Labour must not leave the field to the Tories as it did in the 1980s

The period from Margaret Thatcher’s victory in 1979 to Labour’s utter rout in 1983 has come under renewed scrutiny. Moderates have sought to use it as a dire warning of what happens when the Bennites are ascendant: political irrelevance and practical impotence to aid the poor and vulnerable.

Bennites have revisited the same period and sought to rehabilitate it: the election defeat was the fault of the right, or that it was not Labour’s policies that were at fault, but instead only the Falklands war saved Thatcher and prevented Michael Foot becoming prime minister.

So could Labour have stopped Thatcher?

There were three occasions when this was theoretically possible. The scenario which excites political historians the most is: ‘What if James Callaghan had gone to the country in October 1978?’ The economic circumstances were favourable. Inflation was falling, incomes were rising, and the balance of payments was back in surplus. The North Sea oil had started to flow, and Britain had repaid the final instalments of the International Monetary Fund loan. The unions were primed and ready to support Labour. Callaghan had even poached the Sun’s political editor to write his election speeches.

As we know, like Gordon Brown 30 years later, Callaghan made the wrong call, and delayed until 1979, by which time the unions had destroyed the government’s credibility with the Winter of Discontent. But had Callaghan gone in October 1978, it is possible, likely even, that Thatcher could have been defeated, and ended up as an IDS-style footnote in the annals of the Conservative party.

The behaviour of the Labour party after 1979 largely sealed its fate in the next election. At the very time the country was crying out for social democracy, with unemployment soaring, businesses closing and the inner cities in flames, Labour decided to self-harm.

There was the sheer nastiness of the Benn-Healey leadership election. It turned really ugly, with Denis Healey being barracked off stage by Tony Benn supporters, and members of parliament being threatened with deselection if they did not back Benn. Healey recorded in his memoir that the contest created the impression of ‘extremism, violence, hatred and division’.

Nearly 30 Labour MPs from the right of the party defected to the new Social Democratic party, tilting Labour to the left. Whatever their frustrations, there is no excuse for them leaving Labour, especially when others on the right proved it was possible to stay and fight.

And then there was the 1983 manifesto. Whatever the rights and wrongs of its contents – withdrawal from Europe (without a referendum), cancellation of Trident and removal of American bases, state control of industries, currency exchange controls, and a vast increase in public spending – it allowed the Conservatives to paint Labour as blood red. One of the famous posters from the time shows the Labour and Communist party manifestos side by side under the strapline ‘Like Your Manifesto, Comrade’.

By the 1983 election, after four years of splits, rancour, and childlike indulgence in fantasy policymaking it was no surprise that Labour lost three million votes. Labour lost seats to the Tories in Birmingham, Norwich, Leicester, Lewisham, Derby, Nottingham and Sheffield. Labour came within 700,000 votes of coming third in national vote share. Benn lost his seat, Thatcher won a majority of 144.

If Labour had had a different leader and manifesto, and if the party had not lost its governing mojo, it is possible, just, that the dark night of Thatcherism could have been avoided. Instead, Labour opted for opposition for the next decade. Neil Kinnock made Herculean efforts, but the march back to credibility was too slow in pace. While Thatcher had gone, Thatcherism continued into the 1990s. Had Labour modernised enough it could have stopped John Major in 1992 and prevented the privatisation of the railways, signed the Social Chapter and set about tackling child poverty earlier. Instead it took four defeats in a row before Labour was able to replace the Tories.

So what are the lessons, if we are to avoid a repeat of history? First, the party belongs to us all. The SDP split was a terrible self-inflicted wound by MPs who owed their political existence to the Labour party. So moderates should stay and fight their corner, no matter how tough it gets. Progress has a place as valid as the Campaign Group. Labour is a coalition of left and right, and, like an eagle, needs both wings to soar.

The second is focus: the Tories can be beaten. Internal elections must not become a distraction from the main job of providing an alternative government. Thatcher’s first term was untroubled by a serious alternative. Labour looked the other way. This year’s contest is in danger of allowing David Cameron and George Osborne to get away with murder.

Third, Labour needs to behave like a serious force in British politics, not a rabble. This means acting as a team in parliament without grandstanding rebellions, avoiding the temptation to offer running commentary to Sky News, and ending the name-calling of ‘Tory’ or ‘nutter’ towards anyone with whom we disagree. Labour does not have a cloak of invisibility. People can see and hear us, and this summer the sight has not been very attractive.

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Photo: Robert Huffstutter