Since the Scottish and local elections last year – or even longer – people have worried that the ‘Muslim vote’ in Britain is shifting away from Labour. In March, an ICM poll showed support for Labour at 38 percent, only two points ahead of the support for the Liberal Democrats. Historically, the Muslim community in Britain has cleaved very tightly to Labour, with support at around 80 to 90 percent.
So what is happening to the Muslim vote?
We first need to go back a stage and ask why we are talking about the Muslim vote at all. We only really talk about the Christian vote in very specific ways – evangelical lobbying around Christian radio licenses, say. We rarely hear discussions about the Hindu, Sikh, or the Buddhist votes, but the Muslim vote is discussed ceaselessly.
Why is that?
There are two obvious reasons. The first is the size of the British Muslim community. In the 2001 census, the figure for the Muslim population stands at 1.59 million. That is as large as all other non-Christian groups put together. The second is the institutional islamophobia of the press. The Muslim community in the UK is always described in the mainstream press as a single entity, a state within a state. The motivations for individual journalists may be nothing more sinister than laziness. The story writes itself: simply find an extremist Islamic figure, an extremist islamaphobe, get quotes from each and sprinkle the story with words like ‘rising’, ‘anger’, ‘boiling’, and ‘point’. Taken together, though, these stories (and the pictures that accompany them) create a widely held assumption that the British Muslim community is 1.5 million angry young men.
It is important for Labour to continue to build links with Britain’s Muslim community, not only from the top, but also in constituency and branch parties across the country, where the record is more patchy. The first stage, for non-Muslims, is setting aside preconceptions and understanding that they are approaching a community with a deep commitment to discussion and argument; and a profound sympathy with Labour’s goals of social justice, born out of religious teaching.
The vast majority of the British Muslim community are of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin or ancestry. The first generation of immigrants overwhelming identified themselves by ethnic origin. This is the generation that tied themselves so strongly to the Labour party. The reasons were many. The majority of the immigrants came from poor backgrounds in Bangladesh and Pakistan and moved, at least initially, into inner-city areas and low paying jobs in the UK. The Labour party was a natural home for a community looking for a political voice.
When you add two further historical factors, the pull of Labour’s decolonising record, and the push created by the Tory flirtation with Powell-ism, the Labour party was all but cemented as the voice of a generation of the Muslim community.
But is that indefinitely sustainable – Iraq or no? In the 2003 Scottish elections, the Muslim vote for Labour all but collapsed. In the 2001 general election, 73 percent of Scottish Muslims voted Labour, in 2003 the figure was 27 percent.
Obviously the figures are not directly comparable, but they are very clearly no cause for Labour complacency, either. Gordon Jackson MSP, who sits for the Glasgow Govern constituency that sends Mohammed Sawar to Westminster, told the Glasgow Herald at the time: ‘While it is a concern for the Labour party, that is what a community maturing is all about.’ That is not giving up, or fatalistic, it is the Labour party acknowledging that it can no longer pocket all the votes of the Muslim community, but must engage in a continuous and on-going discussion, as indeed we do with every other part of the electorate.
An integral part of that discussion is understanding the shift across the generations in the Muslim community. There is evidence that younger generations see themselves primarily as both British and as Muslim. We are seeing a new identity being formed.
Clearly British Muslims follow British and US foreign policy towards Muslim nations very closely. The Muslim sense of umma, of community across the boundaries of nations, means that Iraq, the Middle East crisis, Kashmir and Afghanistan are of immediate and daily importance.
That does not mean, as some assume, that Labour can no longer pursue an activist and interventionist policy without alienating itself from the Muslim community. In 2002, an ICM poll found 70 percent of British Muslims were ‘very concerned’ about war in Afghanistan, with a further 22 percent fairly concerned. Despite this concern, though, there was not the deep unhappiness that we have undoubtedly seen over Iraq.
The Muslim community is not monolithic; like any other it is swayed by the detail of policy and the way it is put across.
Returning to this March’s ICM poll of British Muslims, we can see that the picture is rather nuanced. While 80 percent think the war against Iraq is unjustified, almost the same number 73 percent think further Al Qaeda attacks on the US would be unjustified. This is clearly not the ‘fifth column’ portrayed in the tabloid press.
Perhaps the most crucial figure is that 82 percent do not believe that the US administration wants to create an ‘independent sovereign and democratic state’ in Iraq. That is the avowed policy of the Labour government. Achieving it will clearly be the basis for renewed discussion with the Muslim community, and the repair of trust.
The presence of self-identified British Muslims in British political life should be welcomed as an imperative to explain foreign policy, not feared as a standing veto on intervention.
So if the imperative is to communicate and explain, how should the rest of Labour do this locally and nationally? The March edition of Q-News, a British Muslim journal, debates Muslim representation in Britain. Humera Khan argues: ‘British Muslim politics have always been a bit like Monty Python’s Life of Brian. Small groups of men call for unity but what they really mean is ‘unite but follow me’… result[ing] in a myriad of splinter groups all espousing variation of the same idea with the only difference being the order of the words: ‘Muslim’, ‘association’, ‘council’, or ‘Britain’.’
But do non-Muslims really have a right to expect Muslims to organise themselves under a single body, with a single phone number? As Fareena Alam, editor of Q-News, wrote in the Observer on 4 April: ‘Give up the colonial mentality where the white master feels he can approach a people and ask to speak to their village headman. Roll up your sleeves and start talking to people, activists and organisations that are not usually on your sanitised radar.’
The Labour party must continue to engage with the Muslim community. Iraq has undoubtedly shaken up the situation. But generational shifts may well mean that this would have happened anyway. On foreign policy, the way ahead is clear: achieve a democratic Iraq and Afghanistan, wage war on terror with sensitivity as well as strength, apply energy and fairness to the Middle East peace process and champion Turkey’s case to join the EU. And, above all, explain. On domestic policy, there are some specifically Muslim issues, such as faith schools and the need for a law (blocked by Tories and Lib Dems in the Lords) that outlaws religious as well as racial discrimination.
But, overwhelmingly, the issues of British Muslims are the issues of British people: living mainly in the inner cities, often living in large families, often looking for the skills and opportunities to gain good jobs, for good behaviour on their streets and public investment.
Despite the tabloids and the one-note courtship of opposition parties, we do not have in Britain parties that are primarily coalitions of identities. The Labour party is a coalition of interests: those that seek a better life and better public services for themselves and their families. That will always be the basis of Labour’s offer to the Muslim community – family tax credits, not marches and demonstrations. The party must avoid panicking about ‘losing’ the Muslim vote and instead lay aside simplistic preconceptions and build new links – often local ones – to a maturing and diversifying community.