Inevitably, opponents of the Iraq war are being challenged to admit we were wrong. Yet the swift fall of the regime has not answered all the questions at the heart of the debate.
Saddam Hussein has been removed. There are doubts about what will follow, and the ultimate political outcome may
be quite different from that sought by the US administration. Great tensions may well yet lie between what the Iraqi people desire, and the coalition’s aspirations. But only the most churlish Cassandra would wish it to be a disaster. The chances of an outcome acceptable to the Iraqi people must be better than evens. Liberal left opponents must concede that, without
the war, Saddam would still be in power today. But acknowledging this does not mean that all the arguments against the war simply fall away.
The Iraqi people are probably less concerned than anyone else whether weapons of mass destruction are found. In the wake of Saddam’s fall, there will be a tendency, not least in the UK and the US, to treat this as a side issue. But it should matter to us, as it does to the rest of the world. In the absence of any international consensus about how tyrannical regimes should be addressed, it was the foundation of any legitimacy the war had.
I still assume that some WMD programme will be found, but I doubt whether it will make an overwhelming case for military action in our own defence. It may well make the case that
a longer period of pressure may have achieved the disarmament that lay at the heart of the war.
The Iraq conflict has removed one dictator from the world; but it has weakened rather than strengthened the possibility of international support on similar or other equally pressing problems facing the global community. US neo-conservatives argue that this does not matter. They want the rest of the world
to accept the US as the guardian of universal values and to rely on the US, and the US alone, to assert them.
There is little in US history, or in our own history of empire, to suggest that we should accept that promise. Powerful countries inevitably exert their power in their own interests and in projecting of their own view of how the world should be. The US will do things that are right; they will also do things that are wrong.
International action to tackle international problems requires international legitimacy if it is to be effective. Without it, a few rogue states might be dealt with (though I doubt that Zimbabwe will ever be high up the US’s international agenda). Countering terrorism, which requires political will and intelligence co-operation between diverse governments, may be less amenable to unilateral action. If we want UN members to accept international standards of human rights and conduct, and help uphold them, such standards must be applied with consistency. Whether we like it or not, there is little trust around the world about the US’s intentions, or of our own.
It is hard to appreciate, sometimes, that others do not see us as we see ourselves. But we experience this everywhere: in the genuine desire in much of the Muslim and Arab world to see the coalition fail, even though they had no sympathy for Saddam; in the reluctance of African states to shun Mugabe because they do not believe we have a genuine interest in the well-being of Africans; and in the likelihood that terrorism will grow as the one sure way of challenging the power of the US and its allies.
Global poverty, hostility to western values, disease and environmental problems threaten our own security. A well-ordered and co-operative world is in our own interests. After Iraq, the challenge is to find new ways of achieving it.
Opponents of the war need to recognise weaknesses in our own case. The liberal left has never had a consistent approach to dealing with tyrannical regimes, or collapsed states. We have been better at condemning rights abuses than
at advocating positive measures to support the people of those countries. We have been sharper in our criticisms of the ways such regimes are supported – arms sales, political alliances and badly designed economic adjustment and trade policies
– than in finding ways of isolating and challenging those who oppress their own people. We have not been prepared to rethink where the boundaries of national sovereignty lie, even in extreme cases.
So we have some thinking to do if, in future, we are to articulate a more convincing third way between inaction and unilateral action. There is no future in denying the pre-eminent power of the US, or simply opposing its every action. But we should not disguise from our American allies our desire to influence their actions and their strategy; or fail to be clear to American citizens why we have concerns. A lesson from Iraq is to be clearer about the strategy, the tactics, the timetable and the limits of our support.
The UK alone cannot exercise the influence on the US that we and the wider world require. A lot rests, now, on our ability to rebuild our relations with other European nations. A Europe divided between supporters and sceptics about the US is in no one’s interests, so we have to shape Europe into a distinctive and influential European voice in foreign affairs that does not become an alternative or rival pole to the US.
In many parts of the world, UK foreign policy is now seen as indistinguishable from that of the US even where the differences are significant, as they have been over the Middle East, trade talks, debt relief or the environment. In the months ahead, we must ensure that distinct British views are projected clearly, particularly in ensuring that the Middle East ‘road map’ does not become a one-sided set of demands on the Palestinians.
Finally, we need to begin the difficult and sensitive debate about how the international community can deal differently but effectively with tyrannical regimes and the role of the United Nations in this. Many countries will not welcome such a debate; it may be seen as a different justification for a new imperialism. But to challenge the unilateralism seen in Iraq the world community needs better and more consistent ways of challenging oppression.
Many supporters of the war, as well as its opponents, will agree that Iraq should not be the model for future action. The challenge now is to make the alternatives achievable.