At the beginning of the 20th century the House of Lords threatened the emergence of a fully democratic Britain. It was hereditary, unaccountable, overwhelmingly biased towards a single party – regardless of public opinion – and militant in defence of the interests of one class above all others. The question, then as now, is not whether to reform the second chamber, but how?
The second chamber is often dismissed as unnecessarily obstructive. One of the main arguments used in support of Lords reform is that it continues to be dominated by one political party and obstructs the work of the legitimate, elected chamber. It is not automatically wrong for the second chamber to block elected governments; making the government of the day think again is a key function of the second chamber. But it is wrong that the House of Lords continues to be far more of a hurdle for Labour governments than for Conservative governments. Between 1979 and 1997, the Tory government was blocked, on average, just thirteen times a session by the Lords. In the 2003-4 parliament, the Labour government was blocked 88 times.
A group of Labour Peers, chaired by Lord Hunt, recently proposed changes to the powers of the second chamber. Discussion about the powers of the Lords is important but a distraction at this point in the debate. The controversy surrounding the composition of the second chamber prevents it from exercising the limited powers that it has. While it is still necessary to review the powers of the second chamber, the issue of composition is more pressing.
Opponents of a directly elected second chamber argue that it would challenge the primacy of the House of Commons, lead to gridlock and that there is no consensus in parliament or the country for reform. This is simply not the case. The primacy of the Commons is rooted in its powers, not its method of selection. A new Parliament Act could clearly set out the distinct and complementary roles and functions of each chamber.
Gridlock would only be an issue if both chambers had equal powers, as is the case with the US Senate. The second chamber should remain the subordinate chamber but appointing members is not the way to achieve this. A combination of the right roles, functions, powers and composition would not only remove the risk of gridlock, but also produce a healthier relationship between the two Houses and between parliament and the executive.
There is also no evidence that the number of elections influences turnout. Lord Wakeham claimed this in his report, yet failed to provide any evidence of it other than a declining turnout in the US. Yet turnout has declined in recent decades while the number of elections has not significantly changed from 100 years ago. It is hard to see how an extra ballot on the same day as the Commons’ election will cause people to turn off from politics: experiments in holding separate ballots on the same day – such as 2004’s ‘Super Thursday’ – would appear to have been largely successful.
One compromise proposal is Billy Bragg’s secondary mandate. This would see the votes cast at each general election aggregated at a regional level and then allocated to each party in proportion. But this creates all kinds of anomalies. For one thing, people voting for independent candidates, or parties that only field candidates in a few constituencies, will not be represented in the second chamber. Far from being a ‘secondary’ mandate, many people will vote with the second chamber specifically in mind, while tactical votes for the Commons will end up being counted again for the second chamber.
What’s more, because the secondary mandate uses closed lists, it will contain the same flaws in the system used to elect MEPs, combined with anxieties about appointment. The lists will reflect the preoccupations of the parties that appoint them, not the priorities of the electorate. This is hardly a system to instil public confidence.
A predominantly directly elected second chamber remains the best option in terms of consensus. The Commons came remarkably close to voting for an 80 percent elected chamber in 2003, with the motion defeated by just three votes. Given the confusing system used, and the fact that a total of 332 out of 659 MPs voted for one or more of the 60 percent, 80 percent and 100 percent elected options, it is clear that the Commons broadly favours a predominantly elected option. Public opinion has increasingly favoured an elected element to the second chamber. The 2004 JRRT/ICM State of the Nation poll suggests that 67 percent of the public favour a majority or wholly elected second chamber. In 2003, Charter88/YouGov put the figure at 83 percent.
And it should not be forgotten that all of the other main parties favour direct election. The Liberal Democrats and Greens want a 100 percent elected senate; the Tories want 80 percent. Far from being the consensus option, secondary mandate enjoys almost no support outside of the Labour party. Labour is in danger of going into the next general election with the least progressive option for reform on offer.