Introduction

‘What is the role of an individual nation state in the world’ is one of the greatest questions facing all nations. It is one Progress are rightly asking at this time of enormous uncertainty.

Today we are launching our defence review, which will look at our policy priorities, and I want to talk about the changing security landscape that will shape our work.

Events in North Africa and the Middle East are helping to redefine the balance of security, peace and liberty across the world.  They have proved again that real power can lie in the common causes that unite people and that the denial of freedom is unsustainable. Time takes power away from dictators.

We are not the global power we once were but we do have global influence, through our history, language, economic ties, military capability, university system, cultural heritage, as well as our unique diplomatic reach.

Today Britain’s influence is shaped by power shifting Eastwards, a new emphasis on multilateralism which demands pooling sovereignty, a relative military decline, new threats from climate change to international terrorism, as well as domestic unease about overseas interventions. 

We meet at a moment when we have to make decisions about the role we want this remarkable nation to play in the world.

I want to argue today that the narrow Conservative view of Britain’s role in the world is misplaced. It is essential that we remain a player and partner in world events, maximising our influence and doing so increasingly through a new multilateralism in defence policy which recognises the transformative new security landscape in which we operate.

Historical context

This may have been a less complicated question to answer at different points in our history, dictated by old certainties.

Up until the 19th Century the principal source of conflict was territorial expansion, exploration and trade. It was a period defined by the building of kingdoms through external acquisition, at which Britain was at the forefront.

Our role in the world was clear. To protect our colonies and mandates through technological and industrial superiority and comparative maritime advantage.

The turn of the 20th Century brought the beginning of a period of ‘industrial war’, Britain’s place as a peerless industrial or military power diminished and our role became more complex.

Both World Wars caused a major reassessment of British imperial policy. The growth of the United States and Japan as naval powers and the rise of independence movements in India and Ireland after World War One both proved and precipitated the Empire’s decline, and it is in this context that the Washington Treaty, and later the Atlantic Charter, cemented alliances which would shape and strengthen our future defence posture.

After the Second World War we entered a new era of emerging multilateralism, saw the confirmation of two dominant superpowers, experienced a foreign affairs crisis and lived through the occasionally turbulent stalemate of the Cold War.  The Cold War demonstrated that the centre of gravity in geo-politics had fundamentally shifted, while the Suez Crisis very publicly exposed the limitations of Britain’s military power. 

Up to the end of the 20th century Britain and her international allies faced threats which were essentially state-centred, but new threats have emerged which have forced us to again recalibrate our place in the world.

September 11th exposed the force of militant transnational terrorism and underlined how fundamentally security policy would need to change in response. This new ideologically-driven enemy is the most significant short and medium-term threat we face, driven by non-state actors capable of operating on a global scale, exploiting the teachings of a peaceful religion as justification for murderous acts. This new threat means Britain again has to be central to global affairs. Coupled with a belief in humanitarian intervention, our role has focused more on defending values and interests not territories, and as part of coalitions not as an expansionist nation state.

Where we are today

Today, our role is made less certain by the many emerging trends redrawing the security landscape.

Globalisation is diffusing power amongst many different actors.

The global population is growing rapidly, putting a massive pressure on resources, space and forcing migration from rich to poor states.

Climate change will reduce available land, food and water, exacerbating the drivers of state failure.

Weak and unstable states outnumber strong and stable states by more than two to one.

A youth bulge is seeing rising aspiration and greater emotional urgency in the desire for change.  

The advance of information technologies and biotechnologies threatens international security infrastructure, while nuclear proliferation and cyber attack pose potential for mass destruction.

These trends will drive state-on-state conflict but also internal conflicts between peoples. What is clear is that in today’s interdependent world risks are increasingly shared and interconnected – so so too must be the solutions.

Oppression of people

But there is a critical new threat to global security that has been proven through events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya: the oppression of citizens.

Most people have never heard of Mohammed Bouazizi, but the Tunisian fruit seller who set himself alight in protest at the brutality of the old Tunisian regime was the catalyst for the awe-inspiring civilian surge we have all witnessed, fracturing orthodoxies and assumptions on which policy has been based for many years.

The actions of Bouazizi embody the cultural clashes which have led to the historic events of the last weeks: between authoritarianism and a young population yearning for freedom; between totalitarian politics and communication technologies; between economic insecurity and the lure of free markets.

While we know how these events started, no-one knows to where they will lead. 

Libya

It was right that we took the action we did.  No one could have been anything other than stunned by the ferocity of Gaddafi’s attacks on his own people.  As internationalists we had both the responsibility and the opportunity to help enforce international law and save innocents from slaughter.
 
The arrest today of Iman al-Obeidi, the woman who was gang raped by government forces is a despicable act which underlines this is a vile regime which will stop at nothing.

The bravery of the Libyan opposition to the regime is not in doubt. What is unclear is the motives of some other than the removal of Gaddafi. As the opposition stampede Westwards across Libya, therefore, it is also crucial that we better understand who they are and their wider ambitions, and do due diligence on the make-up of the opposition forces.

I hope today’s conference will address this issue and the long-term political future of Libya. The Libyan National Council’s call for a democratic, new Libya is encouraging, as is the breadth of nations – over 40 – in London today supporting the aspirations of the Libyan people.

