Many charges can be levelled against David Cameron’s government. But not giving Old Etonians a fair break is probably not one of them. No fewer than four members of the prime minister’s inner circle attended his old school. It is perhaps unsurprising then that Cameron’s decision to appoint yet another Etonian – and the brother of one his main political rivals to boot – as the head of the No 10 policy unit last week raised more than a few eyebrows.

Anyone who has opened a newspaper in the last year will understand why Cameron felt the need to shake up his Downing Street operation. The succession of government U-turns, policy collapses and self-inflicted wounds have reached such proportions over the last 12 months that commentators have had to borrow a new term – omnishambles – just to describe it. Myriad factors have contributed. But two have loomed particularly large.

There has been a vacuum at the heart of government. One of the most striking things about Cameron as a prime minister is how little interest he has shown in shaping the substance of policy and the mechanics of governing. Civil servants tell numerous stories of a prime minister who does not bother to read policy briefs, seems disinterested in the business of government and is happy to leave the hard work and the tough decisions to others. Despite daily political meetings between the prime minister and chancellor, insufficient attempt seems to have been made to coordinate messages between departments. Underlying this, Cameron seems to have given little thought to how to make government deliver. The reason may well be ideological: Cameron sees government’s primary role as not to have one, to set the framework for competition and then get out of the way and let the invisible hand of the market and the small battalions of the ‘big society’ do their work. As a consequence, officials have been left to run much of the show in No 10 while ministers have been left to their own devices.

Exacerbating his mismanagement of the government machine, Cameron has serially mishandled relations with his own backbenchers. As with the business of government, his management of his own party has betrayed a lack of thought and an assumption that his colleagues will simply do as they were told, even as their views are ignored and their personal ambitions thwarted.

In appointing Johnson and creating a new policy board featuring a broad spectrum of opinion from across Conservative ranks, including a number of rebels and those passed over for preferment, Cameron is trying to address both issues. But it is unclear how successful he will be. For starters, this is not the first time he has tried to shake the No 10 operation from its torpor. A number of highly touted figures have been brought in to Downing Street only to subsequently head for the exits. It is also not immediately obvious that appointing an MP who can only play the role on a part-time basis will work. Cameron’s previous experiment with flexitime working – appointing a part-time chancellor –  has not been a notable success. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the changes will be enough to satisfy the malcontents in his party. Cameron’s policy board looks too large, unwieldy and diverse to genuinely shape policy. Absent skilful leadership, it will provide Tory MPs at best with an outlet and a talking shop. Meanwhile, Cameron’s decision to once again favour the old school tie may not help his cause with his parliamentary colleagues: if their twitter feeds are anything to go by, the latest round has not gone down universally well among his backbenchers.

Most importantly, however, the changes look unlikely to work as they do not address the core problems that lie at the root of his policy and political management challenges: his failure to change his own party and ultimately, to lead.

Cameron ran for the Conservative leadership on a manifesto of modernisation and renewal. But once elected, he shied away from the confrontation that would have been required with elements in the Tory ranks to bring about genuine and lasting change and drag the party kicking and screaming into the 21^st century. As importantly, he failed to articulate what a ‘modernised’ Conservative government would stand for, what its defining purpose would be. As a result, he never created cohesion and consensus within Tory ranks around a shared set of objectives and a common vision of what a Tory government would stand for. Lacking the bonds of ideology, he also failed to inspire personal loyalty. Instead, he was reduced to a much more transactional and contingent relationship with his backbenchers. They would tolerate him as long as he delivered consistent leads in the polls and electoral success.

That was the deal. But Cameron is struggling to honour his side of the bargain. And without intellectual or ideological substance to provide purpose and direction-other than austerity- and constrained by coalition in the number of government jobs that can be handed out to buy loyalty, Tory discipline and unity has begun to fray. The bottom line is that Cameron has failed to provide compelling intellectual or political leadership to his party. Simply moving the deckchairs in No 10 will be insufficient on their own to address this structural fault line running through the Cameron premiership.

What does this all mean for Labour? It is unclear that the changes to the Tory policy machine will have much impact and a bad set of results in Thursday’s elections may serve to reignite the rumblings of discontent that have roiled the Tory backbenches over the last year. But we cannot be complacent. The Tory operation has slowly, almost imperceptibly begun to sharpen up since the arrival of Lynton Crosby in No 10 a few months ago. These reforms could help accelerate the process if they provide the intellectual heft to complement his instinct for the jugular. Increased co-ordination across government may also help the Tories reduce the number of unforced errors they commit.

Most of all, these changes hint that maybe, just maybe after a period when the mood of the Tory party was despondent and defeatism hung heavy in the air, the Conservative’s instinct for self-preservation is beginning to kick in. Cameron is trying to get a grip on government and is trying to improve his management of his own party. Only time will tell, but in future, we may not be able to rely so much on their capacity for self-harm. This renders the work Ed Miliband, Jon Cruddas and the shadow cabinet is undertaking to build a compelling ‘One Nation’ manifesto and the reforms of the party that Iain McNicol is leading all the more crucial.

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David Pinto-Duschinsky was formerly a special adviser at the Treasury and Home Office. He writes in a personal capacity

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Photo: Jo-Johnson.com