Fulfilling Tony Blair’s promise to advance peace between Israel and Palestine requires, among other things, understanding the current trends in Israeli thinking. The conflict on Israel’s northern border caused a political crisis, not because Israel lost the war, but because it damaged the credibility of the government and its policy of disengagement.

The war showed the extent and the limitations of Hezbollah’s threat to Israel. Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Syria, disrupted the lives of a million Israelis, forcing them to flee or confining them to bomb shelters. But Israel’s military response showed the costs of using Lebanon as a base to attack Israel. Furthermore, whilst Iran seeks to increase its threat to Israel, developing long range missile and nuclear technology, the deployment of internationally backed Lebanese forces on the Israel-Lebanon border was a setback for them.

However, the war did succeed in damaging the credibility of Israel’s plan for disengagement, or ‘realignment’, on the Palestinian front. When Ehud Olmert became prime minister in March, establishing borders with the Palestinians, unilaterally if necessary, was his central policy. Following the failure of the Oslo process, unilateral separation, made possible by the security barrier and initiated by Ariel Sharon, gave hope to many Israelis in the political centre ground. Most Israelis are ready to withdraw from most of the territories, but have lost faith in the Palestinians as peace partners. Unilateralism gave Israel the option to separate from the Palestinians and firm up its international legitimacy, without the need for a reliable Palestinian partner. The withdrawal from Gaza and part of the northern West Bank in 2005 began this process. Disengagement undermined the goals of Iran, and other extremists, who are happy to see Israel bogged down in an occupation which erodes its international legitimacy. It was also a sign to the settlers that the dream of ‘greater Israel’ was over.

But the Lebanon war exposed the risk of conceding territory without an agreement. Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 left it open to Hezbollah rocket attacks and guerrilla incursions. Withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 allowed Palestinian groups to heavily arm themselves to fight each other whilst firing rockets at Israel. Now Israelis fear that vacating the West Bank will expose the centre of the country, where its population is concentrated, to the same threats. In addition, Israel’s political and military shortcomings in the war damaged public confidence in the government and its principal leaders, Kadima prime minister Ehud Olmert and Labor defence minister Amir Peretz. As a result, disengagement is on hold.

Kadima’s creation prior to the elections recast Israel’s party system by drawing elements of left and right into a centrist bloc which backed disengagement. But in the absence of Sharon as its founding leader, and disengagement as its central policy, the Kadima led government’s leadership and direction are in question. Whilst the desire for peace in Israel remains, optimism is thin on the ground. The Israeli public’s disenchantment with its government has been enhanced by a series of unpleasant stories about the personal conduct of senior politicians.

Israel has been left with a sense of inertia. Since the death of Yitzhak Rabin 11 years ago, both negotiated and unilateral approaches to resolving its conflicts have led to more violence. The loss of confidence on the Israeli side is compounded by the political chaos on the Palestinian side. Little progress seems possible until the Palestinians can establish order and a unity government that is ready to engage with Israel.

Given all this, it would be understandable if international leaders did not want to get involved. But with the need for a diplomatic horizon so great on both sides, sympathetic yet firm guidance, from trusted international friends, may be what Israeli and Palestinian leaders need to take their weary nations through this impasse.

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Fulfilling Tony Blair’s promise to advance peace between Israel and Palestine requires, among other things, understanding the current trends in Israeli thinking. The conflict on Israel’s northern border caused a political crisis, not because Israel lost the war, but because it damaged the credibility of the government and its policy of disengagement.

The war showed the extent and the limitations of Hezbollah’s threat to Israel.
Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Syria, disrupted the lives of a million Israelis, forcing them to flee or confining them to bomb shelters. But Israel’s military response showed the costs of using Lebanon as a base to attack Israel. Furthermore, whilst Iran seeks to increase its threat to Israel, developing long range missile and nuclear technology, the deployment of internationally backed Lebanese forces on the Israel-Lebanon border was a setback for them.

However, the war did succeed in damaging the credibility of Israel’s plan for disengagement, or ‘realignment’, on the Palestinian front. When Ehud Olmert became prime minister in March, establishing borders with the Palestinians, unilaterally if necessary, was his central policy. Following the failure of the Oslo process, unilateral separation, made possible by the security barrier and initiated by Ariel Sharon, gave hope to many Israelis in the political centre ground. Most Israelis are ready to withdraw from most of the territories, but have lost faith in the Palestinians as peace partners. Unilateralism gave Israel the option to separate from the Palestinians and firm up its international legitimacy, without the need for a reliable Palestinian partner. The withdrawal from Gaza and part of the northern West Bank in 2005 began this process. Disengagement undermined the goals of Iran, and other extremists, who are happy to see Israel bogged down in an occupation which erodes its international legitimacy. It was also a sign to the settlers that the dream of ‘greater Israel’ was over.

But the Lebanon war exposed the risk of conceding territory without an agreement. Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 left it open to Hezbollah rocket attacks and guerrilla incursions. Withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 allowed Palestinian groups to heavily arm themselves to fight each other whilst firing rockets at Israel. Now Israelis fear that vacating the West Bank will expose the centre of the country, where its population is concentrated, to the same threats. In addition, Israel’s political and military shortcomings in the war damaged public confidence in the government and its principal leaders, Kadima prime minister Ehud Olmert and Labor defence minister Amir Peretz. As a result, disengagement is on hold.

Kadima’s creation prior to the elections recast Israel’s party system by drawing elements of left and right into a centrist bloc which backed disengagement. But in the absence of Sharon as its founding leader, and disengagement as its central policy, the Kadima led government’s leadership and direction are in question. Whilst the desire for peace in Israel remains, optimism is thin on the ground. The Israeli public’s disenchantment with its government has been enhanced by a series of unpleasant stories about the personal conduct of senior politicians.

Israel has been left with a sense of inertia. Since the death of Yitzhak Rabin 11 years ago, both negotiated and unilateral approaches to resolving its conflicts have led to more violence. The loss of confidence on the Israeli side is compounded by the political chaos on the Palestinian side. Little progress seems possible until the Palestinians can establish order and a unity government that is ready to engage with Israel.

Given all this, it would be understandable if international leaders did not want to get involved. But with the need for a diplomatic horizon so great on both sides, sympathetic yet firm guidance, from trusted international friends, may be what Israeli and Palestinian leaders need to take their weary nations through this impasse.