This week’s ICM poll by the Guardian shows 54% of the public now oppose the renewal of Trident – a marked change from just three years ago when 51% favoured renewal and just 39% opposed it. At the time, the government won House of Commons support for the renewal of Trident with the help of Conservative support.
The erosion in public support for the renewal of an independent nuclear deterrent comes at the same time as public support for military operations in Afghanistan increases. This split decision by the public shows an electorate more willing to prioritise Britain’s military needs than its government.
With a price tag of at least £20bn, the renewal of Trident represents a remarkable expenditure for a weapon of remarkably limited utility. At a time when President Obama is leading calls for a new wave of nuclear weapons reductions, any realistic scenario in which Britain would need to launch a nuclear strike independent of its French and American allies becomes almost unimaginable.
Defence spending has long been a perilous issue in Labour party politics, all the way through from the resignation of Aneurin Bevan over the introduction of charges in the NHS to pay for Korean War rearmament to the call for unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1983 manifesto – the infamous “longest suicide note in history”.
But good politicians know that precedent only carries you so far, and that adaption is the key to survival in changed circumstances. Whereas the public once viewed a nuclear arsenal as a cornerstone of Britain’s international heft, now the public is more likely to determine the efficacy of British military power by the actual use of conventional force rather than the hypothetical use of nuclear force.
The ability for such a bold break with the past is further enhanced by the support for, at a minimum, serious consideration of non-renewal by such respected defence authorities as former Defence Staff Chief Lord Guthrie, former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and former Liberal Democrat Leader Lord Ashdown. Indeed, even the former Conservative Defence Secretary, Michael Portillo, has argued that money spent on renewing Trident would be better spent on conventional defence.
It would be unfair for the public to accuse the government of prioritising resources for a possible future nuclear war over a current conventional conflict – after all, defence procurement is matter of billions of pounds spread over years and years. However, symbolism in both war and politics matters deeply. A reprioritisation from nuclear to conventional defence requirements is vital as a signal of British will to fight and win not only the war in Afghanistan but the probable counter-insurgencies, humanitarian interventions and conventional wars we are likely to face in coming years and decades.
The British public realise this. The defence establishment increasingly accepts this. It is time for the government to act accordingly.
Some comments on Marcus’ stimulating article by para and then overall…
p. 1+2: ‘Public opinion’ is not a suitable standard by which to set defence policy priorities. The public are short sighted, ill-informed and led by media priorities. Besides, opinion polling is not an institutionalised form of democratic expression, unlike elections.
p.3 Obama is speaking to the Russians, in particular, and his pronouncements have no relevance to us, despite the tendency to take his every word as gospel truth. At £20bn Trident is extremely cheap (compare to France) for its ‘utility’ (see below). Any sort of strike using any nuclear weapon, let alone, Trident is unimaginable, that’s not the point!!! It’s not intended to have utility like conventional weapons and it’s the height of folly to attach the same sort of values to it.
p.5 Again, what the ‘public’ might or might think is immaterial (given the choice most of the public would support the death penalty). The deterrent isn’t meant to be measured by the British public but by foreign statesmen, friendly and hostile. That’s why government have consistently supported it, Labour or Conservative.
p.6 I’m rather sceptical about Lord Guthrie’s position – he’s a soldier and wants the money for the Army! Let’s face it, non-renewal will inevitably mean that money will go into the rest of the government budget (or budgetary black hole) rather than to defence. You might, perhaps, get some of the 20bn but not the through-life costs. And you can say bye-bye to any sort of independent British foreign policy whatsoever.
Defence, and associated foreign policy, is not solely about the rather insignificant insurgencies or humanitarian interventions, headline-grabbing they may be. Defence is also about power, prestige and national posture. Trident forms a cheap and invaluable part of that national posture. We should remember that the key part of our national policy remains dealing with the powers. Russia, China, India, America, Iran… These countries listen to strength, not weakness, and they put stress upon mililtary potential, of which being a nuclear power is vital. A non-nuclear Britain can’t play in this league; we’ll be relegated below France and even below Germany and Japan due to our smaller economy. Do we really want that? Trident’s utility is that it enables us to have a ‘seat at the top table’ which we wouldn’t otherwise have, at relatively little cost. The US, NATO, ESDP, UN – Britain obtains leverage in these organisations because of her nuclear status. Again, compare France, it maintains an (overpriced) deterrent for exactly that reason. Let’s think about the dire consequences of yielding place within EU defence to the French and Germans!
