’ over voting reform recalls 1932, while Vince Cable’s noisy disaffection resembles events leading to Lloyd George’s sacking of Addison and Montagu. The ambiguous roles of local party organisation shown in the Oldham East and Saddleworth by-election, and current division between ‘social Liberals’ (Simon Hughes, Charles Kennedy) and ‘economic Liberals’ (Clegg, David Laws) parallel Liberal divisions over Ireland and social reform in 1919-22. Then, many radical Liberals in the Union of Democratic Control (Arthur Ponsonby, Charles Trevelyan) moved over to Labour while others (Churchill, Alfred Mond, Edward Grigg) later joined the Tories.

As in 1919-22, Liberals are more ideologically fluid than are the other parties. They have specifically broken their word on three manifesto pledges – cutting back public spending last year, PR and university tuition fees. More might follow, perhaps on child and housing benefit, Trident or Europe. Old progressives like Paddy Ashdown and Shirley Williams make a virtue of their inconsistency. Old disciples of Lloyd George have cheerfully voted to undermine his legacy on social welfare, redistributive taxation, stimulating employment, and children’s allowances. The Liberal Democrats are stronger than they were but seem no longer on the left-of-centre as Jo Grimond urged after the rightwing drift under Clement Davies in the 1950s. A clean break, as in 1932, seems less likely than years of defeatist decay, as in 1903-6. Bad news either way. These current Liberals could regret their fourth, and perhaps final, fling with the Conservatives.

Forthcoming as part of our Progress magazine feature on the Liberal Democrat party are Professor Paul Whiteley on the different types of Liberal Democrat that coexist within the party, and electoral expert Lewis Baston on what Labour may or may not have to fear from a Liberal Democrat collapse?