Theresa May’s ‘veiled threat’ to the European Union over information-sharming endangers the security of Britons, argues Claude Moraes MEP
On the 31 March, Donald Tusk replied to Theresa May’s letter triggering article 50. There will be many analyses of the European council’s response, but one widespread initial reaction is how clear and unambiguous their response seems to be in relation to such historic and sensitive negotiations. This is why, while many have acknowledged that the prime minister’s letter adopted an appropriate tone, one of its deep flaws were the multiple mentions of security which have been considered a ‘veiled threat’ to the European Union over security cooperation and a widespread belief that the United Kingdom wants to use security as a bargaining chip. This was exacerbated by the home secretary’s recent threat to withhold information from Europol if we did not get the deal we wanted.
This suspicion was underlined by The Sun’s extraordinary front page headline ‘PMs BREXIT threat to EU; your money or your lives, trade with us and we’ll help you fight terror.’ While a tabloid headline, it underlined a long held suspicion that the UK sees cooperation on anti-terrorism as a quid pro quo on those issues critical in the negotiations, primarily trade.
But if the UK is strong in the area of security, then why would this be the wrong position to take? The fact is the UK has some of the most effective intelligence and policing operations anywhere in the EU in addition to assets like GCHQ which give the UK international standing. The problem however is that we’re talking about anti-terrorism cooperation in our European area of proximity where we as the UK are the biggest users of EU intelligence and anti-terrorism assets, such as the Schengen information system, the Eurodac asylum fingerprinting system and Europol which is headed by a Briton. In essence we need this as much or more than other EU countries.
While it is also the case that the UK contributes to these databases and assets the fact is that it is the UK which will seek a security deal with the rest of the EU on security cooperation following our exit.
The security infrastructure does not just relate to anti-terrorism and foreign fighters but to new legislation where the UK was at the forefront such as passenger name record, and the whole area of organised crime and cyber crime, much of which we will want to continue to be associated with following our exit.
In relation to our intelligence services, much of what they do works internationally through the ‘Five Eyes’ arrangement, and bilaterally with EU and non-EU countries, even today when we are members of the EU. These arrangements will continue unchanged because they are mutually beneficial.
In February, I did an interview in the Guardian where I warned that there was widespread concern in the EU that security would be used as a potential bargaining chip by the UK, and that there was already widespread rejection of this tactic, mainly because it would have no practical effect, there is no real leverage, and it would just smack as a ‘veiled threat.’ This has now happened and has made our security negotiations probably more difficult rather than providing the sort of leverage the prime minister had intended.
In the end the UK is strong in both security and defence. This is a given. But underneath these obvious strengths are real complexities, which do not lend easily to article 50 negotiations where the UK will now seek to negotiate some future partnership with organisations such as Europol and to continue using the extensive intelligence databases which are so effective in ensuring our response to anti-terrorism, organised crime and people smuggling.
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Claude Moraes MEP is chair of the European parliament civil liberties, justice and home affairs committee
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