This month’s elections were never going to be particularly easy elections for Labour: mid-term referendums on the performance of third term governments are frequently brutal as Margaret Thatcher found in 1990. Few, however, expected the scale of the carnage which ensued: the party’s worst defeat for 40 years and an anaemic 24 per cent of the vote.

Some of the damage Labour sustained was undoubtedly self-inflicted, most especially by the furore over the abolition of the 10 pence tax rate. This apparent muddying of the government’s commitment to the working poor is, however, symptomatic of a wider problem: the fact that the electorate no longer seems to know where the party stands. This confusion stems from the fact that the sum of the government’s parts doesn’t appear to make a coherent whole: a compelling sense of direction is lacking and even its four or five top priorities appear unclear, a reflection of the fact that frenetic activity has replaced strategy.

Too often, indeed, the government employs the language of progressive change without seeming to mean it, sending out conflicting messages on a range of issues, from public service reform to whether or not the era of ‘Whitehall knows best’ is really over. To paraphrase Norman Lamont, it’s not so much that the government is in office but not in power, as in office but without a defining purpose.

For Labour to find itself in this situation barely a year into Gordon Brown’s premiership is deeply depressing. But the party needs to move quickly to rediscover its self-confidence and recognise that, however bad these mid-term results, the next general election is still very much up for grabs. The opposition’s personnel and policy agenda remains embarrassingly weak and it’s arguable that the public are not yet convinced that David Cameron is ready for Number 10. Nor, as we have suggested before, does the country appear to be undergoing the kind of political sea change which it experienced prior to the landmark elections of the 20th century: 1945, 1964, 1979 or 1997.

However, as we warned in February, Labour should beware of the ‘safety-first’ option of relying on the Tories’ underlying weakness and the traditional recovery most governments experience as they move from mid-term towards polling day. May’s elections underline graphically the dangers of that approach: without a clear sense of where Labour wants to take the country, the siren cry of ‘time for a change’ is all the more difficult to refute.

But the suggestion that the party needs to return to a mythical ‘real Labour’ agenda in order to win back lost supporters is just as flawed. Yes, the results in traditional Labour areas such as Merthyr Tydfil, Blaenau Gwent, and Hartlepool point to disillusionment amongst the party’s ‘core vote’. Equally, however, the party’s defeats in Southampton, Reading and Harlow reinforce the need to urgently address the growing problem of ‘southern discomfort’.

Ken Livingstone’s defeat sounds another dramatic warning bell about the weakness of Labour in the crucial London electoral battleground, where the party suffered some of its most dramatic losses in 2005. It also indicates clearly the perils of losing the suburban vote, which Labour did so much to appeal to in the late 1990s.

We have long argued that to follow a ‘core vote’ strategy alone is dangerously misguided and ignores the hard lessons of Labour’s years out of power: that the party must not be forced into a false choice between pursuing support in Middle Britain and its heartlands. In the 1980s, it accepted this notion and paid a heavy price. In the late 1990s, by contrast, it crafted an agenda which appealed to both and victory followed.

Tackling the plight of the disadvantaged is very clearly at the heart of the prime minister’s mission, but that effort must be allied with a new focus on an aspiration and empowerment agenda which can unite low and middle-income voters and appeal to those who voted Labour for the first time in 1997. The party must never forget that it is only with a broad, election-winning coalition that it can retain the power to pursue the policies which can assist those who most need its help.

The recent public sector strikes – the ‘summer of discontent’ as the media so unimaginatively term it – have led to predictable but flawed comparisons with the last days of the Callaghan government. But this parallel is correct in one regard. Then, as now, Labour faced a choice about whether it was able to demonstrate that it was in-touch with the times and the aspirations of not only the country as a whole, but also its core supporters. That government was not without ideas – the prime minister’s Policy Unit proposed a drive to raise school standards and council house sales – but they all came to nothing as the party retreated to its comfort zone, ceding a potentially vote-winning agenda to the Conservatives. Labour must avoid repeating this tragic mistake.