Howard Dean’s presidential campaign represents a familiar anomaly in modern US politics: the once-in-a-generation popular movement. In 2003 Dean leapt from being an ‘asterisk in the polls’ to being the man to beat. Then, over the course of one humiliating week in January, his campaign all but collapsed. Without winning a single primary and having spent some $200 per vote, Dean for America has been forced to close its doors and is now saddled with nearly half a million dollars in debt.
Dean lost because of political mistakes, barbarous media coverage and because his lack of experience showed. The reasons behind this electoral washout are, however, less important than the lessons of the campaign. Most significant is the impact of the Dean for America movement on political grassroots organising, which will be felt beyond 2004 and well beyond the Democratic party.
America in 2003 was ripe for a popular political insurgency. When it emerged, the new movement was a political revelation. It had very little structure, few funds and fewer backers, but it did have energy. Supporters were urged to organise their own ‘meet-ups’ and to invite their friends. Momentum rapidly grew and by September Dean had over 600,000 registered supporters ready and willing to help in any way they could.
The Dean campaign also saw the potential of the internet and used it as a tool to reach millions of formerly unengaged citizens, to educate them on the issues, to organise, advertise and to raise money. Over 300,000 people pledged money to the campaign online, breaking all Democratic fundraising records and raising over $40 million, with the average contribution only $143.
However, the strengths of Dean’s campaign became weaknesses in the final stages, particularly in terms of organisation. The lack of command and control was perfect for building grassroots support as it individualised the message. But it also bred woolly thinking, with the result that Dean’s campaign HQ had repeatedly to issue clarifications, climb-downs and apologies.
The campaign was crying out for a clinical, professional political machine to kick in towards the end of 2003 to harness Dean’s potential in the early primaries, but this did not happen. Organisation in Iowa was weak, momentum was lost and, by the time of voting in New Hampshire, it was all over.
In 2000 America was split 50-50, Democrat-Republican, and turnout was just 51.3 percent. This year the White House will be won by the candidate who can bring the most new voters into the process while retaining their core support base. The challenge is to attract the elusive, untapped constituency – the ‘sleeping giant’ vote of the young, the poor, women and ethnic minorities. Dean’s goal was to bring one million new voters to the Democrats and if nothing else his campaign proved that such re-engagement is possible.
The challenge for the Democrats now is to learn the lessons of the Dean campaign in galvanising the grassroots and to ensure that they capitalise on that new support. The Republicans are proving that a coherent, controlled message-based campaign can be maintained alongside an amorphous activist base. They are beating the Democrats at their own game – they have been training activists for this year’s election since 2001. The strength of the Democratic turnout campaign ‘Project 5104’ (51 percent in 2004) will be key, and with the re-emergence of the third party threat in Ralph Nader, the Democrats have more than ever to earn each and every vote.
It was with this overarching goal in mind that Dean succeeded in bringing hundreds of thousands of new people into the process. A virtual stalking horse of the left, he served to remind his punch-drunk party what needed to be done and showed them how to do it (and how not to do it). Ultimately Dean failed, but his impact has been huge. This should be recognised if the Democrats win in November.