
The opposition CHP is still seen by too many as the party of the old guard which is responsible for the ills of the country.
The CHP was created by Ataturk himself and has therefore been closely connected to the secular state apparatus from the beginning of the republic. This has not been an electoral asset for many years. The old regime with the military at its centre has lost much of its support over the years due to army coups, economic crisis and its treatment of the Kurds. The government’s reform process has been slow and based in part on dismantling the old structures as a prelude to more fundamental changes. This has not been universally popular as it also strengthened the ruling party at the expense of the opposition while provisions for a fundamental extension of human rights and democracy have been on hold.
High growth has been consistent since Erdogan was first elected, but this election is not about the economy alone, nor could it be in a country like Turkey. Without stability and democracy there is always the danger that the economy will revert to times of boom and bust – therefore the winning combination for the AK in every election so far has been good economic performance plus the promise of political reform.
Erdogan has pledged a new constitution to replace the old military constitution of 1982. Once again he has been able to argue persuasively that greater freedoms cannot be brought about without first weakening the old structures, in this case by creating a new civil constitution which would accomplish that and serve as a basis for advancements on human rights and democracy. So compelling has been the promise of change that the AK has been able to win the support of some liberals as well as conservatives to produce convincing majorities at the polls in both elections prior to 2011.
The CHP has been caught on the back foot and seemed at first unsure how to respond to this challenge. Some of its liberal supporters defected to the AK leaving the CHP more than ever in the hands of the old guard which in many ways continued to defend the status quo. This has now begun to change but only after a damaging sex scandal involving the former party leader Deniz Baykal who was caught in flagrante in a hotel room with a member of his own party in 2010.
The new leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has begun the process of modernising the party but this is a huge task and will most likely have to be a gradual one. The party is now on its way to becoming a western style social democratic party and the voters have begun to take note but this is not likely to alter the outcome of the election in a few days time.
Unease in the country has begun to grow as a result of increasing authoritarianism. A large number of opposition journalists now languish in jail accused of plotting with others to stage a coup, a charge for which there have as yet been no convictions after three years. This cuts both ways; on the one hand it makes the government less popular on the other it silences media critics in the run up to the election thus cutting down on the amount of accurate and uncensored information available to voters.
As the human rights situation has deteriorated the government has shown less of an inclination to satisfy EU entrance requirements, instead choosing to cultivate close relationships with dictators such as Syria’s President Assad which has had a negative impact on public opinion at home and in the wider Middle East in the light of the Arab Spring. In response to this and the hostility of some EU states to Turkey’s membership bid, EU membership has not been a major election issue.
Turkey too has a democracy movement, one which has democratic instruments at its disposal. If in its third term the government fails to deliver its promised reforms and continues its repressive policies it will lose many of its liberal supporters, a process which has already begun. It will then need to rely more on its conservative support base which will narrow its appeal, create greater dissent and most likely an increase in repressive measures.
who’s paying for the new canal to ease congestion through Bosphorus Straights ? I suppose that’s how the oil gets from Russia to Israel ? (of course in ’03 Israel was looking at the possibility of oil from Iraq when things ‘settled down’ – ’08 they looked at piping to Haifa paying transit to Jordan if Israel backed Americans dunno what happened next) (how much oil comes through the BTC pipeline now?)