What to do about Ukraine?

The rather bizarre images coming out of Ukraine highlight the particularities of the conflict. Balaclava-wearing soldiers with no Russian markings on their uniforms dig trenches, lay minefields, rough up United Nations envoys and storm Ukrainian facilities with a few shots being fired in anger right in front of the gathered press. The threat of force rather than the reality has its own momentum and has delivered the Crimea back to the Russian motherland, while eastern Ukraine waits nervously for Putin’s next steps.

US-Russian relations, so frequently reset by the Obama administration, have worsened quickly with even the famous Kerry-Lavrov ‘bromance’ failing to deliver anything tangible in terms of roadmaps out of the crisis. The rapid cooling of Washington-Moscow relations is of global consequence and particularly bad news for those looking for a diplomatic route out of the Syria conflict with UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi admitting this week that he has no idea when the sides could next be brought around the table.

European diplomacy, a fragmented beast at the best of times, has struggled to influence Russian behaviour and appears very reluctant to endanger energy supplies from the east at a time of economic uncertainty. Likewise the American attempts at ‘smart sanctions’ of individuals – including banking restrictions and travel bans – has been laughed off by those affected. Listening to Putin justify the land grab as originally a response to the threat of ‘terrorism’ is a reminder of the blowback from the western war against that particular tactic that now seems a zeitgeist for justifying any form of military or security action.

The key question is whether an escalation up the ladder of sanctions can affect Russian behaviour and prevent further expansionism or whether the bear is not satisfied with gobbling up Crimea and has larger plans ahead that it feels it can achieve with little cost. The fact that the Ukraine crisis follows the billions spent on the Sochi Olympics and the continued Russian investment in PR, suggests that Moscow does care what the world thinks. Boycotting the upcoming G8 in Sochi is being discussed as a potential option into a policy of isolation. One other route that needs to be explored is bringing pressure via the BRICS forum.

China, interestingly, only abstained on the security council resolution that the Russians vetoed. Like Brazil and India, the Chinese hold a firm belief in sovereignty and are nervous about any form of local referendums over succession. Opposition to Russian policy must actively seek to break out of a prism that allows Moscow to frame the debate as that of a ‘new cold war’, something that Putin appears to revel in as de facto meaning that Russia has been restored to some glorious bygone age. Ukraine has to be viewed as the battlefield for a redefinition of US, European and wider global relations with a Russia that is looking to embrace an assertive foreign policy to paper over the cracks at home.