The worldwide countdown to the end of the Bush presidency – I have even seen a Londoner wearing a 20.01.09 shirt – has created more anticipation than perhaps even the Beijing Olympics. That would be true regardless of the candidates. Yet precisely because Barack Obama and John McCain are both perceived as representing a significant departure from the Bush administration, expectations have soared among Europeans that the next American president will implement a dramatically different, and improved, foreign policy. Both candidates would change American foreign policy, but probably not in the ways most Europeans think.
As perhaps George W Bush himself would appreciate, there is not much nuance in the analysis of his presidency and his foreign policy; it’s just plain awful. But the Bush administration has recently taken some small steps towards pragmatism that are not well understood, but are vital for the task of identifying the point of departure for the next American president. It hosted a Middle East peace conference; negotiated North Korean nuclear disarmament; engaged in by far the highest-level direct negotiations with Iran since the hostage crisis in 1979; and even accepted the need for a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. This should not be mistaken for a tidal wave of success, but these last two years compare favorably with the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Bolton axis of incompetence.
McCain’s foreign policy is no better understood than the Bush administration’s shift towards pragmatism. Ironically, it was Bush who campaigned in 2000 on a ‘humble’ American foreign policy and McCain who advocated the neoconservative mantra of ‘rogue-state rollback’. It was the post-9/11 shift to McCain’s brand of ‘national greatness conservatism’ that prompted the Economist to declare approvingly in 2002 that, ‘despite his defeat, he [McCain] laid much of the groundwork for Mr. Bush’s post-September presidency.’
This time around, McCain seems intent on undoing the modest achievements of the latter Bush years and returning to the aggressive neoconservatism of his 2000 campaign. McCain and his team of advisers believe that the limitations of American power evident under the Bush administration resulted from poor tactical choices and that the strategy of reshaping the world, by force if necessary, is still sound. As McCain often says on the campaign trail: ‘I know how to win wars.’ A McCain administration would likely get an early opportunity to test that hypothesis in Iran: the Republican nominee has ruled out talks over its nuclear program as appeasement and declared war preferable to an Iranian nuclear bomb.
Amazingly, the casualness with which McCain promotes further wars in the Middle East is less alarming than his plan to upend the international system and divide the world between democracies and non-democracies. He wants to kick Russia out of the G8, add rising economic powers India and Brazil to the group of industrialized economies, and exclude China from the new lineup. McCain also proposes a League of Democracies to assume much of the role of the United Nations. This neoconservative dream would serve the dual purpose of undermining the UN and reigniting great power conflict, causing some analysts to warn that President McCain would start a new cold war.
As much as Obama’s candidacy is identified with radical change, an Obama administration would look sceptically upon grand designs to use American power to rapidly change the international economic and political system. Instead, President Obama would bring to American foreign and security policy a new point of emphasis on how the US engages with the world. It seeks to recognise the limits of American power evident not just in the failures of the Bush administration but also in the defensive crouch adopted by most Democrats on national security issues since Vietnam.
Three key Obama foreign policy positions reflect part of this new approach: his early and consistent opposition to the Iraq war for the right reasons; his willingness to meet directly with leaders of America’s fiercest foes; and his commitment to use force against al-Qaida’s senior leadership in Pakistan if presented with actionable intelligence.
At a time when most Democrats were comfortably hiding under the Republican security blanket, Obama articulated a remarkably prescient opposition to the invasion of Iraq. He argued that although Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator, he could be contained until he faded from the scene, and that even a successful invasion would require a long and messy occupation that would roil the Middle East and swell the ranks of al-Qaida. Obama understood the lessons of the Iraq war before it began – the strategy was wrong, not just the tactics – and he was not afraid to say it.
This lack of fear led Obama to a position that seems obvious but no one dared mention before: negotiating with our enemies and adversaries. It is abundantly clear that the strategy of refusing to negotiate is not producing results while negotiations have led to breakthroughs – just look at North Korea. Only in the Bizarro world of American politics would such a results-based policy be ridiculed as appeasement. Few, however, were brave enough to challenge this convention until Obama.
For some, Obama’s stated willingness to go after senior al-Qaida leaders in their new safe haven in Pakistan stands in contrast to his opposition to the Iraq war and readiness to negotiate with Iran. Yet for others, it is another example of stating the obvious – how could an American president not target Osama bin Laden? – and demonstrates Obama’s commitment to a comprehensive foreign and security policy that is ready to use all the instruments of national power. The Democratic candidate is not opposed to war nor committed exclusively to negotiations. But clearly Obama understands the limits of American power and the negative consequences that could occur from sending US forces into such a hostile environment.
Using military force to counter terrorism forms only a part of Obama’s overall strategy towards Pakistan and, more broadly, to drain the pools of extremism and build sustainable and more prosperous societies. Obama’s outreach to the world would shift the focus from governmental action and elections and instead address people’s basic needs and aspirations, moving from democracy promotion to dignity promotion. In Pakistan, that means drawing red lines on al-Qaida, but also massively increasing non-military aid with an emphasis on education and infrastructure development in the breeding ground for the Taliban along the Afghan border.
McCain talks a great deal more about working with allies and institutions than Bush ever did, but Europeans should be clear on precisely what project McCain would ask them to join. He appears eager for new conflicts on a dangerous quest for top-down democratic transformation achieved through confrontation and force.
Obama would make a clean break with the mistakes of the past, challenge the orthodoxies of American policy, and tap our common humanity as the starting point of America’s engagement with the world. He speaks of a different kind of transformation, one that reaches from the bottom up and strives not for some vague notion of freedom, but a tangible improvement in human dignity. That’s the kind of change we need.