The most recent talks between Iran and five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Britain, France, Russia, China and the United States plus Germany, over Iran’s nuclear programme took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan on 5 April and ended a day later without agreement and no date set for further discussions. Iran is a signatory to the United Nations Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970 but questions have been raised about its compliance with the treaty’s provisions by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN body which was set up to provide safeguards against nuclear proliferation. While compliance issues have served as the main focus of the talks and there have been opportunities to discuss wider issues, it may now be necessary to do more to address concerns about trust and security.
Iran cannot feel comfortable about the fact that it is surrounded by American bases or that it exists in a hostile environment. It may be that it feels the need to increase its power in the region to protect itself and wants a nuclear weapon for this purpose. If this is the case it may be difficult to convince the regime’s leaders to abandon the more contentious aspects of their nuclear program until their security concerns are successfully dealt with. The west requires similar kinds of assurances. Western statesmen fear that a nuclear weapon may not be used for defensive purposes only because it is not clear that Iran’s intentions are purely peaceful.
In its foreign relations Iran’s behaviour has been erratic. It has vacillated between greater and lesser degrees of hostility toward western states and regional adversaries. In the days of Ayatollah Khomenei Iran sought to export its revolution to neighbouring states, especially the Gulf monarchies. These policies were later abandoned in favour of ‘normalisation’ of relations with these states, but in recent years there has been a re-escalation of tension and conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia as competition for regional supremacy intensifies between them.
Iran’s most polarised behaviour has been reserved for Israel and includes a military dimension via Hamas and other groups. The Islamist ideology of the hardliners, which is extreme and anti-western, has given rise to inflexible behaviour, yet here as well we have seen pendulum swings. Iran’s conduct toward the the US has been characterised by oscillation, from threats and violence to sporadic cooperation in key areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan where there were areas of mutual interest. As the US has allies in the region it is difficult to tell how much of Iran’s antipathy, notably toward the Gulf monarchies, is driven by concern for its own security and how much by a desire to rid the Middle East of US influence for ideological reasons.
Because Iran’s actions are inconsistent we don’t really know what its ultimate aims and intentions are, yet the unknown is alluring; it has tempted some observers to create narratives with negative or positive spin to explain the Islamic Republic’s ambiguous behaviour. The international community should avoid creating or buying into such tales for fear of over- or under-reacting. It is safer to test the other side through negotiations in which all contentious issues can be placed on the table for discussion. If the two sides are willing to talk about their fears and address them they may be able to dispel doubts and find ways forward on all fronts.
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