An international treaty banning cluster munitions is being negotiated in Dublin from 19 to 30 May. This meeting is the final stage of the Oslo Process and is a historic achievement in arms control; a testimony to the growing capacity of the world community to recognise shared responsibilities and to work together to shape the norms governing armed conflict.
The Oslo Process has been made possible by a partnership between committed governments and civil society. Charities and NGOs promoting human rights, disability rights and those that work to alleviate suffering caused by conflict, have all brought their experience to a process initiated and led by a group of committed states. Cluster munition survivors, many of whom have been maimed and injured by these weapons, are playing a major role in bringing this treaty about.
Although the UK has been involved in the discussions so far and Gordon Brown made a clear public commitment to this process in his 2007 Lord Mayor’s speech, it is far from certain that they will endorse the treaty. The UK wants loopholes that would allow it to continue using some of its cluster munitions. Furthermore the UK may be unwilling to tell the US that it can no longer stockpile its cluster munitions on UK territory, or transfer them in and out of the country; both of these activities would be illegal under the current draft treaty text.
The UK has been the third biggest user of cluster munitions in the world over the last 10 years. Only the US and Israel have used more of these weapons. In Kosovo and Iraq the UK scattered nearly 200,000 submunitions – the small lethal bombs that cluster munitions disperse across wide areas. As a major military actor and past user of cluster munitions, it would significantly strengthen the new treaty to have the UK on board. However, the concessions that the UK is demanding represent far too great a risk to the effectiveness of the treaty in the future.
The UK wants certain weapons to be exempted from the ban that have a track record of civilian harm in conflict. In an effort to exclude these weapons it is also prepared to open up loopholes that will be widely exploited in the future. The UK argues that these weapons are needed for the protection of its forces but a number of senior former military commanders have publicly rejected this claim.
The UK has backed proposals to remove from the treaty the prohibition on ‘assisting’ other countries to use cluster munitions: so while recognising these weapons are unacceptable it would be reasonable to help others to carry on using them. In addition, the UK may be unwilling to ask the US to remove its cluster munitions from bases on UK territory. If the UK does back out of the treaty, it will probably claim that it was because British troops would have left without weapons that they need, but the real reason is likely to be unwillingness to assert its moral position in the face of pressure from the US.
Even if it succeeded in watering down the treaty during the negotiations, the UK could still refuse to sign or ratify it. The UK has still not ratified Protocol V to the UN Weapons Convention which was agreed in 2003 or the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which was agreed in 2006 and entered into force this April.
A common thread in many of these issues is money. For all the posturing about ‘military capability gaps’, the UK is worried about having to buy some replacement weapons. The irony here is that whether the UK is inside or outside the treaty, it will not be using its cluster munitions again. The risk of civilian casualties and the international dishonour that would result are too great to make military or political sense. In Afghanistan, there is now a standing policy against the use of cluster munitions. In real terms the military capability gap already exists.
For all the talk of ‘shared interests’, it is narrow, short-term, national financial considerations, coupled with an unwillingness to contradict the US, that seem to shackle UK policy on this issue. If the government can rise above these self-imposed constraints it has an opportunity to take a leading role in the most important weapons treaty for more than 10 years – a treaty that will stand as a landmark international commitment to protect civilians during and after conflict.