Revolt on the Right

A whole section of the electorate is going through a ‘conscious uncoupling’ with the political mainstream. That, in essence, is what is behind the rise of the ‘radical right’ across Europe.

It says something about the depth of much political commentary that Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin have to spend so much time in Revolt on the Right explaining that Euroscepticism is not the only factor behind the rise of the United Kingdom Independence party (though it is a notable factor). Something else is at play. Ukip’s support is more weighted towards working-class and older voters than the support of the mainstream parties. The former looks like the stereotype of a Labour voter; the latter the stereotype of a Conservative voter. Recently, Ukip’s support has become older. That is probably as a result of its mopping up of disgruntled Conservative voters.

This highlights Ukip’s challenge. The working-class voters are more likely to be found in the north. Its older voters are more likely to be found in the south. This stretches its geographical focus, which is a weakness for a small party in the British political system. In the short term, milking Conservative discontent is the obvious strategy. However, most of these voters are likely to return reluctantly to the fold in 2015. It is the more ‘Labour-type’ voter that is the long-term opportunity for Ukip (and they may currently be voting Labour or not voting at all).

Ford and Goodwin take a political science approach to analysing the rise of Ukip. This places their work on solid methodological ground. Inevitably, this means that some of the economic, moral, cultural and psychological drivers of Ukip’s rise are slightly underplayed. Revolt on the Right will be the definitive work on Ukip. It will be difficult to comment authoritatively on Ukip without having read this book.

The big question is: What is the likely trajectory of Ukip? How much further will the ‘conscious uncoupling’ go? This largely depends on the party’s ability to concentrate its organisation and pursue the longer-term drivers of its rise. In the face of the formidable obstacle of the electoral system, will it hold its unity and nerve?

A Labour government may be the best thing that Ukip can hope for as the short- and long-term opportunities will then be aligned. Labour defection will provide a much better opportunity than Conservative defection does currently. However, a Tory party collapsing into disunity around a European referendum should also be factored in as an opportunity for Ukip.

In the longer term, sources of Ukip support are on a shrinking trajectory. This may take a decade or so to manifest itself. European societies will remain divided and fragmented but groups who favour openness and diversity will increase over time. Ukip is at the opposite end of the spectrum. For the time being, Ukip hints at deeper anxiety and discord. The political mainstream has been placed on notice. Ford and Goodwin provide a vital relationship tool for what could be an acrimonious split if the deep factors at play are not understood.

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