The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia
Svante E. Cornell & S Frederick Starr (eds)
M.E. Sharpe
279pp
£21.50
Just one year ago a war erupted in the South Caucasus, unforeseen by the West, which lasted a week and quickly fell out of public view again.
That it involved one of the most heavily armed nations in the world, a former superpower with a nuclear arsenal, flagrantly breaking international law and invading one of the world’s smallest, less well-armed nations, is only one aspect of the story of the Russian-Georgian war of 2008.
The wider narrative lies not just in the conventional war but in the major information war that took place concurrently; it also lies in the fall-out for major western political alliances such as NATO and the EU; and it calls into question the stability of the entire post-Cold War settlement across two continents.
‘The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia’ is a factual and highly detailed analysis of a geo-political event mostly ignored in its detail by Western populations, which is also an engrossing and enjoyable read.
As a collection of essays, it adds greatly to our sum of knowledge surrounding the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, by bringing together 12 contributors from all sides of the event.
While balance is sought throughout, it is clear that the editorial line is pro-Georgian, though not slavishly so. Its aim it appears is to provide clarity on the war: that though Russia won the information and propaganda war at the time of the conflict, successfully (in the eyes of the West, and specifically Germany) blaming Georgia and in particular President Saakashvili for the hostilities, it is in fact Georgia that was the victim of a pre-planned invasion.
The facts as reported by the contributors support this case. Johanna Popjanevski writes in her chapter ‘From Sukhumi to Tshkinvali: The path to war in Georgia’, that Russia’s actions from the spring of 2008 into the August War strongly suggest that Medvedev’s administration intended to create a confrontation, with Russian aircraft involved in incidents against the Georgian military over Abkhazia (sovereign Georgian territory), and increases in Russian ‘peacekeeper’ contingents complemented by significant troop manoeuvres on the Russian side of the border.
Many interesting pieces of information are picked over to create a far fuller picture than presented at the time: for example, Russia flew 48 of its journalists out to Tskhinvali days before the conflict began – odd for an administration that claimed it merely reacted to the situation. The total repair and renovation of the railway line from Russia into Abkhazia by Russian troops stationed there suggests to several of the contributors that Russia intended the war to start there, since Russia transports troops by rail – exactly what Moscow did once hostilities began.
The contributors give a wide and clear view of the objectives and fears of both Russia and Georgia, and the lessons both nations learnt from the engagement. For Russia, its aim of territorial control over large parts of sovereign Georgian land was achieved. Georgia’s fear of its far larger neighbour’s aggression was realised. Both learnt that the West was unable to form a coherent response in the face of Russian belligerence.
‘The Guns of August’ is an absorbing analysis for those interested in learning more of a newly aggressive Russia, keen to recreate their old sphere of influence in the face of NATO and EU expansion. It is surely not the last time we will see Russian tanks rolling into a neighbouring state; next time the West may not have the option of hand-wringing and inaction if the principles of democracy and sovereignty are to be maintained in Europe’s backyard.