So, Dubya’s back. Bush II is likely to be more ideological than Bush I. Hopes that George Bush will ‘go moderate’ in search of his ‘legacy’ – as the Reagan presidency shifted from first-term überhawk to second-term peacemaker – do not ring true. Expect instead to see how the president governs with the ‘mandate’ he never had in 2000. His clear – if narrow – victory, with the highest number of votes of any American presidential candidate, was both a personal endorsement for the president and a political triumph for Karl Rove’s strategy of mobilising the Republican base.
The president is likely to judge his legacy not by how far he manages to make up with us ‘euroweenies’ but on how far he can shift the centre of gravity in American politics further to the political right. After the Republican sweep of White House, Senate and House, those more fiscally conservative and internationalist Republican senators who counsel moderation, even humility, in victory may find themselves dismissed – like Margaret Thatcher’s ‘wets’ – as remnants of the old establishment. While a Democrat victory would have been heralded as a return to ‘normal’ after the traumatic aberration of the post-9/11 Bush foreign policy revolution, George W will now have an opportunity to redefine what the new normality in American politics is. ‘I have political capital and I am going to use it,’ Bush has pledged. Let us not misunderestimate his intent.
The Atlantic has already become wider. The British government has immediately begun to implement a different public strategy towards the Bush administration. Long-standing disagreements with the United States – over global warming, or protectionism and tariffs – are being publicly emphasised and not swept under the carpet. The pressure to persuade the US to engage fully in pursuit of a Middle East settlement has been conducted by public as well as private diplomacy. Most significantly, Jack Straw quickly set out some pre-emptive British ‘red lines’ over Iran by stating that he could see ‘no circumstances’ in which military action would be justified.
For all the value that the prime minister places on the closest possible relationship with the world’s sole superpower, there is also a clear acknowledgement of the need to handle the domestic fallout of a relationship that has become politically toxic at home, especially within the Labour party itself. But the debate about how Britain deals with America risks becoming something of a phoney war – primarily about the language of our public diplomacy. Is there much real difference – for example – between those who are sceptical about whether Bush will respond to pressure to genuinely commit to Middle East peace, and those who believe that it is vital to try because a settlement cannot stick without American engagement? The objective of both sides is the same.
Blair’s failure to ‘bridge’ the gap over Iraq may not mean that the ‘Blair bridge project’ is over – but it will need to be rethought. The transatlantic bridge needs to be primarily a European one – but this can only be built by dealing with the very real differences within the European Union about Europe’s role in the world. For Britain, this would mean focusing less on seeking influence through a partnership of unequals across the Atlantic and more on thrashing out the deeply contested future of Europe’s own global approach. The heat of the British debate over Iraq means we often overlook how deeply traumatic the Iraq crisis was for all of Europe’s major powers. In fact, in its aftermath, none of Britain, France or Germany has a clear European policy any more.
Tony Blair was forced to make a choice – between America and Europe, the transatlantic relationship and the UN – he was desperate to avoid. But this was just as much a watershed for France and Germany. Gerhard Schröder, in the midst of an election campaign he would otherwise have lost, found himself going much further in open dissent with the United States than the German political and diplomatic classes ever thought possible. France found that even the Franco-German partnership could no longer speak for the European Union: a majority of the new EU 25 supported the US position. This has added to the mood of deep ‘declinist’ gloom among the French political class about the future of the European Union, especially when combined with what is seen as the Anglo-Saxon dilution of the EU Constitution and the failure of some of the new Central and Eastern European members to recognise the European spirit (or to defer to the founders of the club).
In the short term, Britain can play a constructive role in seeking to limit the damage and repair the tone of relationships between Germany and France and the United States.
Transatlantic relations might not be warm, but they do need to function. The fall in the value of the dollar is just the most recent example of the depth of our interdependence. But the key issue within the European Union should not be who has the right approach towards America.
An existential debate about the nature of Europe’s relationship with America will tell us more about the national identity and self-image of different European countries than it will about what Europe can achieve in global politics. Nor will it be possible to build Europe as an ‘alternative pole’ to Washington in a ‘multipolar world’. Even if it were achievable – and there is no consensus within the enlarged EU for it – what would the objective of a new ‘balance of power’ be?
Instead, European governments should focus on where they can play an effective leadership role on international issues where there are vital issues that America is unlikely to prioritise. Next year’s British G8 presidency – focusing on Africa and global warming – will seek to do this. The UN reform agenda arising out of Kofi Annan’s High-Level Panel should also be a priority: while the neo-cons like to UN-bash, they may not show much interest in this concrete agenda for reform.
We should work closely with America where we can – for example, in pursuing the Doha round of trade liberalisation and development – and recognise more clearly where – as on global warming – we cannot. Remember Donald Rumsfeld’s undiplomatic diplomacy on the eve of the Iraq war – ‘If they are with us, they are with us. If not, there are “workarounds”’? Of course, we will be able to achieve less where America is not engaged: that unfortunate Clintonian phrase – America as ‘the essential nation’ – contained more than a ring of truth. But we may more often be looking for the best ‘workarounds’ we can find.
But this will mean reining in our obsession with America, which, for the political classes across Europe, has reached new heights this year. Too many of us can give chapter and verse on the Iowa caucus or Colorado’s initiative to split the state’s electoral college vote. In Britain, the race to be mayor of New York or governor of California receives much more coverage than that to be prime minister of Italy or Germany.We can keep the weekly appointment with The West Wing for entertainment. But the most difficult debates about the future of our foreign policy lie closer to home.