Democracy has failed in Afghanistan. That statement can’t make easy reading for Barack Obama, Gordon Brown or indeed anyone that believes in democracy. But has it failed, or was it simply always the wrong solution for Afghanistan?
No doubt the international community was wringing its hands before the election and in the interregnum before the aborted run-off, hoping for a clean, legitimate outcome, and probably for an Abdullah victory which would have signalled a new start. But that is nothing more than a ‘what if’now.
So how did Afghan ‘democracy’ end up here? In 2002, it was decided that a western model of democracy would be the best route to a Taliban – and al-Qaeda-free – Afghanistan. In the intervening years, however, the US and UK’s strategic and resource focus on Iraq meant that efforts to effectively quash the Taliban insurgency and bring economic development to Afghanistan have been unsuccessful.
Despite this, a ‘democratisation’ process, spearheaded by elections, continued. Critics point out, however, that key to the success of democracy is a sense of national unity, economic development and preserving local customs. Afghanistan has historically been an economically poor and highly decentralised tribal society. Installing a strong government at the centre through the mechanism of elections thus seems a curious priority. It is perhaps not unsurprising, then, that Afghan democracy was vulnerable to abuse. As Paddy Ashdown has asserted, this is not the fault of President Karzai, but rather the international community for attempting to patch on an unsuitable regime. So what options are there for the future?
Happily, there is a middle ground between the two starkest options of complete withdrawal and sending in more troops. The Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid takes a ‘minimalist state’ approach. Prior to 1979 and the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was peaceful, albeit poor, with a subsistence economy that provided employment in agriculture. The government, though only a ‘bare-bones’ structure under a king, worked well because it was strong enough to maintain law and order but did not undermine the autonomy of the tribes.
In 2002, Rashid tried to convince the Bush administration that it should rebuild a ‘minimalist state’ to keep al-Qaeda and the Taliban out. Back then, Richard Holbrooke estimated that this might cost $5bn a year over 10 years. Today, it would cost $10-15bn a year and tens of thousands of extra troops. As this is now unlikely, and knowing the power of public opinion, Rashid suggests the first thing to be done is for the American and European people to be told the truth by their governments: that mistakes have been made; that the minimalist state approach should have been taken; and that the terrorist threat has grown and spread throughout Africa and Europe.
Second, the minimalist state should be rebuilt as quickly as possible, focusing on agriculture, job creation and justice. Third, more aid should be given to Pakistan to help fight the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda. Finally, Afghan partners on the ground should be cultivated – crucially, Karzai should be forced to bring all the leading opposition figures into the government.
The international community has both a moral obligation and a security imperative to finish what it started in Afghanistan. Hopefully, Obama’s new strategy will feature elements of the Rashid thesis and the end result will reflect the Afghan context and the needs of the people. This may not look like a democracy in the western model, but Afghanistan can still remain an ally in the fight against terrorism.
It is essential for the west to learn how to use democratic principles, if not ‘democratisation’ itself, to counter the threat posed by terrorism, and for western leaders to find better ways of explaining to their people why this is necessary. Losing the war against terrorism abroad would be catastrophic, but losing the argument at home about how to do it could be fatal.
I find it hard to understand when you say lossing war against terrorism. There no way you can win terrorism, you can only change their attitude throgh negotiation and deplomacy. This people are illusive, the are the Afgan military and in the police. Even some of them are in the government.
I think you are right when you said It is essential for the west to learn how to use democratic principles. The threat posed by terrorism, and for western leaders to find better ways of explaining to their people why this is necessary. Yes,losing the argument at home about how to do it could be fatal.
Yes, we need to set time table for withdrawing our troops. But before withdrawing we must make sure that the country is stable.
No countries want their land to be occupy by Foreign occupier.
Posted by Samuel Dada on 03 December 2009, 3:05:54 PM
I find it hard to understand when you say lossing war against terrorism. There is no way you can win terrorism, you can only change their attitude through negotiation and deplomacy. These are people are illusive, the are they Afgan military and in their police. Even some of them are in the government. But, I think you are right when you said It is essential for the west to learn how to use democratic principles. The threat posed by terrorism, and for western leaders to find better ways of explaining to their people why this is necessary. Yes,losing the argument at home about how to do it could be fatal. Yes, we need to set time table for withdrawing our troops. But before withdrawing we must make sure that the country is stable. No countries want their land to be occupy by Foreign occupier.
Does Ms Owen not see how farcical is her statement:”In 2002, it was decided that a western model of democracy would be the best route to a Taliban – and al-Qaeda-free – Afghanistan.”. WHO decided? Most certainly, not the Afghan peoples, not even the mythical ‘international community’, but a small gang of vengeful and vainglorious imperialists in the US and UK. In 2001 Bush refused to ask the Taliban to extradite Al Qaeda, preferring revenge against the entire Afghan people. Seeking to impose a centralised state, the precondition of democracy, compounded the blunder. Jack Straw used to babble, following Richard Holbrooke and Philip Bobbitt, that democracies have never engaged in war against each other . Without even mentioning that as soon as Georgia and Armenia achieved democracy in 1918, they started fighting, Errol A Henderson (google him) showed the gross factual error of this view. Politically, it is and was just an excuse for another War to End War (remember 1914-18?). Yet still more farcical is Owen’s claim that:
The international community has both a moral obligation and a security imperative to finish what it started in Afghanistan. Pouring live blood after blood that is spilt and dead – what a moral obligation. Now, the best educators of the Western occupiers are the Taliban – to quote Nutting on Suez”No end of a lesson”. The more minimal any state in Aghanistan the better – but only a lunatic could think that the giant aggressive bureaucratic states of the the US and UK could contribute anything to this task.
Anna
Your ‘middle-for-diddle’ compromise solution to the Afghan war betrays your ‘media’ interpretation of events: “a certain % of the public will want complete withdrawal and an equal % prefer an increased involvement therefore I will argue a solution that will please both camps” as totally pathetic.
Let us, as rational people, ignore your shallow provocative views and take a realistic look at what is needed to eliminate the deadly attacks on all democratic societies.
I have no feelings of guilt when I say that the future freedom of our children depends on democratic values as opposed to undemocratic ones. The Media, including Anna Owen, often mistakenly state that “compromise is the best policy” when prognosticating on Afghanistan intervention yet abandon “compromise” when considering issues such as rape or education. She may be content that Afghan women are treated as inhuman objects because of ‘cultural’ differences but to use this Taliban argument as a basis for extremist violence is nothing but despicable.
How stupid are you? Do you think that the only reason Islamic extemists are murdering civillians around the world is because the UK is in Afghanistan (or Iraq)? Who, with a brain, would ever accept the premiss that “suicide justifies mass killing”?
The truth is that what is right and moral is not a path betwixt democracy and dictatorship but a clear distinction between what is democratically acceptable and what is democratically unacceptable.
War is never acceptable but it is sometimes justifiable. I believe Belgium, Poland, Falklands, Iraq and Afghanistan were justifiable. It may be unpopular but sometimes you have to be true to the “moral and democratic values” as expressed in the social history of the UK rather than displaying a certain compromising and unpatriotic attitude.
It’s not just that strong government was a mistake, but also that it was never communicated to Karzai whay was expected of him; that he would need to be an instituion builder rather than a tribal deal maker, typical of the stateless Pakistan region that he comes from. He wasn’t even present in Oslo when the west devised 40 government departments including a Health and Safety executive. 4 departments of state are appropriate. Security, roads, education and health.
I’m not saying Karzai is blameless, but I am saying that we have to learn how not to impose our culture on others and expect them to immediately fit our sqare holes.