Iran’s regime has been weakened by months of protest. Loss of legitimacy inevitably means loss of authority, and for the hardliners this has meant a narrowing of options for countering protest. In Iran doubts are creeping in everywhere about the regime and undermining its foundations. The institutions of the state are not immune from this and have become less effective in dealing with the growth of opposition.
During the post-election protests last summer, we witnessed divisions
deepening within such bodies of state as the Assembly of Experts, which is responsible for choosing the Supreme Leader, the post held by Ayatollah Khamenei. Some of its members have been canvassing for a change and for the election of a new leader, thus weakening Khamenei and lowering his prestige. At that time there were also reports of Revolutionary Guards servicemen speaking out in support of the opposition.
During the most recent protests there have been eyewitness reports of militia and Guards members refusing to fire on demonstrators, apologising to protesters about using force, and abandoning their posts in the middle of protests. It is impossible to judge the degree of dissatisfaction and doubt about the killing of protesters within the various militias, but that is part of the problem the government is faced with: it just doesn’t know who it can rely on any more.
The doubts have probably begun creeping into the minds of the hardliners themselves, and this is also a big part of the problem they face. The doubts are like grit in a machine, creating uncertainty and paranoia, which inevitably affects decision-making processes. Whatever his doubts he may himself harbour, Khamenei as Supreme Leader wants to create an impression of strength. In part this is due to the fact that he does not want to repeat the mistakes of the Shah, who he believes allowed power to slip from his hands due to weakness and vacillation when confronted in the 1970s by mass protests.
Khamenei makes a show of resolve, but the doubts which the hardliners themselves must feel translates into an unwillingness to use the instruments of repression with full confidence. In recent protests the regime has sometimes lost control of the streets and allowed protesters to stone militias with impunity. What the regime has opted for instead is a policy of piecemeal repression. They have arrested leading opposition figures and demonstrators and shot people selectively, all of which has only created more martyrs and alienated the regime further from the people.
Antagonism has built up over time, while the government has been unwilling or unable to deal with the consequences effectively. The result is that with every fresh wave of anger the government loses a little more credibility and its options are reduced even further. It is a counter-productive process, yet the government keeps on with it as if it were sleep-walking. The opposition have of course been playing their own hand skilfully. By only coming out to demonstrate on public occasions, they avoid a decisive confrontation (which they might well lose at the moment), allow themselves to rest between bouts of demonstrating, and allow time for more and more of the public to be won over.
The government is thus impaled on the horns of a dilemma. If this process continues, a tipping point will be reached and support for the regime will collapse. Itis impossible to tell whether this will actually happen because it’s not easy to gauge the level of support for the regime that still exists, or whether current government tactics will at last succeed. But the opposition has grown stronger, the government weaker, and its remaining options fewer.