The crisis in Darfur has just entered its fifth year. For nearly all that time, hundreds of thousands of civilians have had to endure murder, rape, disease and privation. The scale of the crisis is nearly unimaginable, over 2.5 million people now live on the edge of existence. Figures as to how many have perished are difficult to estimate, the media and politicians have been content with a figure of 200,000 – a figure that has remained static in the policy debate for the last three years, while the killings and deaths have continued unabated. The real number of deaths will never be known, but it is likely to be at least twice that amount. But no number, however small or large, would be able to convey the utter tragedy of the past five years.
This article will ask what we can learn from the last five years, and what lessons can be applied so that the civilians of Darfur no longer have to suffer intolerably.
The international community has learnt little and applied even less from the tragedies of Bosnia and Rwanda. The response to the chaos in Darfur has been disorganized and uncoordinated, feeble and lacking in real sanction and as such has been largely ineffectual. This sentiment is acknowledged by nearly all including the British government. ‘If the question is, and it is, were we slow as an international community to respond? Then the answer has to be yes. There’s no doubt about that whatsoever and it’s one of the lessons that we need to learn. We were slow looking back with hindsight given what we now know.’ Hilary Benn, then Secretary of State for International Development, made this statement in July 2005, two years into the crisis.
Three years on from those words, what lessons have been applied? The Sudanese are still bombing civilians, humanitarian assistance is still being hindered, the Janjaweed remains armed, active and maiming, raping and killing. Civilians continue to flee from targeted attacks upon them, the Sudanese government can still buy small arms and military hardware, there is little to no prospect of a peace deal let alone a ceasefire, and the new hybrid joint United Nations African Union force (UNAMID) is as nearly as undermanned and lacking in essential equipment as the previous African Union force.
So has the UK changed its tack, five years on into the crisis, and three years on from the acknowledgement by the then Secretary of State that lessons needed to be applied? In a statement issued by DFID this February, Benn’s successor, Douglas Alexander, reiterated that:
‘The recent fighting in west Darfur has had a devastating impact on the lives of innocent Darfuris … I am particularly concerned by reports of aerial bombardment by government of Sudan forces, in contravention of UN security council resolutions. The latest violence in West Darfur underlines the need for the speedy deployment of UNAMID to protect civilians, and for a comprehensive political settlement. I urge all UN members to support this work, and for the international community, including the Security Council, to keep focused on this issue.’
So in reality little advance has been made in the international community’s response. If anything, the prospect of peace seems even more remote than at any other time during the conflict. The Sudanese government, emboldened by five years of inaction and half-measure from the international community, took the truly astonishing step of appointing one of two individuals indicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes by the International Criminal Court in the Hague, Ahmed Haroun, to head the Sudanese Department for Humanitarian Affairs, the department tasked with coordinating the humanitarian effort in Darfur. The other has been appointed as a presidential adviser.
If the UNAMID force is not supported by western governments, it will go the way of the previous African Union force: under-equipped, undermanned, outgunned, with civilians having little confidence in its ability to protect their lives. The capacity to increase the number of peacekeeping personnel on the ground will be crucial. The force is mandated to have 26,000 troops and 18 helicopters. Four months after full deployment was scheduled, there are only 9,000 personnel and no helicopters
Considering the hundreds of millions of dollars that western countries spend each year in the massive humanitarian aid effort, the UK, France and the USA should – at the very least – lease or underwrite the costs of the helicopters required for the mission. Those assets will be vital if the UN is to have any chance of taking hold of the security situation in the region. The UK government has committed to providing funding towards the costs of the UNAMID Mission through the UN assessed contributions fence some of that funding to provide the helicopters that are needed now.
It’s a sign of how little we have progressed that five years into the chaos and carnage the British government is still calling on the Sudanese to end its indiscriminate ‘aerial bombardment’. Sudan well knows that while western governments may call for an end to the bombings from the Anatov aircraft and attack helicopters, words alone are not enough to persuade it to forfeit one of its most effective and potent weapons against both rebel forces and the civilian population.