There is also the doubt that counter-insurgencies etc will remain our major priority – the international situation can change extremely rapidly, just look at 1989. I question whether they are anyway, terrorism is not exactly a major threat to our existence here in the UK, and ‘humanitarian’ interventions are always going to be small-scale wars of choice, not to mention increasingly controversial.
There’s also no ‘moral’ example to be set – disarmament will mean other powers laugh at us for our folly, and go on with their nuclear programmes anyway.
Once gone, the nuclear deterrent will never be recovered. So this ‘bold’ break with the past will be, like most ‘bold breaks with the past’, a policy of short-termism which will harm Britain’s international position and do not a jot for her armed forces. Marcus’ thinking is quite the wrong-way around, in an increasingly multi-polar world we should be maintaining our nuclear forces, if necessary at the expense of ability to prosecute campaigns which have little real value. Nuclear weapons are proliferating throughout the world, whether we like it or not, which enhances Britain’s need to have them.
Some comments on Marcus’ stimulating article by para and then overall…
p. 1+2: ‘Public opinion’ is not a suitable standard by which to set defence policy priorities. The public are short sighted, ill-informed and led by media priorities. Besides, opinion polling is not an institutionalised form of democratic expression, unlike elections.
p.3 Obama is speaking to the Russians, in particular, and his pronouncements have no relevance to us, despite the tendency to take his every word as gospel truth. At £20bn Trident is extremely cheap (compare to France) for its ‘utility’ (see below). Any sort of strike using any nuclear weapon, let alone, Trident is unimaginable, that’s not the point!!! It’s not intended to have utility like conventional weapons and it’s the height of folly to attach the same sort of values to it.
p.5 Again, what the ‘public’ might or might think is immaterial (given the choice most of the public would support the death penalty). The deterrent isn’t meant to be measured by the British public but by foreign statesmen, friendly and hostile. That’s why government have consistently supported it, Labour or Conservative.
p.6 I’m rather sceptical about Lord Guthrie’s position – he’s a soldier and wants the money for the Army! Let’s face it, non-renewal will inevitably mean that money will go into the rest of the government budget (or budgetary black hole) rather than to defence. You might, perhaps, get some of the 20bn but not the through-life costs. And you can say bye-bye to any sort of independent British foreign policy whatsoever.
Defence, and associated foreign policy, is not solely about the rather insignificant insurgencies or humanitarian interventions, headline-grabbing they may be. Defence is also about power, prestige and national posture. Trident forms a cheap and invaluable part of that national posture. We should remember that the key part of our national policy remains dealing with the powers. Russia, China, India, America, Iran… These countries listen to strength, not weakness, and they put stress upon mililtary potential, of which being a nuclear power is vital. A non-nuclear Britain can’t play in this league; we’ll be relegated below France and even below Germany and Japan due to our smaller economy. Do we really want that? Trident’s utility is that it enables us to have a ‘seat at the top table’ which we wouldn’t otherwise have, at relatively little cost. The US, NATO, ESDP, UN – Britain obtains leverage in these organisations because of her nuclear status. Again, compare France, it maintains an (overpriced) deterrent for exactly that reason. Let’s think about the dire consequences of yielding place within EU defence to the French and Germans!
There is also the doubt that counter-insurgencies etc will remain our major priority – the international situation can change extremely rapidly, just look at 1989. I question whether they are anyway, terrorism is not exactly a major threat to our existence here in the UK, and ‘humanitarian’ interventions are always going to be small-scale wars of choice, not to mention increasingly controversial.
There’s also no ‘moral’ example to be set – disarmament will mean other powers laugh at us for our folly, and go on with their nuclear programmes anyway.
Once gone, the nuclear deterrent will never be recovered. So this ‘bold’ break with the past will be, like most ‘bold breaks with the past’, a policy of short-termism which will harm Britain’s international position and do not a jot for her armed forces. Marcus’ thinking is quite the wrong-way around, in an increasingly multi-polar world we should be maintaining our nuclear forces, if necessary at the expense of ability to prosecute campaigns which have little real value. Nuclear weapons are proliferating throughout the world, whether we like it or not, which enhances Britain’s need to have them.
How does the UK differ from other countries in its defence needs and priorities?
If the purported “independent deterrent” is essential for us, logically it must also be essential for every other country e.g. Iran.
There are also cheap Machiavellian approaches to retaining nuclear capability.