Protests in Iran continue to drive a wedge between the ruling hardliners. President Ahmadinejad broke ranks with many supporters when he appointed Esfandiar Mashai as first vice president after the June 12 election. The divisions occurred mainly due to Mashai’s already well-known statements that Iran should show respect to all nations and peoples and be friends with the people of Israel and the US.
Ahmadinejad, with this appointment, has shown a degree of pragmatism, brought on by pressure from the opposition which is livid about his Holocaust denial and Great Satan approach to foreign affairs. Reformers feel that Ahmadinejad has isolated Iran and made it a laughing stock in the world, which is anathema in a nation proud of its history and concerned about its international standing. These events amount to a net loss of power by the hardliners. Not only do the conservatives continue to fall out but their most high profile torch-bearer, Ahmadinejad, has conceded a point to the opposition.
Ayatollah Khamenei, railing against the appointment, demanded and got Mashai’s dismissal, while the newspaper Kayhan, which represents hardline opinion, was also critical of Ahamadinejad. The regime has now been weakened by attacks, splits and defections. Street protests have mobilized masses, supported by members of Iran’s old guard, which include men such as Rafsanjani and Mousavi. Now the hardliners, or ‘new’ conservatives, which are based around the Revolutionary Guards, Kayhan and the hardline clergy, have become engaged in infighting as well. The world has seen a show of unity as Ahmadinejad was sworn in as president on 5 August, but beneath the gloss cracks are increasing.
The appointment of Mashai was a significant blow to hardliners, and created so much alarm because it strikes against the ideological underpinnings of the regime. The views expressed by Mashai undermine some of the most basic tenets of extreme Islamism, which divides the world into good and evil. If nations are to be respected as such, then the ideology begins to break down.
The real schism for such zealots is religious and ideological, principles which do not give highest priority to national boundaries. Respecting nations and peoples, especially those which think differently to the hardliners, also cuts across jihadist notions directed against the West, upon which is built much of the regime’s support. The perception of external threat is hence essential to hardline unity, as well as national unity when viewed through a fundamentalist lens.
Many of the grievances against the West have more than one meaning, depending on whom one is talking to. The US abetted coup against Mossadegh in 1953, a cause of still smouldering resentment, can be viewed through a nationalist lens or a fundamentalist one. When viewed as an outrage against the nation a remedy can be sought through statesmanship and diplomacy. From a fundamentalist perspective, the events of 1953 are simply evidence of a diabolical mindset, and hence no compromise is possible. For these reasons, Ahmadinejad’s change of tack is of more than passing significance.