There is no need for a no-fly zone to be constantly monitored over Darfur, with expensive Awax planes flying over Sudanese airspace and radar monitoring stations set up in situ. What is required is a limited air-force sortie to take out a small number of the Sudanese aircraft that have rained destruction on Darfur for far too long. An operation that would take a couple of weeks to plan and just a few hours to execute would signal to the Sudanese that it can no longer utilise – as it has done ruthlessly for five years – air power against its own civilians without consequence. Maybe this is even too much to consider, possibly just a couple of cruise missiles launched from a NATO warship in the region would state the West’s renewed commitment to face down the Sudanese genocidal apparatus.
Both the Ministry of Defence, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have privately argued the latter is not viable. Particularly, that a military response may need to be escalated if the proverbial shot across the bow was not heeded by the Sudanese and that a military step such as this could provoke a response on the ground from the Sudanese against civilians that are already suffering enough. Both those arguments were also put forward in relation to the air campaign against Serbia, and in reality were not off the mark. Slobodan Milosevic did intensify his campaign of ethnic cleansing after NATO initiated its air campaign against their brutal regime, and Britain and America were certainly privately considering ordering a ground invasion of Kosovo in the event that they would have to escalate their military response to Serbian intransigence to respond to military and diplomatic pressure.
It is widely acknowledged that the air campaign was successful in its primary aim, the Serbian forces did withdraw from Kosovo, and ultimately led Milosevic to a path that lead to the court room and detention in the Hague.
Clearly the elephant in the room here is whether a western country, NATO or the EU could politically justify a military strike on a Muslim country while waging war in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The precision of the military strike would have to be matched by the precision of the diplomatic manoeuvring around such an attack.
First, unambiguous diplomatic statements of intent would have to be addressed to Sudan and the world. Action would be taken if Sudan continued to utilise its air force to attack civilians. The allies would have to present clear and irrefutable evidence that the Sudanese were continuing to indiscriminately bomb following such a warning. This would require aerial photographs, confirmation on the ground from the hybrid United Nations and African Union force, and possibly identification of the actual planes and helicopters used in such an attack. A period of time would have to be given so that the Sudanese could make clear that they would not take such action again. If that was not forthcoming or if further bombings took place, then the same pattern would have to be repeated. Warnings, presentation of evidence, except that this time it would be followed by a limited air force or cruise missile strike upon the offending aircraft, hanger or runway were the aircraft were based.
Clearly, there would be governments around the world that would state that such action would not be warranted whatever the situation. A number of Sudan’s closest Middle East allies, plus China and Russia at the Security Council would cry foul and whip up their domestic media to follow suit. But the alternatives are stark: a diplomatic spanking from Sudan’s closest allies or the Sudanese government’s continued utilisation of air power against its own civilians. It should surely be a central function of a diplomatic service to take such flack on behalf of genocide victims.
Much needs to change in how the west is dealing with the crisis in Darfur. There must be much greater international coordination in relation to challenging the Sudanese. Our diplomatic efforts need to be backed up with the real threat of military action, even if only of a limited nature, otherwise our words will continue to be ignored in Khartoum. The EU should introduce targeted sanctions upon the Sudanese government immediately, and only consider lifting them if they finally disarm and disband the Janjaweed militias and actually come through on the much-vaunted ceasefire. It is remarkable, that the European Union forged out of war and unimaginable genocide, five years into a genocidal conflict so close to its own shores has still not introduced any meaningful sanctions against the perpetrator regime. The combined political and diplomatic machine of the most powerful trans-national union in the world has mustered only its “concern” for what is happening – to be precise 64 mentions of concern in 25 EU General Affairs & External Relations Council statements One could ask, how concerned does it have to be, before it actually does something?
The last five years have offered little real hope for the Darfuri people. The crisis is certainly not intractable. Five years on, there is still a lack of recognition that the Sudanese government is intent on achieving its goal of pushing the black African population out of Western Sudan, and on the way killing as many of them as possible. It has used its entire diplomatic prowess and the leverage of its powerful friends at the Security Council to buy itself five years. In that time possibly as many as a sixth of black African Darfuri population may have perished due to this conflict, and well over four-out-of-five have had to relocate to refugee camps either inside Darfur or over the border into Chad. Will the Sudanese be allowed to complete their work?