The Scotland Act 1998 represents a key moment during the twentieth century’s greatest period of constitutional change within the UK. The Act, followed in May 1999 by the first Scottish parliamentary elections, helped provide scope for a fuller and more effective regional democracy throughout the country. Along with parallel developments in Wales and Northern Ireland, the Act set a pattern of greater legitimacy for policy execution at the regional level through the creation of a chamber of elected representatives. It laid the foundation for a period of civic regeneration by providing an environment suited to experimentation with new models of civic activism. And it serves as a vital test-bed for new political relationships and election systems.
The Scottish executive has had an effective two years, especially given the modest parliamentary experience, albeit excellent quality, of many of its members and Donald Dewar’s untimely death. It has coped well with the early vicissitudes of a new political environment and, significantly, a parochial Scottish media with a strong line in destructive criticism.
The executive has, of course, seen its fair share of teething problems, including the departure of two special advisers in less than ideal circumstances and the systemic managerial failure of a major executive agency, the Scottish Qualifications Agency. The former arose, at least in part, as a consequence of the goldfish-bowl nature of local Scottish politics, the latter as a consequence of overly corporatist Scottish instincts which require some degree of modernising. Most significantly, however, the executive successfully led the passing of eight Acts specific to Scotland in the first legislative year alone, on subjects ranging from national parks to incapable adults. In substantive terms, therefore, the executive has performed well where it has mattered most.
The Scotland Act recognises explicitly that some institutions are peculiarly Scottish and that some policy functions are best carried out at the Scottish level. Equally, the logic underpinning the Act means that some institutions and perspectives must be shared across the UK – this, in effect, represents the fabric of UK nationhood.
Over the coming years, the great overarching challenge faced by the Scotland Office and Scottish executive together will be to overcome the significant but surmountable threat that the benefits of devolution may be constrained, and its direction distorted, by professional vested interest groups seeking to present the Scotland Act as incomplete.
Historically, Scotland’s legal and commercial infrastructure has ensured that some professionals, such as lawyers, judges, bankers and accountants, can have a career at the highest level without leaving Scotland. Devolution naturally shifted some new institutional and organisational influence from the UK level to the Scottish and this had the side effect of enabling some largely public and voluntary sector professionals, working in areas related to these institutions, to take an extra step up a shortish ladder.
However, while the private sector continues to make staffing decisions based on market exigencies, some professional groupings have now seen their own interests reflected in new institutional structures emphasising the Scottish level at the expense of the UK level – and many want more of it. The danger for the government and executive is that the tail of professional vested interest may begin to wag the institutional dog and that professional interest lobbying in Scotland might end up playing straight into the hands of those who wish to extend devolution beyond the present settlement, beyond its natural elasticity.
It is worth looking at this a little more closely. The term ‘the new Scotland’ is ubiquitous throughout the Scottish media. It is an aspirational phrase referring to the scope for the ‘renewal’ of regional civic, political and cultural life presented by devolution. It implies optimism and high ambition. The same term is sometimes used as a collective noun, however, referring to the professional and organisational paraphernalia surrounding the new parliament. This is where some professionals in Scotland have so far prospered, albeit in a modest way, from devolution. For example, the burgeoning Scottish media establishment (with its own high-selling tabloid, two ‘quality’ daily and Sunday papers, a unique layer of regional papers, plethora of local newspapers, Scottish versions of all the UK newspapers, BBC Scotland, two independent TV companies and a number of independent radio stations) grew additional digits, if not arms and legs, to both take account of, and reflect, the nature of politics as a growth industry in a newly devolved Scotland.
New mid-level jobs (some relatively senior at the regional level) within quangos and the voluntary sector were also created and non-departmental public bodies , such as the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality, received uplifts in their officer complements, with the most senior positions being upgraded. Interestingly, the legislation which provides each of these latter organisations with its raison d’etre, the Sex Discrimination Act and the Race Relations Act respectively, is reserved to Westminster, so their upgrading did not reflect a direct legislative imperative, rather the perceived requirement to be seen to respond constructively to devolution.
In addition, a number of UK public affairs organisations have opened Scottish offices and a number of Scotland-based private sector organisations have created new parliamentary liaison units. And new ‘civic’ bodies have appeared, too. These include the Scottish Civic Forum, a new organisation facilitated by the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations and part-funded by the Scottish executive, which seeks to promote wide debate on matters of policy. The SCF also exists, according to its website, to ‘scrutinise’ the legislation which passes through the Scottish parliament.
