GREECE
On October 4 2009 the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) scored an impressive victory over its centre-right rival Nea Dimokratia (ND) in the Greek general election. After six years in opposition, PASOK obtained 44% of the vote on a 70% turnout and returned to power with an absolute majority in parliament. Though PASOK’s victory was far from unexpected, the scale of the victory was not. Led by the president of the Socialist International George Papandreou, the Greek social democrats have obtained a clear mandate to proceed with reform. Young faces, a historic high of nine women in the cabinet and promises of immediate, hard work have led to high approval ratings for the new government.
Which factors led to the social democrats’ victory and what lessons can progressives draw? To be sure, the party’s electoral victory has a lot to do with the previous administration’s abysmal record in office. Over the last legislative period (2007-09), ND disappointed all but its die-hard supporters with sleaze and a catastrophic handling of the economy. At 33.5%, its 2009 vote share constitutes a historic low and finger-pointing has already begun.
This, however, says little about the result. The scale of PASOK’s victory can hardly be accounted for solely on the basis of governmental ineptitude. After all, the social democrats were until recently written off as a political force plagued by past political sins. Also, arguments emphasising Papandreou’s utilisation of Obama-style techniques (an electoral campaign based on hope etc) are inadequate considering that ex-premier Karamanlis was consistently seen as more charismatic than the new PM.
Two factors are central in explaining PASOK’s victory. First, the social democrats have embraced the emerging zeitgeist and focused on policies rather than personalities. Facing the centre-right’s scenario of wage freezes and massive tax hikes was a demand-oriented economic policy programme promising to redistribute income through cautious, reformist politics. Voters faced a clear alternative in economic policy and were attracted by PASOK’s central message – that economic hardship was but an aspect of a much larger picture of discontent, and that establishing a new relationship between the citizen and the state was a must in the new era.
Second is the social democrats’ party renewal effort. Having first won office in 1981, PASOK had been notorious for its centralised and clientelistic practices. Long a party of government, it stood accused of blurring the lines between party and state, allowing the enrichment of party officers at the expense of state coffers. Its 2004 election defeat was to a large extent the result of such phenomena, and even its own supporters had lost faith in the party’s ability to mobilise people behind progressive causes.
After assuming the leadership in 2004, Papandreou began a process of party modernisation. Realising that the old party structures had disconnected the party from society, he took initiatives to promote transparency and accountability. Party candidates are now elected by PASOK’s devolved organs that operate on a local, municipal, regional and national basis. Elected committees of party organs provide a link with the party’s HQs and update the party on local developments. The party leadership has established links with civil society organisations, has placed itself at the forefront of new technologies via Facebook, Twitter etc, and has attracted a new wave of young volunteers by completely restructuring the party’s youth wing. The cornerstone of the inner party revolution is that the party leader is now elected by both party members and ‘friends’ with no previous party affiliation.
What matters most here are not the reforms themselves but the goal guiding them. Politics has been transformed and is now filled with floating voters, weak party links and the decline of traditional constituencies. Progressives should encourage new, horizontal forms of party-society linkages and devolve power-making authority. They can in this way secure the building of alliances that will carry the party message throughout the country and promote citizen engagement. The Greek experience shows that progressives can reap the benefits of a new form of politics.
Dimitris Tsarouhas is assistant professor in European Politics at Bilkent University, Turkey.
GERMANY
In late September, while many of us were absorbed by the Labour party’s conference bubble, Angela Merkel emerged victorious in the country’s federal elections. Her solid and decisive victory left her grand coalition partner in tatters. Labour’s sister party, the SPD, with which she had ruled since 2005, suffered its heaviest defeat in the post-war period (with only 23% of the vote).
Ironically, against the backdrop of global capitalism’s biggest crisis, voters turned in significant numbers to the neo-liberal Free Democrats, whose campaign was dominated by calls for lower taxes and welfare state reform. The FDP uniquely blends right-wing economics with social liberalism. Their success is also surprising given that Germany is traditionally a highly regulated social market economy.
Although Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) and their Bavarian sister party (the CSU) saw a reduction in their proportion of the vote, their overall share of the seats in the Bundestag dwarfs that of the FDP (the CDU/CSU has 239 seats compared to the FDP’s 93). No wonder then that they are glad to be rid of the grand coalition. Moreover, Merkel’s high level of popularity has arguably bolstered her authority. According to a recent poll, three-quarters of Germans believe that she is doing a good job.
The election was widely regarded as extremely dull. This was partly because both the main parties were defending the same record in government – perhaps an inevitable byproduct of grand coalitions. Symptomatically, the only television showdown between Merkel and her SPD opponent, Frank Walter-Steinmeier, was considered a duet rather than a duel.
In contrast to the somewhat boring election, Merkel’s rise to power is as fascinating as it is surprising. It also gives a useful context to what might come next. The once dowdy, Protestant physicist from the former Communist east was catapulted from political obscurity four years ago to become Germany’s first woman chancellor. However, she had an inauspicious start.
In the run up to the 2005 election, her party’s early 21% lead was nearly wiped out. The SPD clawed their way back, even despite their incumbent chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s unpopularity. As a result, Merkel was forced into a ‘grand’ coalition. Her failure to gain a larger proportion of the vote was attributed to the reformist zeal of the CDU-CSU, which partly explains her subsequent move to the centre.
Early on in her chancellorship, she proved impressive on the international stage. During her six-month stint as president of the European Council, she managed to forge an agreement on the EU budget which most thought impossible.
More surprisingly, her domestic profile has been enhanced, rather than dented, by Germany’s economic troubles. Despite her party’s centre-right profile, she has vigorously pursued Keynesian and social democratic policies to ease the pain of the recession. Most notably, there has been a massive fiscal stimulus package, including subsidies to struggling firms to introduce short-time working arrangements rather than lay off workers. These policies led some commentators to conclude that she is more leftwing than Schroeder.
The problem for the SDP is
that not only has Merkel stolen their ideological clothes but the electorate has given her all the credit for steering the German economy through the recession. The fact that her SPD opponent has been the foreign minister for the last five years didn’t help matters, but her personality rather than her policies go a long way in explaining her success. Her charisma is of an unusual brand. She is reassuring, pragmatic and competent. No surprise then that her nickname is ‘Mutti’ (Mommy).
The SPD thus finds itself between a rock and a hard place. Its electorate has been eroded from the right by Merkel’s shift to the centre; and it has been squeezed on the left by the Greens and the Left party (both parties increased their share of the vote in the recent election).
It remains unclear whether the SPD will tack left or move towards the centre. It might well depend on Merkel vacating the centre ground which is far from clear. Although the Economist believes that the election result has set her free to pursue neo-liberal economic reform, it is hard to predict what will be pragmatic Angie’s next move.
Emma Reynolds is Labour’s prospective parliamentary candidate for Wolverhampton North East. She was special adviser to Geoff Hoon in his role as Europe minister and has been a political adviser at the Party of European Socialists