On 22 May the nightmare of the German centre-left came true. After five decades in power, the Social Democrats suffered a devastating state-election defeat at the hands of the Christian Democrats in their political homeland of North Rhine-Westphalia. The blow, however, was hardly unexpected. The true surprise came a little later in the evening, when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder threw Berlin’s political scene into turmoil by announcing new federal elections for September 2005.
The chancellor’s decision to ask for a new mandate has been interpreted by some as a brilliant – and necessary – strategic move, while others see it as capitulating in the face of insurmountable problems, a knee-jerk reaction reflecting the panicky mood of the current government. So what are the prospects for this autumn? Unlike the 2002 cliffhanger election when the red-green coalition clung on to power by the skin of its teeth, opinion polls suggest that this time round its luck may have run out: with a strong lead in most surveys, the CDU has a better chance of returning to power than at any time since 1994. As a result, many political commentators confidently speak as if power had already changed hands in Berlin.
What did the coalition do to incur the wrath of its electorate? A better question might be what it did not do. The two problems that dominate the debate in Germany are those of unemployment and economic growth. The former is too high, the latter too low. Around five million people (close to 12 per cent) are on the dole: the highest rate since the 1930s, sapping the morale of an entire people. GDP grew by 0.7 per cent last year – compare this to the UK’s rate of 3.2 per cent and the global rate of 5.1 per cent in 2004. ‘Deutschland unter alles’, as the British media gleefully remarked.
First elected in 1998, it took the coalition five years in office to come up with something resembling a plan. Since 2003, two major reform programmes have been underway – ‘Agenda 2010’, aimed mainly at reforming the health and pension system; and the notorious ‘Hartz IV’ labour market reforms that, among other things, merge means-tested benefits and unemployment aid into one, with a view to providing an incentive to work for those who rely too heavily on the generous German welfare system. The latter was heavily criticised by the SPD’s left wing as an act of betrayal to social democratic values.
How long it will take for these reforms to kick in is debatable. What is clear, however, is that the Schröder government waited too long to do what was painful but inevitable. As a result, the German electorate has begun to lose its trust in the ‘third-way politics’ of a ‘new centre’ and the centre-left is perceived as having run out of ideas and energy. Despite some rhetorical blunders over the past weeks, the CDU, led by Angela Merkel, has high hopes of moving into the ‘Kanzleramt’ (the chancellor’s office). So what might one expect of former chancellor Kohl’s protégé?
In concrete terms, Merkel’s own answer is a simple one: not much. Germany is still waiting for a CDU master plan. Never has a hopeful opposition, weeks before a general election, promised so little to the electorate. Merkel, a woman from east Germany and thus something of a rare specimen in the CDU, is clearly keeping her options on the domestic front open, relying instead on the electorate’s despair with the current government. Aware of this, the SPD’s strategy has been to argue in terms of general ideas and direction, rather than concrete policies.
It is from an international perspective, however, that differences between the two opponents become clear. Unlike the incumbent, Merkel is generally viewed as an ‘Atlanticist’, keen to re-establish ties with the US and reach out to the UK, and critical of Schröder’s populist rejection of US policy in Iraq. She would also be unlikely to try to revive the Franco-German alliance in the EU (despite her recent chmoozing with the French presidential hopeful Sarkozy).
On a more controversial note, her strong stance against Turkish EU membership could lead to some early tensions should she be elected during the UK’s EU Presidency. But changes in Germany’s foreign policy might be the thing to look out for, rather than a major shift in domestic politics. As far as the centre-left is concerned, barring any major surprises, the nightmare is likely to continue for a while.