We in Britain have followed closely the unfolding crisis in Iran, culminating in the arrest and possible trial of local British embassy staff. Yet while we have been gripped by events in Tehran, we have failed adequately to appreciate the implications of another striking aspect of the current crisis. Throughout, the UK has benefitted from the strong and unanimous support of its EU partners.
This has taken several forms. All 27 EU member states summoned Iranian Ambassadors to protest against the detention of local staff of the British embassy in Teheran and to warn of tougher steps if they were not freed. Sweden, currently holding presidency of the European Union, was unequivocal in its condemnation of Iranian actions. EU ministers meeting in Greece warned that any “harassment or intimidation” of British staff would be met with a “strong and collective” response. This response is starting to take shape with restrictions on the issuance of visas to Iranian officials the first of a series of measures being prepared.
Such solidarity is all the more impressive given the significant economic ties that link several member states to Iran. While the federal government has recently taken steps to clamp down on export credit guarantees, German companies exported almost $6bn worth of goods to Iran in 2006, and over 1500 German companies are active there. Italy, Spain and Austria also have significant trade ties with the country.
Anxious not to jeopardize such close and profitable ties, the governments of these states have frequently proven reluctant to impose tougher economic sanctions on Iran in response to its nuclear programme. All the more striking, then, that, in response to a threat to the interests of one of their number, all have responded promptly and uniformly.
Such solidarity, moreover, challenges prevailing assumptions about European integration in this country. We in the UK are only too happy to ridicule the latest directive from Brussels concerning straight bananas, or the content of sausages. The EU is generally spoken of as a threat to our independence, a constraint on our ability to do as we please.
Yet discussing the union in these terms is misleading. Not least, it serves to obscure the fact that the EU often increases, rather than constrains, our ability to achieve our objectives. In the case of Iran, EU trade with that country is an enormous source of influence. Between 2000 and 2005, European-Iranian trade nearly tripled, while the union accounts for some 40% of Iranian exports. In 2006, the European Union was Iran’s leading trading partner, toping tables for both exports to (33.4% of Tehran’s imports) and imports from (23.9%) that country. Whilst the threat of retaliation from Britain may not be enough to make the Tehran regime quake, the prospect of changes to its leading trade relationship might well be.
And such logic is not confined to Iran. In many aspects of foreign policy Britain is simply unable to exert influence alone. As part of the world’s largest market, however, London’s leverage is increased significantly. A collective EU position towards Russia, for instance, could well prove effective in preventing the kinds of energy blackmail to which the Russian government has been increasingly willing to resort.
As part of the EU, Britain benefits from a collective clout which far exceeds its own. This is not something a mere free trade agreement, of the kind so often clamoured after by eurosceptics, could provide. Yet it remains something of which many in this country remain profoundly, and damagingly unaware.