Labour’s second term victory was built on the same cross-class coalition of ‘middle England’ and ‘heartlands’ voters which brought the party to power four years ago.

   But while similar, the result was not a carbon copy of the 1997 general election victory. Not only did turnout slump by thirteen percent, but Labour’s support amongst working class voters also slid. Those losses were, however, offset by Labour gains in ‘middle England’.

   Although little remarked upon, the 2001 general election marked a watershed in British political history. For the first time ever, middle and working class supporters provided the same 50 percent share of the electorate. It is a sharp turnaround from 1964, however, when 70 percent of voters were working class and Harold Wilson needed fewer than two million middle class voters to win. By contrast, Tony Blair required four million middle class voters to secure power.

   It was a challenge Labour easily met. According to the ICM/BBC exit poll, the party’s support amongst middle class voters rose to 36 percent – its highest ever figure. Tory middle class support collapsed even further. The Tories enjoyed a 32 percent lead over Labour amongst middle class ABC1 voters in 1992. That lead shrank to five percent in 1997 and down to two percent in 2001. There was a 1.5 percent swing to Labour amongst professional AB voters and a two percent swing to the party amongst white-collar C1 voters.

   Labour’s strong ‘middle England’ performance was exemplified by seats such as Wimbledon, where Roger Casale achieved a 1.47 percent swing to Labour, Enfield Southgate, where Stephen Twigg quadrupled his majority, and Harrow West, where Gareth Thomas achieved a phenomenal 5.4 percent swing. Indeed, as political analyst Peter Kellner suggested: ‘New Labour MPs defending narrow majorities seem to have benefited from incumbency.’ Thus although Labour’s vote fell by 2.4 percent across the country as a whole (with the Tories rising by 1.2 points), Labour MPs defending majorities of less than 10 percent saw an average rise in their vote of 1.8 points with the Tory vote up by just half a percent.

   While Labour gained ground in ‘middle England’, its working class support slipped, adding to the fears of some who warned last year of disenchantment in the party’s ‘heartlands’. Labour’s 1997 lead over the Tories amongst working class voters of 31 percent dropped to 21 percent this year. Amongst skilled C2 voters, Labour’s vote dropped three percent on 1997 with the Tories gaining two percent. And amongst DE voters – the semi-skilled, unskilled and pensioners – Labour’s vote dropped by seven percent as the Tories rose by six percent and the Lib Dems by five percent. The swing against Labour was thus 3.6 percent in the most working class seats – but only 0.3 percent in the most middle class ones.

   The drop in Labour’s support in its ‘heartland’ seats was reflected in differing regional swings around the country. Apart from a poor Conservative performance in Scotland, the swing away from Labour since 1997 was lowest south of a line from the Thames to the Severn. Thus while the swing to the Tories was a mere 0.4 percent in the South East and 0.7 percent in London, it was a more significant 3.1 percent in the North East and 3.8 percent in Wales. In the crucial Midlands battleground regions, the swing was 2.1 percent (West Midlands) and 2.6 percent (East Midlands).

   Labour’s ‘heartlands’ difficulties were compounded by the differential turnout between the party’s seats and those held by the Tories. The ICM/BBC poll found that Labour supporters were twice as likely as Tory supporters to stay at home. Unsurprisingly, turnout fell more heavily in Labour ‘heartland’ seats than others. There is now a double-digit difference between turnout in typical safe Labour seats and their Conservative counterparts.

   The drop in working class support for Labour, however, should not disguise the fact that the party still won more support in 2001 from C2 and DE voters than it did in the 1979 general election, which brought Margaret Thatcher to power, or the 1992 general election, the last of the Tories’ ‘four in a row’ victories.

   What, though, were the other demographic characteristics of the Labour victory? The 2001 election saw the gender gap – which had seen women more likely to vote Conservative than men – firmly closed. Labour polled the same 42 percent amongst men and women.   

   Labour’s support was also disproportionately concentrated amongst younger voters. Labour polled 47 percent of the vote amongst both those aged eighteen to 24 and those in the 25 to 34 bracket, giving the party an eighteen percent lead over the Tories. Voters in the 35 to 44 age group were also more pro-Labour than the national average, with 44 percent backing Labour and only 28 percent supporting the Tories.

   But Labour performed less well amongst older voters. The party polled 39 percent amongst 45 to 54 year-olds with the Tories only five percent behind. The gap between Labour and the Tories was one point higher in the 55 to 64 age bracket. Only amongst one age group – pensioners – did the Conservatives manage to win a plurality. The Tories polled 42 percent, five percent ahead of Labour.

   Whatever the challenge Labour faces over the next five years – to retain the support of its middle class supporters while repairing its losses in its ‘heartland’ areas – it is clear that the mountain the Conservatives have to climb is enormous. At just the moment that the Conservatives’ traditional base – the middle classes – has reached new heights of political power, the party has, thanks to its sharp shift to the right, alienated a substantial proportion of it.

   The second half of Labour’s first term saw a heated debate in the party over whether it would be forced to choose between its ‘heartland’ supporters and its new 1997 ‘middle England’ voters. The election suggests that, with middle class and working class voters equally concerned about the need to revitalise Britain’s public services, no such choice had to be made. The results do, however, indicate that while the party’s first term concern to keep ‘middle England’ on board paid off handsomely, the ‘heartlands’ are showing signs of restlessness. It is a warning Labour would be ill-advised to ignore.