New multilateralism

There has been much talk of the international community’s response to events in Libya, the success of multilateralism and the implications for defence policy. Successfully securing a UN resolution, gaining the support of the Arab League and some military contribution from a limited number of Arab nations to the effort all signal that this is a collective international operation. As Hilary Clinton has said, this was a “watershed moment for international decision-making”.

A multilateral effort in Libya was particularly important because humanitarian military action should not only be seen to be driven by a particular cluster of nations.

It is vital that defence policy is internationally co-ordinated wherever possible. Domestic pressures on defence budgets also demand we seek new ways of building capabilities.

The challenge for UK defence policy is how we strengthen our own posture through multilateral action.

That means forming new defence partnerships. The bilateral agreement signed with France is a positive first step. Interoperability and sharing expertise to enhance domestic capabilities are vital. This should be extended to other groups of European nations, in particular Nordic states.

It also means strengthening multilateral institutions. Democratic procedures by which international decisions can be made must be more flexible and representative, yes, but they are the best means we have to establish common ground for collective action – as recent events have proved.  I want to see an engaged Britain in a strong European Union, but alongside a strong African Union and strong Arab League and so we should help build their capacity and encourage their participation. This is a particularly important agenda for Britain. We are the only nation with a place on the Security Council, in the EU, in NATO, in the Commonwealth and as part of the G20, which gives us unique diplomatic reach, and so developing the role of those institutions can help us retain a strong role in unfolding world events.

A new emphasis on multilateralism in defence should also mean a new approach to conflict resolution through regional political reconciliation. Interdependence means that defence policy must better integrate regional partners. In Afghanistan the indispensible political settlement inside the country is dependent on the political settlement outside. In Libya it was vital that we had the support of the Arab League for the no-fly zone, but they will also play an important role in diplomatic efforts to determine Libya’s long-term political future.  Active defence policy is strengthened if executed through political alliances from the areas towards which policy is focused.

New multilateralism – states and citizens

This is a big part of the agenda which Labour’s defence policy review will explore.

I would argue, however, that the catalyst for the events we have witnessed, not just the response to them, should also guide our policy-making. 

Change in Tunisia and Egypt was brought by the emotional expression of a logical truth.  States were brought together to act in Libya because they responded to calls for democracy which came not from communiqués but communities, not from summits but from the streets. 

Internal oppression has been revealed to be one of the biggest security threats we face.  The right to realise aspiration is not a luxury but now a fundamental part of any leadership’s right to govern.

In the past we confused a strong government with a stable state, whereas in fact strong unelected government often means a weak state. Power without authority means that authoritarian governments act in ways that may necessitate an international response.

Many of those nations which suppress the rights of their people to take advantage of civil society, democratic expression or the rule of law can no longer be considered stable nation states. The unsustainability of democratic denial has been exposed. The drive for self determination has shown itself to be more powerful than the clasp of autocratic control. 

While conflicts will be inter-state, they will also be intra-state, between peoples or between people and their government.  New multilateral engagement between states will, therefore, only succeed if coupled with a parallel process between states and citizens.

Sustainable stability will be achieved by supporting systems which empower people and enable them to be part of an organic civil society at home and abroad.

Sustainability now means better co-ordination of defence and development.  It means recasting our notion of intervention too so that it is about building capacity not in a way that leaves Western-created administrations dependent on overseas aid, but by enabling effective national and local governance and functioning rule of law.

This is not about choosing governments from afar or imposing a way of life. It is about recognising where the freedom to create societies, economies and administrations does not exist due to the suppression of legitimate calls for change and ensuring Britain is a part of the process by which those calls are answered.

This is about finding the right balance between hard and soft power. Yes we sometimes need to respond militarily to crises, but we also need to ensure we are tackling the very conditions which give rise to the suppression from which people are themselves now fighting.

Defence review

This is the agenda for defence policy for which the Government’s Defence Review and National Security Strategy are both inadequate tools.  We cannot have this year’s level of foreign policy ambition on next year’s profile of defence investment. The defence review took place before the Arab Spring.  Once current operations are over, I will urge them to think again.

Labour’s defence review has experts from government, military, charity and industry backgrounds who will help us look at the major challenges we face, from the defence budget to force structure to mapping the security landscape of today and tomorrow. This will, we hope, provide a contrast to the short-term, Treasury driven review the Government carried out and will aim to address some of the issues I have raised.

Conclusion

Britain’s role in the world has changed as the model of international relations has evolved.

Through the period of colonisation and imperial expansion to independence and the primacy of stable statehood.

Through the Cold War, where for some political proximity to superpowers was more important than political proximity to citizens.

Through to globalisation and interdependence, where states are increasingly mutually dependent.

Throughout these periods notions of sovereignty have changed.  The declining Empire saw the rise of opaque sovereignty – where events and actions within borders were only the business of domestic authorities.  Globalisation and the rise of technology, media, a sense of universal entitlement and multilateralism has seen a shift towards transparent sovereignty – where events have significance and implications across borders and national interest is often entwined with events overseas.

In the Middle East we are seeing this shift from opaque to transparent sovereignty taking place rapidly before our eyes.

I believe it is Britain’s role to promote the conditions that will allow citizens and nations who have yet to open up to be able to do so, to enable the conditions for freedom to flourish, to give citizens a stake in their societies and to ensure responsibilities and resolutions are shared.

A new multilateralism in defence, of which I have spoken today, could make an important contribution.

The ark of history has always had a British slant, and this next stage in world affairs should be no different.

It is both an opportunity and a duty of ours, and I look forward to discussing it in greater detail today.

Ends