The additional resources provided to the ‘public’ professional classes through the devolutionary settlement, however, do not at this early stage appear to have enabled the devolutionary settlement to ‘bed down’ by reconfiguring public life to fit it. Rather, some of those who articulate and interpret the language of devolution appear to have sought to maintain momentum towards the ‘extension’ of devolution in a way which reflects their own greater personal interest. By far the most important specific example of this can be found at BBC Scotland, where the senior staff and recently retired Scottish governor have consistently supported, even campaigned for, a Scottish six o’clock news bulletin. Their main argument has been that residents in a grown-up ‘new’ Scotland should view the world through a Scottish prism rather than a UK one. The awkward compromise solution to date has included the extension of the regional news bulletin and the creation of a Scottish opt-out segment within the BBC’s Newsnight programme. The latter programme in particular is characterised by its introspective approach, in contrast to the to the outward-looking perspective of the post-eleven o’clock segment of the UK programme from which it opts out. Indeed the programme concludes with a press round-up which substitutes, with unintentional symbolism no doubt, references to the Aberdeen Press and Journal and Dundee Courier for the International Herald Tribune of its parent programme.
At one level, BBC Scotland’s philosophy of parochialism is not inconsistent with the wider purpose of the BBC as a whole – it agrees that a nation’s perspective upon the world is a fundamental part of the fabric of the nation itself. It is just that while the parent organisation’s nation is the UK, consistent with the ‘reserved’ legislative status of broadcasting, BBC Scotland’s ‘nation’ is Scotland.
And here we can see how small but significant groups of educated mid-level professionals living in Scotland are discovering how the unchecked and intelligent application of linguistic nuance can increase their personal status. This opportunism can have wide cultural consequences. What, for example, is a ‘nation’? One thing is certain, for most people living in a Scotland today the nation they live in is now Scotland, not the UK, and this is underlined by both its new status as a kind of body politic and the language of the media. Yet the larger debate around the nature of nationhood in Europe is more normally set into the context of the ability of nation states to assure the security of their citizens and to control their economies. This is not the kind of ‘nation’ represented by a devolved Scotland, where the use of the word often seems to extend from confused interpretations of the historical movement of people between what is now Ireland, mainland UK and other parts of Europe.
The campaign of senior staffers at BBC Scotland has, therefore, served to exploit what some may see as the erosion of the nation state within Europe in precisely the same way as the Scottish National Party. It follows that the validity of the UK’s claim to be a nation-state in the true sense is patently declining within Europe and that Scotland’s claim to be, culturally at least, a nation within Europe provides the word with its only real meaning.
Of course, the SNP’s deeper analysis of nationhood is rooted in the nineteenth century ‘nationalist’ philosophy, reflected all too graphically in the newly-reconstructed Balkan and Baltic states today. Its economic policy, such as it exists, is protectionist and its newly adopted idea of nationhood within Europe both incoherent and crudely opportunistic. Indeed, the latter is explicitly rejected by the demeanour and argument of its activists and politicians on the streets.
But it is the general thrust of devolution as ‘a process, not an event’, as the SNP phrases it, which is attractive to BBC Scotland personnel and other professionals in Glasgow and Edinburgh – not what most would admit is a half-baked confection of weepy-eyed emotionalism and third-form economics. It is, therefore, a primary role of all Scottish politicians to show how the settlement articulated within the Scotland Act is both an end in itself, and one which best marries regional identity and a deeper democracy with the true economic and social interests of British people resident in Scotland.
The Scotland Act was designed to recognise and capitalise on regional diversity within the UK, while ardently avoiding stultifying and horizon-shortening parochialism. The broader political aim is to ensure that the principles and values guiding the Labour government’s objectives, where possible, are tailored to local requirements. What the Scotland Act was manifestly not about was implementing a political programme in Scotland based upon a different set of values, nor one which fails to recognise the strengths of UK-level governance. These details are intrinsic to devolution.
This means that future debate around devolved tax-varying powers must be considered alongside Scotland’s beneficial per capita expenditure within the UK, the fact that reserved policy areas account for around the same government expenditure in Scotland as the block grant, and that future debate must note the importance of non-Scotland resident UK citizens retaining confidence in devolution, too. It also means that those establishing new ‘civic’ and voluntary sector bodies in Scotland must ensure first that each has a new and real purpose, and that they are not simply ‘independent’ versions of UK bodies, created for their own sake.
The Scottish Civic Forum, for example, has the potential to make a significant contribution to Scottish civil life. But one of its stated roles – ‘to scrutinise Scottish parliamentary legislation’ – looks very like an informal attempt to create the second chamber the unicameral Scottish parliament was explicitly designed not to have.
Relatively inexperienced parliamentarians must develop an awareness that they have much to learn about the practice of UK governance. The Scottish executive has been effective to date because of the positive influence of those senior members who gained extensive experience at Westminster, and because of the ability of a number of new parliamentarians who are ministers to perform extremely well on an astonishingly steep learning curve. While constructive backbench criticism of the executive is an important part of parliamentary activity, new parliamentarians who are backbenchers are, of course, on a steep learning curve, too.
The role of the Labour-led Scottish executive, supported by all Labour MSPs, is to deliver the benefits of devolution as laid out by the terms of the Scotland Act. This is in partnership with their Westminster colleagues.