New research on public opinion in the south of England finds pessimism about the future and about politics – but Labour not yet capitalising on it, suggest Patrick Diamond and Giles Radice

Southern Discomfort One Year On seeks to address the crippling weakness that Labour faces in southern England after its catastrophic 2010 defeat. We make no apology for highlighting once again what voters are saying, and for putting their views at the forefront of our analysis. We do not argue that Labour should slavishly follow the opinions of particular groups, or that opinion polls are a substitute for policymaking. But listening carefully to voters and getting a feel for their hopes and aspirations is the prerequisite of any successful political strategy.

Following Labour’s 1992 defeat, the Southern Discomfort series revealed that floating voters were aspirant and upwardly mobile. Today, they are far more cautious about their own prospects, prioritising security and a better future for their children. These hard-pressed families feel insecure and vulnerable in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the dramatic squeeze on living standards. Wage rises over the last six years have been small or nonexistent, with employees having to work harder for the same or less money. Pay rises have failed to keep pace with inflation, household incomes are more unstable than at any time in the last 40 years, and job insecurity is widespread. In these circumstances, centre-left parties must be alive to the politics of insecurity, not just financial and employment insecurity but the combination of crime, public disorder, family breakdown, and loss of identity which impact directly on people’s lives.

This year’s survey shows that voters are, if anything, more anxious than they were last year. Insecurity has replaced aspiration as the dominant concern of wavering Labour voters. Their pessimism is reflected in the finding that three-quarters of all voters believe that children growing up in Britain today ‘are likely to face tougher times than their parents’ generation’. These voters still have aspirations to get on and do better for their families. But for many life is more financially precarious than ever.

And while the south and Midlands are marginally the UK’s most anxious regions, Labour does not yet seem to be gaining any significant electoral advantage. The heightened mood of pessimism and anxiety may encourage voters to take refuge in what they know, namely the apparent certainties of the Conservative approach based on sound money, smaller government, hostility to Europe, and a punitive approach on immigration and crime which may have added resonance among some voters given the prevailing sentiment of insecurity.

Disturbingly, there is also widespread disillusionment with politics and politicians. One-quarter of voters think that neither a Conservative nor a Labour government would make any difference, while over one-third describe both major parties as ‘incompetent’. This mood of disengagement is especially bad for Labour, since parties of the centre-left depend on creating a climate of hope.

In general, voters are also still much clearer about what the Conservatives stand for than Labour. According to a YouGov poll carried out for our research, 57 per cent know what the Conservatives stand for, while 37 per cent are unclear. Only 40 per cent of voters are clear about Labour, compared to 54 per cent who are unclear. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Liberal Democrats have suffered  from a weakening of their political identity with only 21 per cent of voters now clear what they stand for, compared to 72 per cent who are not clear.

The national variance is amplified in comparing north and south; 61 per cent of southern voters are clear about the Conservatives compared to only 53 per cent in the north. Northern voters are also much clearer about what Labour stands for (45 per cent clear, 48 per cent unclear), indicating the potential resonance of Labour’s message on public spending cuts in these regions. When asked about how they view the major parties in British politics, the electorate is negative about all three, but there are marked regional differences. In the south, the Conservative party has a net popularity rating of -10 compared to -27 in the north (a gap of 17 points). Labour has a -27 per cent rating in the south, compared to just -4 in the north (a gap of 23 points).

This gap is repeated in relation to particular aspects of the policy agenda. Voters in the south believe that the Conservatives are more likely than Labour to ‘ensure value for money in the provision of public services such as schools and hospitals’ (34 per cent to 22 per cent). Northern voters believe that Labour ‘understands the concerns of people about day-to-day life in Britain’ compared to the Conservatives by a margin of 43 per cent to 16 per cent; in the south the margin is 30 to 25 per cent. There are similar differentials for ‘helping people who play by the rules get on in life’ (36 to 22 per cent in the north, compared to 29 to 24 per cent in the south), and ‘acting fairly towards people like you when taking decisions on tax and welfare benefits’ (36 to 20 per cent in the north, compared to 28 to 23 per cent in the south).

Furthermore, voters in the south are more likely than the national average to have a negative perception of Labour’s immigration policy (55 per cent think Labour is more interested in helping immigrants than those born in Britain, compared to only 50 per cent nationally) and Labour’s capacity to deal with the so-called ‘something for nothing’ welfare culture (66 per cent compared to 61 per cent nationally agree that the party is ‘not really serious’ about tackling it); by implication, these same southern voters are more likely to have a favourable view of the Tories. They are less likely than the national average to agree that the Conservatives favour the rich, and more likely to dispute the claim that the Tories are not serious about improving and protecting the NHS.

This demonstrates that Labour has to work much harder in order to convince voters in southern England that it shares their instincts. The public are more ambivalent about the proposed cuts to the size of government and the public sector than Labour might imagine. For example, voters agree by a small margin (45 per cent to 43 per cent) that ‘public services such as health, education and the police are so inefficient that it is perfectly possible to cut spending on them significantly without cutting the quality of the service they offer’. As expected, more southern voters (48 per cent) apparently agree with that proposition than northern voters (42 per cent).

Labour has to do more to reconnect people with politics, but it is the economy which continues to damage its electoral prospects. While the majority of voters believe that the coalition government is managing the economy badly, they trust the Tories more than Labour to run it. YouGov found that 40 per cent trust the Tories ‘to take the right decisions on the economy’, while 54 per cent do not; meanwhile 36 per cent trust Labour, but 56 per cent do not trust the party. However, in southern England, the gap widens substantially: 47 per cent trust the Tories; 49 per cent do not. But only 31 per cent trust Labour, while 62 per cent do not. By a wide margin, voters in the south of England trust the Conservatives more than Labour on the economy. Although they are increasingly concerned about jobs and living standards, they continue to blame Labour for the credit crunch, and think that public spending cuts are necessary to secure the economic recovery. It is crucial for the party to regain its reputation for economic competence, so painstakingly built up in the decade after 1992, and then so dramatically lost following the 2007-9 crash. As one party worker said, ‘History is now being rewritten by the Conservatives. The biggest hurdle is being branded economically incompetent. It is a very difficult legacy to overcome.’

Unless it does so, Labour will go into the next election with an insuperable political handicap. No party has secured a parliamentary majority without winning the trust of the electorate on the economy. Restoring trust will be critical to Labour’s prospects of electoral recovery.

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Patrick Diamond is senior research fellow at Policy Network and a councillor in the London borough of Southwark. Giles Radice is a member of the House of Lords. Southern Discomfort One Year On is published by Policy Network at www.policy-network.net

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Photo: Chalkie_CC