Shifting Alliances: Europe, America and the Future of
Britain’s Global Strategy
Patrick Diamond • Politico’s Publishing, 56pp, £14.99
Although he does not believe that Britain faces a basic choice between Europe and America, in this book, Patrick Diamond argues that it faces a question of priority which, since 1945, has been answered in favour of Atlanticism.
Blair viewed Britain as a bridge between America and Europe – Britain would influence US policy by abstaining from public criticism, while balancing between Washington and European powers. In practice, this meant an Atlanticist foreign policy which was cautious about European engagement, reinforcing the paradigm which has remained fixed since Suez. In this respect, Blair was ‘more a foreign policy traditionalist than a…reformer’.
However, this choice entailed political costs, which were dramatically revealed by Iraq. Diamond appears to agree with Gerhard Schröder’s comment that the traffic on Blair’s bridge went in only one direction. He argues that the primacy given to Britain’s US relationship – a strategy prompted by declinism – has inhibited accurate assessments of post-Cold War threats and emerging powers, and has prevented Britain from seriously engaging in Europe.
Diamond’s description of the British national interest in strong international institutions is surely correct. Yet, the US – at least the current administration – does not share this conception. Blair’s bridge failed to anticipate that British interests are more closely aligned with European than with American interests. Thus, Diamond calls for Britain to rebalance its priorities in favour of acting as a bridge within the EU, as a precursor to transatlantic cooperation.
Diamond emphasises the difficulties in achieving this shift, but it may be that engagement will be easier in an enlarged, more Atlanticist, EU than it was in a body motivated by opposition to America. His most useful contribution is the argument that, having halted postwar decline, Britain can now engage in Europe from a position of strength and a more accurate assessment of her global capabilities. Although Britain should never entirely jettison its privileged US relationship, a UK properly engaged in Europe would certainly be a more useful American partner than a detached Britain using the illusions of an unequal ‘special relationship’ to cling to a post-imperial global role. This book makes a strong case for that reassessment.