Retrospection is wisdom indeed. What would any campaign manager give to be able to make decisions knowing what the future was? Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some early lessons from the failure of the Yes to AV campaign.

That there was an overconcentration of resources on the grassroots ‘ground war’ as opposed to the media-led ‘air war’ is probably true. We committed too many of our resources to building a grassroots campaign that could never be big enough. Despite the impressive efforts of our workers and volunteers, and the fact that we raised half again of what we spent on the field operations through small donations, a national vote can never be won from the grassroots up.

The Yes campaign tried to frame the debate as ‘people versus politicians’. The research confirmed that, in the wake of the expenses crisis, the public viewed politicians as self-interested. The accuracy of that belief, or even the morality of seeking to exploit it, can be questioned, but no one ever challenged the premise. It was also the accepted wisdom that politicians of any party leading the call for change (or indeed opposing it) would also be seen as self-serving. Nobody said this was the wrong frame or suggested another.

It is clear to everyone now that the frame did not hold for a variety of reasons. One is that Nick Clegg’s role as ‘father of the referendum’ was impossible to avoid. Another was that those who write or comment about politics have no interest whatsoever in what ordinary people have to say on an issue such as the referendum. So if non-politicians were our messengers, no one was going to hear our message. A reliance on celebrities may bring slightly more media attention, but slightly less credibility. In the end it turned into a familiar political bun fight, crushed into the wrong frame.

Labour Yes began to deploy the message of ‘Kick Cameron, Vote Yes’ in the last two weeks of the campaign and it may be that this should have been the main thrust from the beginning. A Yes win needed Labour voters in a proportion of 2:1. There were several problems with this challenge. First, David Cameron had promised the Liberal Democrats that he would not campaign, and he probably meant it at the time. A reluctance to go negative, combined with Cameron’s lack of a clear association with the No campaign until the closing stages, meant that it would have been difficult to pursue such a strategy until the last two weeks anyway. The other problem was the fact that some Labour ‘big beasts’were so anxious to give an overwhelmingly Conservative campaign a hint of cross-party credibility, dissipating any potential blows that might land on Cameron.

The Yes campaign probably should have put more resources into the Labour element of the campaign. However, until the last two weeks of the campaign trying to get other than a few Labour figures to hold a Yes speech bubble was like playing pass the parcel in a Belfast pub in the 1970s. Difficult as it was, we probably should have tried harder.

I am disappointed by the lack of strategic vision from those in Labour’s ranks who so wholeheartedly defended the status quo. Now Cameron is in an ascendant position, Labour’s position in Scotland is precarious, and boundaries will be redrawn in the Tories’ favour without AV to mitigate. If they have sacrificed their own party interest for principle then they are martyrs to their hearts. If it is for anything else they are not even useful fools.