The popularity of Emmanuel Macron and Martin Schulz has turned the narrative of the inevitable decline of the European centre-left on its head, writes William Bain

Visiting Paris and Berlin last autumn to speak with politicians and commentators on the common challenges faced by the centre-left in Europe, despondency was everywhere. Disaster was predicted in both the French presidential and national assembly elections this May and June, and in the German federal elections this September. Conversation focused on rebuilding shattered parties for four or five years’ time, and avoiding the fate of the British Labour party, sliding back in public support during the mid-point of a second term in opposition. 

Now a few months on, there is a more optimistic tone in France and Germany. Strong polls may not translate into election victories, but it is at least conceivable that over the next year, the three major nations in a post-Brexit European Union may elect centrist or centre-left leaders – Martin Schulz in Germany, Emmanuel Macron in France, and the return of Matteo Renzi in Italy. If all three win, it could have profound implications for the future of the EU, particularly the application of the fiscal rules underpinning the Eurozone. We could see the dawn of financial reforms that could aid the still-economically stricken southern Eurozone states.

Even should only one of the triumvirate prevail, the narrative of an inevitable era of European centre-left decline will have been arrested, and valuable lessons offered to the UK centre-left on putting together an election-winning narrative and progressive alliance of voters to defeat the forces of the centre-right, nationalism and populism.

There are different forces at work in each of the three nations however. In France, the post-Hollande deep split in the Socialist party I encountered between more leftist voters tired of the compromises of power, and those intent on being a better governing force cost former prime minister Manuel Valls the Socialist presidential nomination. These divisions are likely to worsen after both the presidential and national assembly elections. An electoral pact between the Socialist nominee Benoit Hamon, and the radical leftist Jean-Luc Melenchon appears unlikely. So the race comes down to the three front-runners – the former centre-right prime minister Francois Fillon, still strongly in the race despite the scandals over his family and publicly-funded salaries, the former economy minister Emmanuel Macron, and Marine Le Pen.

Centrists outside the Socialist party and the Republicans tends to soar in the spring but fade by polling day. This time may be different. Macron has proven a charismatic campaigner with a powerful unifying message. In a change election, he offers a generational shift, a powerful defence of the benefits of the EU, economic renewal, and unity in place of populism. His support is broad, but still lags behind Le Pen and Fillon in terms of its depth and certainty to vote. This, together with translating his positive message into a convincing policy agenda that can seal the deal with voters is his biggest challenge on the road to the Elysee Palace. In recent weeks, Le Pen has been strengthening her position in both the first round, and final run-off polls. Given her plans for French withdrawal from the Eurozone, the campaign could yet be an uncomfortable rollercoaster ride over the next couple of months for Europe.

The transformation in Germany is equally remarkable. Although I detected a listlessness at the prospect of a fourth term for Angela Merkel (in tandem with the SPD again) last autumn, there was seen to be little possibility of anything which could shake that eventuality. Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s election to the federal presidency together with SPD chairman Sigmar Gabriel’s decision to step aside as chancellor candidate-presumptive created the circumstances for the Schulz effect, lifting the SPD from the low 20s to around 30 per cent in polls for September’s federal election. The election looks to be as close as those in 2002 and 2005.

Schulz has a strong story to tell about his politics and life, with the advantage of having been outside of federal politics in his time in the European parliament. In a Germany appreciative of Merkel’s chancellorship, but with a pent-up desire for change, these are powerful advantages. The SPD has attracted support from both Die Linke and the Greens, but the CDU/CSU have come together to end their public differences over immigration given the strong Schulz threat. Schulz’ campaign is likely to focus on economic fairness, with the paring back of the Agenda 2010 labour market and welfare reforms. The Union by contrast will emphasise security – both to stop any leak of support to the AfD, and to win back centrist support flirting with the SPD. Scrutiny of Schulz’ views on Eurobonds and the pooling of Eurozone debt will intensify. Positioning on Donald Trump will be a significant campaign issue. At a similar stage of his chancellorship to Merkel’s now, Helmut Kohl held off a strong challenge from the SPD in 1994 – the next seven months will show whether Schulz has the electoral appeal of Rudolf Scharping who lost to Kohl, or Gerhard Schroeder, who defeated the Union in 1998 and 2002.   

In Italy, Renzi is intent on ending divisions within the Democratic party to ready it for the next general election, by calling a leadership election in which he will stand. In his recent speech to PD members of parliament, Renzi strongly allied himself with Macron-style reforms to boost economic growth. Should he win, pro-reform forces within the PD are likely to be in the ascendant. Even after the December referendum which cost Renzi his hold on the Italian premiership, the PD has a narrow lead over the populist Five Star Movement, ahead of probable elections in 2018 under a new electoral law. Renzi could be back in the Palazzo Chigi heading a PD-led coalition by next spring.

Elsewhere in Europe, the picture is less cut and dry than the commonly presented story of centre-left collapse. In Sweden, the Social Democrat government is making important vital changes in the economy and labour market, and leads in the polls. In Spain, PSOE is fending off attacks from Podemos-United Left for abstaining in the confirmation vote for the Rajoy-led People’s party minority government after two inconclusive general elections, but faces an internal battle between supporters of former leader Pedro Sanchez, and more pragmatic forces. In Greece however, Pasok shows little sign of recovery. In central and eastern Europe, cultural and identity politics factors have led to severe problems for the centre-left, not least in Hungary and Poland, but social democrats lead the Slovakian government, and recently won the Presidency in Bulgaria.

The winter was expected to be cold and bitter for Europe’s centre-left – instead it has shown that with popular and charismatic leadership; a compelling narrative for national renewal and change; a defence of Europe’s values and political and economic co-operation; and offering answers rather than anger to the common challenges on inclusive prosperity and identity; makes us electorally popular, relevant, and competitive. Grounds for optimism then, and lessons for us in Britain to learn.

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William Bain was member of parliament for Glasgow North East. He tweets at @William_Bain

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