Some on the left are convinced that Labour’s association with multiculturalism and their uncritical promotion of mass inward migration are the chief cause of this fraying relationship, and therefore support the adoption of a tougher, more populist approach. But it is far from clear that this or any other strategy will, on its own, recoup support for the left over the medium and long terms.
This is partly because concerns about immigration are distributed more evenly across the social spectrum than clichés about the ‘white working class’ suggest. A rising and pervasive sense of cultural threat has become characteristic of public attitudes throughout Europe. An emphasis upon highly visible recent changes – notably the more marked ethnic and cultural diversification of many of Britain’s cities and towns – has also led to the neglect of some fundamental shifts in the nature of community life. Analysis of these shifts is crucial for those seeking an understanding of the growing crisis of political representation and cultural recognition affecting many working-class communities.
The profound social, economic and cultural changes that have taken place over the last half century have radically reshaped the working class in the UK. In particular, the decline of Britain’s staple industries and the emergence of a post-industrial economy in their place have frayed old patterns of solidarity and community. This has led to greater concentrations of deprivation, immobility and insecurity for some, but has also created new opportunities associated with skilled employment, higher incomes and the acquisition of assets for others.
Two specific dynamics developed out of these changes which have had a lasting impact on many communities. First, the relative ‘affluence’ enjoyed by particular groups of working-class people as living standards and consumer spending power rose during the 1980s helped to generate a set of expectations about the quality and nature of public and private services. Second, a hard-edged mood of nostalgia and anger emerged among working-class men, whose economic and cultural position has come under considerable threat in a world that is ceasing to value their distinctive skills.
So what does this mean for the left? For a start, it needs to come to a proper understanding of the nature and implications of the hollowing out of the mid-century communities. The growing distance between parts of its social base and the party’s leadership was, for a while, offset by the economic and social benefits which Labour delivered after 1997. However, once the rise in living standards began to stall it became increasingly clear that the party’s support had become much shallower. Labour was ousted from control of local government in a number of its former strongholds, and in some areas it encountered a potent new challenge as the far-right British National Party fought a number of successful battles to win council seats and slowly increased its vote at successive general elections.
Such challenges suggest the need for a political project that creates a new, progressive sense of belonging across a range of geographic and cultural communities. It also suggests the need for greater ethical reflection upon the values inherent in different kinds of community (from local to national, religious to voluntary) and the ways in which these can be encompassed within a newly constituted politics of the common good. And, crucially, it requires that the party, its political representatives and local bodies reconnect with the communities from which they get their mandate.
While the defence of indigenous traditions and ways of living can take chauvinistic forms which the centre-left should challenge, it is a mistake to see only prejudice and bigotry within the defensive responses to change that characterise many different communities. Such a kneejerk response underestimates the widespread desire to keep hold of institutions, practices and landscapes that are associated with a range of different social values.
Yet the left’s favoured languages of redistribution and rights are found increasingly wanting in the face of these dimensions of popular reasoning. Neither framework appreciates the abiding desire to be rooted in and feel part of a larger whole. Such complex, but common, emotions are typically at odds with the language and logic of both the unfettered market and the distant state. In government, Labour’s association with both of these modes of governance put it on the wrong side of a number of issues and helped disconnect it from a number of different communities. Hence the recurrent complaints that it allowed retail giants like Tesco to reshape the centres of many towns and villages, driving local shops out of business, and that government seemed willing to stand by while some of the key institutions of local communities – post offices or community pubs – were shut down.
Questions of place, belonging and culture need to be much higher on the agenda of social democrats, and not just in order to contest David Cameron’s ‘big society’. This does not imply that all claims to recognition should be engaged with sympathetically. The left cannot meet the demands that are sometimes made in relation to ‘white working-class communities’ without reneging on its commitments to anti-discrimination and equality. Nevertheless, the resentment and demands of working-class communities should be engaged with more attentively, and responded to in political, economic and sometimes cultural terms.
Responding with communitarian or liberal ideas alone is unlikely to build broad-based coalitions of support. A progressive politics of recognition that is plural and outward-facing, but also sufficiently engaged with poorer communities to have depth and durability, provides a more promising way of thinking about how to navigate the unfamiliar political terrain that the centre-left now inhabits.
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A longer version of this article can be found here